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Abstract 
 
Hamas and a Future Palestinian State: A Pragmatic Approach? 
As year 2008 neared its completion, world headlines focused on the fighting between Israel 
and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli announced purpose of this military 
operation was to stop the firing of rockets into southern Israel and of targeting members, 
security forces and infrastructure of those deemed responsible, namely members of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its acronym – Hamas. The fighting followed 
a fragile six-month cease fire between Hamas and Israel as well as nearly three years of Israeli 
and international boycott of Hamas, an isolation policy implemented following Hamas’ 
surprise victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006. This boycott was 
legitimized by Hamas’ history of militant and violent behaviour towards Israel and the peace 
process between Israel and the Palestinians. Notwithstanding the relative unison world 
criticism of Israel’s disproportional use of force in the fighting, the coverage of the conflict, 
and of Hamas in particular, as well as Israeli and international responses following the 
elections of January 2006, are nevertheless important testimonies of Israel’s and the Western 
world’s stigmatized perception of Hamas. This perception centres on an understanding of 
Hamas as an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist organization, whose goals are the destruction of 
Israel and the establishment of a state governed on Shari’a in its stead.  
This dissertation argues that Hamas is, in fact, an organization more flexible with 
regards to its original stated goals, and not just a fundamentalist religious organization basing 
itself on religious ideology and doctrine. This argument is approached by examining two 
different aspects of Hamas’ thoughts regarding a future Palestinian state, the central question 
being: What signifies Palestinian statehood for Hamas? First; by examining Hamas’ 
theoretical thoughts and by discussing its practical behaviour, it is argued that Hamas’ 
philosophical thoughts regarding statehood is not what is commonly perceived in the Western 
world as a fundamentalist Shari’a state, but that it in some ways signifies Western 
conceptions of democracy. Second; by examining Hamas’ approaches and actions in light of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process – the violent, the peaceful and the 
political – it is also argued that Hamas, despite its stated goal of the destruction of the Jewish 
state is willing to compromise on its ideological stand and accept a two-state solution to the 
conflict. 
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“If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your 
friends. You talk to your enemies.” (Moshe Dayan) 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
‘alim (pl. ulema) Scholar, expert (often with reference to religion)   
al-Mithaq Hamas’ 1988 Charter/Covenant 
da’wa Lit. ‘summons’: the call to Islam (preaching)  
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Leftist 
PLO Faction) 
DOP Declaration of Principles (Oslo I Agreement) 
Fatah Palestinian National Liberation Movement 
hadith Lit. ‘narrative’: the oral traditions of Prophet Mohammed 
Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawamah 
al-Islamiyya); acronym means: zeal 
hudna ‘ceasefire’ 
IDF Israel Defense Forces 
ijma’ Consensus 
ijtihad Legal deductive reasoning, independent opinion  
Intifada Lit. ‘shaking off’. ‘Uprising’ 
Islamic Jihad The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine  
(Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filasteen) 
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Hamas’ military wing 
jahiliyya Lit. ‘ignorance’ 
Jihad Lit. ‘struggle’ ((mistakenly) referred to as ‘holy war’) 
mujtahid (pl. mujtahidun) Religious scholar, qualified to perform ijtihad 
PA/PNA Palestinian (National) Authority 
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(Leftist PLO faction) 
PLC Palestinian Legislative Council (the ‘Palestinian 
parliament’) 
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
Shari’a Islamic Law 
shura Consultation 
tahdi’ya ‘cooling off’, period of calm 
umma Global community of Muslims 
waqf (pl. awqaf) Religious endowment  
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Introduction 
 
As year 2008 neared its completion, on 28 December, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
launched Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. The operation was a military campaign 
instigated with the Israeli announced purpose of stopping the firing of rockets into southern 
Israel and of targeting members, security forces and infrastructure of those deemed 
responsible, namely members of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawamah 
al-Islamiyya), better known by its acronym – Hamas. The operation lasted until 21 January 
2009. The fighting followed a fragile six-month cease fire between Hamas and Israel as well 
as nearly three years of Israeli and international boycott of Hamas, an isolation policy 
implemented following Hamas’ surprise victory in the Palestinian parliamentary (PLC) 
elections of January 2006. This isolation policy came about despite the elections having been 
performed in a well organized and democratic manner1, as well as attended by a relative large 
proportion of the Palestinian electorate2, and was legitimized by Hamas’ history of militant 
and violent approaches towards Israel and towards the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Due to the latter, Hamas is also listed as a terrorist organization by several 
Western countries, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) included.3 
The inherent contradiction in this situation – a terrorist organization democratically 
elected – left many analysts at loss, as well as creating a diffuse and difficult scenario in the 
occupied Palestinian territories4; on the one hand, Hamas is using terror tactics against Israel, 
on the other, it participates in law and orderly democratic elections. Further, the parliamentary 
election results of January 2006 meant not only increased tension between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis, but also gave rise to increased infighting between Palestinian factions in the 
occupied Palestinian territories. This was exemplified to its most extreme in the struggle 
between the secular nationalist Fatah party and Hamas in bloody battles for control over the 
                                                 
1 See for instance Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Looking Beyond Elections in Palestine”, 3 
February 2006, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=850-
&&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme.  
2 Nearly 58 per cent of the Palestinian electorate cast a vote in the elections. See Central Elections Commission – 
Palestine, “The Final Result of the Second PLC Election”, at http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=291. 
3 For EU’s terror list see Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 
29 May 2006”, at http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/EUterrorlist-May-06.pdf. For the U.S.’ terror list 
see U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)”, 11 October 2005 at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 
4 By the occupied Palestinian territories I mean the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 
This reflects on my behalf only recognition of this being the most common academic usage, and is not in any 
way coloured by any political interpretation of territory in question which, as stipulated in the Oslo Accords, 
consists of a single territorial entity. 
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Gaza Strip in June 2007. This fighting resulted in a Hamas-led government in the Gaza Strip 
and a Fatah-led government in the West Bank. 
Notwithstanding the relative unison world criticism of Israel’s ‘disproportional use’ of 
force in Operation Cast Lead, the coverage of the conflict, and of Hamas in particular, as well 
as Israeli and international responses following the elections of January 2006, are nevertheless 
important testimonies of Israel’s and the Western world’s stigmatized perception of Hamas. 
This perception centres on an understanding of Hamas as an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist 
movement, whose goals are the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian 
state governed on Shari’a in its stead. Such thinking is also justified in a theoretical approach 
to Islamism and Islamist organizations, mostly advocated by scholars known as the neo-
Orientalists. Their way of thinking is criticized for its view on Islamism with labelling it with 
negative qualities as fundamentalism and radicalism. And that is that so to speak, hence: 
Islamist organizations, basing themselves on a violent and static ideology, are not able or 
willing to change and therefore not compatible with democracy. This theoretical approach is 
also what has lately signified U.S. administrations foreign policy.5 
 
I disagree with such an understanding of Hamas and intend to argue that Hamas is, in fact, a 
movement willing to change its original stated goals, and not just a fundamentalist religious 
movement basing itself on religious ideology and doctrine. I will approach this statement by 
examining two different aspects of Hamas’ thoughts regarding a future Palestinian state, the 
central question being: What signifies Palestinian statehood for Hamas? First; by examining 
Hamas’ philosophical thoughts and by discussing its practical behaviour, I intend to argue that 
Hamas’ thinking regarding Palestinian statehood is not what is commonly perceived in the 
Western world as a fundamentalist Shari’a state, but that it in some ways reflect Western 
conceptions of democracy. Second; by examining Hamas’ approaches and actions in light of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process, I will also argue that Hamas, in spite of 
its stated goal of the destruction of the Jewish state, is and has been since its early evolution, 
willing to compromise on its ideological stand and accept a two-state solution to the conflict. 
Thus, in a discussion of these two aspects of Hamas’ thoughts on Palestinian statehood, I 
intend to show that Hamas is not only a terrorist organization incapable of reform, but indeed 
                                                 
5 Cf. Yakub Halabi, “Orientalism and US Democratization Policy in the Middle East”, International Studies, 
Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999); Halabi, “US Responses to Major Developments in the Arab-Islamic World: Evaluation of 
Role of Ideas”, International Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2006). 
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a movement both willing and able to compromise and modify its ideologies and practices, two 
qualities not common in fundamentalist reasoning. 
Both aspects will be examined in relevance with historical socio-political contexts, as, 
throughout this paper, a main argument will be that Hamas’ thoughts and actions, as well as 
its political and militant practices, are shaped in the historical, cultural, political and social 
landscapes in which it thrives. Thus, an understanding of this contextual environment is 
important in order to understand Hamas’ views and actions. The main socio-political context 
is of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from a Palestinian perspective especially felt 
through the Israeli military occupation following the Six Day War in 1967.  
 
Structure 
I will in Chapter One start by presenting socio-political contexts of historical importance to 
Hamas, beginning with the establishment of Hamas’ mother organization, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in Egypt in 1928, and ending with the birth of Hamas in the late 1980s. Here I 
will argue that the context surrounding Hamas’ very birth already from the very outset altered 
the ideological belief held by its mother organization. It was the socio-political contexts 
created by the Israeli occupation of 1967 that led to the formation of Hamas, and not Islamist 
ideology and doctrine as taught by the Muslim Brotherhood. That Hamas should later show a 
readiness and willingness to compromises and change should therefore not be too surprising.  
This historical introduction will be followed by a theoretical discussion of ‘Islamism’ 
and a presentation of two leading schools of thoughts on the issue, that of the already 
mentioned neo-Orientalists and that of the post-Orientalists. The intention behind this chapter 
is twofold; one generic, the other more specific. First, to set a theoretical framework around 
the issue of Islamism, and second, through a theoretical discussion of Islamism, argue that 
also from a theoretical perspective, the understanding of historical socio-political contexts is 
important. Hence, basing assumptions on Hamas being an Islamist organization not capable of 
change is questionable, also from a theoretical perspective. 
In Chapter Three, I return to an account of historical events and socio-political 
contexts, ranging from the time of Hamas’ birth in late 1987 until end of January 2009. This 
chapter will present and discuss major events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not least 
Hamas’ role in it and will as such provide the necessary background for succeeding analytical 
chapters. By examining Hamas’ role in the peace process I intend to argue that one needs to 
  3 
understand Hamas as a pragmatic player in the conflict and not only a fundamentalist 
response to it. 
This argument will be followed up in more detail in the subsequent three analytical 
chapters. In these chapters, directly seeking to answer the above question on Hamas and 
Palestinian statehood, the main argument will basically be two-folded. First; by examining 
Hamas’ paramount theoretical thoughts on Palestinian statehood in Chapter Four, I will argue 
that a neo-Orientalist understanding of Hamas as an organization not compatible with 
democracy is unfortunate. On the contrary, I will argue that Hamas’ thinking on Palestinian 
statehood reflect an organization advocating for an Islamic state based on the Shari’a which in 
several ways resembles Western conceptions on democracy. 
Second, in Chapter Six, in a discussion on Hamas and a possible two-state solution to 
the conflict with Israel, I will argue that the common perception that Hamas wishes and seeks 
the destruction of the state of Israel is also a truth with important modifications. Hamas is, in 
fact, willing to accept, albeit not unconditionally, a Palestinian state based on the 1949 
Armistice Agreements (the 1967 ‘Green Line’). I will approach this argument by examining 
three different ways Hamas has acted towards Israel and consequently towards the peace 
process and the Palestinian secular nationalists; that of its violent, peaceful, and political 
approaches. Although use of violence and pragmatism may sound contradicting, I intend to 
argue that Hamas’ use of violence is more informed by pragmatic and strategic thinking than 
religious inspiration. This is important, as practices guided by pragmatism and not religious 
ideologies are more likely to change. 
In Chapter Five, I intend to examine new and important Hamas documents to analyse 
Hamas’ more recent ideas as compared to its thoughts reflected in the 1988 Hamas Charter. 
These documents are the political platform Hamas’ joined the 2006 elections on, a Hamas 
draft proposal for a unity government with Fatah and others following Hamas’ victory, and 
the cabinet platform presented by the Hamas Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh (b. 1963) in 
March 2006. These documents have received hardly any attention from Israel and other critics 
of Hamas, and the 1988 Hamas Charter is still the preferred document of reference when 
justifying one’s thoughts on Hamas. I will argue that this is unfortunate, as what these 
documents present is a combination of the two abovementioned arguments – that Hamas’ 
notions on a Shari’a state is to some degree compatible with democracy and that Hamas is 
willing to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
  4 
Theoretical Framework: A ‘Contingenist’ Approach 
As will become clearer in Chapter Two, this dissertation is theoretically influenced by 
contextual and contingenist interpretations of Islam, Islamism and Islamist movements as 
opposed to the essentialist approach of the neo-Orientalists. My main criticism against the 
essentialists is their de-contextual starting point which reflects a stigmatic and categorical 
approach of both Islam and Islamism. This approach is often based and justified in a 
comparison of today’s Islamist movements with the period of classical Islam. From such 
interpretations, accusations of radicalism and fundamentalism are easily made. This 
essentialist account, especially following 9/11, is further characterized by ‘either/or’ and ‘us-
against-them’ rhetoric’.6 
That Islamist movements or Muslim societies in general, should comprise of complex 
and diverse systems and not just of a universal Islamic whole “escapes essentialist accounts 
that only seek to catalog [sic] enemies in opposition to allies.”7 In such an approach there is 
little room for interpretations by examining modern processes such as colonialism, unjust 
governance, economic hardships, poor education and health, etc. The contingenists and the 
post-Orientalists, on the other hand, see Islamism and Islamist movements as a reaction to 
modern processes. It is not Islam or immanent factors in Islam per ce which is the issue. No, 
Islamist movements are instead a consequence of socio-political realities and other contingent 
factors. Context, thus, is of great importance in interpreting Islamist movements. 
My analytical method will therefore centre on contextual analyses of Hamas’ thought 
and actions which explore relationships of agency in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather 
than an approach based on institutional and structural frameworks. Although there is a large 
number of available sources on Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
notwithstanding available Hamas statements and interviews, my argumentation would 
nevertheless have been strengthened by fieldwork. This is probably especially so now, 
following several dramatic and groundbreaking events in the history of Hamas, most 
importantly the Hamas victory in the 2006 PLC elections. Further, not much has been said on 
the more detailed views Hamas has on a Shari’a state. It is tempting to explain this by arguing 
that this is something Hamas has not placed much thought on before, precisely because it has 
                                                 
6 Cf. Shaul Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective”, Armed 
Forces and Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2003). 
7 Nicolas Elliott, “The Future Geopolitical Legitimacy of Islamism: The Case of Hamas” (Honors Thesis, Texas 
State University, 2007), p. 18. 
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not been a realistic reality. Now, however, history may have expedited such philosophical 
thinking and fieldwork would therefore likely have enabled me to obtain new information. 
However, as gaining access to the Gaza Strip proved particularly challenging, and 
since I write this dissertation in less than two semesters, I have chosen to rely on already 
available textual documentation. The dangers of using existing documentation are first and 
foremost centred on the question of reliability. On the other hand, the main scholars on Hamas 
that I am relying on are widely known for their knowledge of the subject of their writings. 
This, however, does of course not subdue any accusations on possible prejudice, but 
complemented with an argumentation that focuses on historical development and contexts, I 
nevertheless consider these secondary sources reliable. This is especially so considering that 
these sources are coupled with primary Hamas documentation as well as statements from 
Hamas leaders and members. 
 
Justified Limitations 
In this dissertation, tackling both the issue of Hamas as an Islamist movement and the issue of 
Hamas as a player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both time and place constraints have 
meant that important elements in understanding Hamas have been neglected. There are in 
particular two omissions that I feel would have strengthened any discussion on Hamas and 
which deserves mentioning here. 
First, Hamas is in the following described mainly as a militant and political player on 
the Israeli-Palestinian arena. However, Hamas have in tandem also continued the social and 
network approach of its mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood: ”Indeed, an estimated 
ninety percent of all Hamas-related activities, including military and political, are consumed 
by its social-welfare initiatives.”8 Had Hamas not focused on such a social agenda among the 
Palestinian population, it is very doubtful that it would have had much popular backing at all. 
The exclusion of this important character of Hamas, on the other hand, is justified by my 
argument that a discussion on Hamas as a social movement would probably not enhance my 
discussion on Hamas and Palestinian statehood. It would absolutely complement it, and as 
such most likely strengthen it, but I doubt that such a discussion would provide with me 
additional answers, especially since I am discussing Hamas’ strong emphasis on society in 
general when discussing its views on Palestinian statehood. 
                                                 
8 Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, “Ideological & Behavioral Metamorphoses: A New Charter for a New Hamas” 
(Master Thesis, Oxford University, 2007), p. 22. 
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Second, another vital and complex factor of Hamas as an Islamist movement is its 
structure and dynamics. This is also not an issue I tackle, neither in regards to internal 
dynamics between the political, social and militant sectors of Hamas, nor in regards to the 
internal-external relations between Diaspora Hamas members and those living in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. Such a discussion would clearly be interesting in it self, as it would 
help to better understand Hamas. There has been argued, for example, that Hamas on the 
‘inside’ have been prudent to more moderation at times of tough Israeli policies in the 
occupied territories than those on the ‘outside’, and that since the 1990s, and especially 
following Israeli assassinations of Hamas ‘inside’ leaders, the outside leadership has assumed 
more and more control.9 This may very well be and a discussion around this would surely be 
interesting, especially in regards to the decision making process in terms of Hamas’ use of 
violence. However, I am not sure revealing answers from such a discussion would give me 
any additional knowledge about a future Palestinian state. As will be discussed in the 
following, Hamas has always placed great significance on consensus and consultation in the 
decision making process. And as I am first and foremost relying on new Hamas documents in 
discussing Hamas’ notions on Palestinian statehood, and since these documents represent 
Hamas’ political participation, it is highly plausible that these documents represent Hamas as 
a ‘whole’. In any case, if it should turn out that the outside leadership is more likely to retort 
to violence, this would also signify an element of Hamas that may be contributed to a 
contextual approach. 
  
Sources 
My primary sources are three new Hamas documents, all of them coming to life following 
Hamas’ decision to participate in the January 2006 elections. The documents are: 1) Hamas’ 
2005 Electoral Platform; 2) The Hamas Draft National Unity Proposal following Hamas’ 
victory in the elections and; 3) The Hamas Cabinet Platform of 27 March 2006.10  These 
                                                 
9 Cf. Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 
2000), pp. 58-9.  
10 These documents have been translated by Khaled Hroub and are available in his “A “New Hamas” Through Its 
New Documents”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Summer 2006). See also and Azzam Tamimi, 
Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), Appendix VI, pp. 274-94 for a complete 
English translation of the Hamas electoral platform. 
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documents become particularly interesting when compared with another primary source; that 
of the Hamas Charter of August 1988.11 
Most of the sources used here, however, are secondary literature. Documentation on 
Hamas and especially on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is immense. Different statements and 
interviews from Hamas members have been found in a wide variety of sources, both in the 
media and among academic scholars. Scholars, who for a long time have commented and 
written on Hamas and which I have relied particularly on are Khaled Hroub, Shaul Mishal and 
Avraham Sela, Azzam Tamimi and Jeroen Gunning.12 In terms of literature on Islamism and 
Islamist movements Ziad Abu Amr13 and Beverly Milton-Edwards14 among others have been 
used, and in terms of the more general political and historical literature on the conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians, Mark Tessler15 and Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. 
Klausner16 have to a large extent been relied on. For a complete listing of literature, please 
refer to the Bibliography section.  
 
Miscellaneous 
I have not followed a specific transliteration system when writing this dissertation. Instead, I 
have used my own transliterations of the Arabic language or used the same transliterations as 
in the sources referred to. Translations of Arabic words are in any case given, although 
normally only the first time of mentioning. In terms of footnoting, I rely on Chicago 15th, A 
Style. All electronic sources were accessible at listed website addresses as of 4 April 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Complete English translated version available in Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Appendix 2), 
pp. 267-91. 
12 Hroub’s Hamas: Political Thought and Practice and Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela’s The Palestinian 
Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) were two of the first 
comprehensive accounts on the movement and are widely referred to by later scholars such as Tamimi and 
Jeroen Gunning who both emphasises Hamas’ pragmatic behaviours in their Hamas: Unwritten Chapters and 
Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), respectively. 
13 Ziad Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism and the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic 
Jihad (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
14 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). 
15 Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1994). 
16 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Fifth ed., New Jersey: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2007). 
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Chapter One: From the Muslim Brotherhood to the Formation of 
Hamas 
 
Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood that originated in the late 1920’s Egypt. The 
Brotherhood’s view on statehood is centred on the concept of Shari’a. How the realization of 
such a state in Palestine should be achieved is the main focus in this history chapter.  I 
approach this by contextualizing events leading to the formation of Hamas, and by arguing 
that the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine followed the ‘gradualist’ approach among Islamist 
movements, that is; in order to establish an Islamic state, it is first necessary to educate the 
masses. 
In this chapter, I intend to show that knowledge of the contextual surroundings of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, of which Hamas grew out from, is crucial in understanding 
the formation of Hamas. In its outmost; had not history developed as it did, with an Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in June 1967, Hamas as an entity would 
probably not have been a reality. In it self, this is not a groundbreaking statement. However, 
when looking at the ideological framework of Hamas’ mother organization with regards to 
creating an Islamic state, the above argument becomes more interesting, precisely because the 
formation of Hamas breaks away with the ideological tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Put differently; had the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to its ideological approach, Hamas as an 
organization would not have been born. Context and history, however, would see it otherwise. 
I approach this by chronologically examining three historical context periods, each 
representing different socio-political realities in Palestine17, important both in an 
understanding of Hamas and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first period starts with the 
foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its establishment and early life in British 
mandatory Palestine, and ends with the formation of the state of Israel. The second period 
describes the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood under Jordanian and Egyptian rule until June 
1967, a period which also witnessed the formation of Palestinian nationalism. The third period 
starts with the Israeli occupation following the Six Day War in 1967 and ends with the 
outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in late 1987 and the formation of 
Hamas just days later. This period also witnessed an ‘Islamic revival’, a factor crucial for the 
formation of Hamas. 
 
                                                 
17 By Palestine I here mean the geographical boundaries of what today constitute Israel and the Palestinian 
occupied territory (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip). 
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The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwaan al-muslimun) was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan 
al-Banna (1906-49). Initially it started as a movement for reform of individual and social 
moral, although its broader political significance soon grew to challenge secular leadership in 
Muslim societies. Its strategy for change was to facilitate a Muslim society through programs 
in education, charity and social activities.18 Transferred into the religious-political realm, the 
goal of the organization became to establish an Islamic society by applying Shari’a law in 
Egypt, and in the Muslim world more broadly. 
The most influential Brotherhood intellectual next to al-Banna is Sayyed Qutb (1906-
66), who argued that contemporary Egyptian society, by embracing Westernization and 
secularization, had re-emerged as a society of jahiliyya – a state of polytheistic chaos marked 
by ‘ignorance’ of God. The solution for a true believer in such a god-forsaken society was “to 
withdraw into separated communities of the faithful, purify his consciousness of foreign 
values, and then reengage society through missionary outreach and, when the moment was 
right, join in outright revolution.”19 When the ‘moment was right’ has subsequently been an 
issue of debate within the Brotherhood, mainly between those labelled the ‘gradualists’ and 
the ‘radicals’. These two groups both reflect the ideas and actions of al-Banna and of Qutb as 
both leaders were assassinated by the Egyptian government and have as such been 
conceptualized with martyrdom and jihad.20 But both have also been understood as images of 
a pious saint, “a living manifestation of the spirit of the shari’a”21 arguing for the necessity of 
purification and education of the society before the time to strike against the un-believers was 
right. 
These two concepts have also shaped the Brotherhood’s relations with the Egyptian 
government, which have consequently been one of both repression and toleration. In 1954, the 
government initiated a severe crackdown of the Brotherhood following an assassination 
attempt on President Jamal Abd al-Nasser (1918-70). Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat (1918-
81) approached the Islamists on more friendly terms and a general amnesty was declared in 
1971. However, this relaxed atmosphere led to a formation of more radical movements “some 
                                                 
18 Cf. Quintan Wicktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, the: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
State Power in Jordan (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 4. 
19 Loren D. Lybarger, Identity &Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism & Secularism in the 
Occupied Territories (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 77. Emphasis added. 
20 Agents of the Egyptian security forces carried out the killing of al-Banna on 12 February 1949. The attack was 
in retaliation for the killing of Egyptian Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi by a Brotherhood activist on 28 December 
1948. Qutb was sentenced to death by Nasser’s government and executed on 29 August 1966 following a plot to 
assassinate Nasser was revealed. Ibid., p. 76. 
21 Ibid. 
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of which began organizing clandestinely to take power”22 which again resulted in new rounds 
of repression. It culminated in the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. In 1995, Sadat’s 
successor and present president, Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928), narrowly escaped an assassination 
attempt on his life. Although not directly involved in the incident, the Muslim Brotherhood 
never condemned the more militant offshoots among the Islamist ranks in Egypt. This was 
also the case after numerous attacks against the tourist industry in the country. Based on this, 
the Egyptian government started a crack-down against the Brotherhood in the 1990s, and all 
political parties mixing politics with religion were proscribed.23 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 
The Brotherhood’s involvement in Palestine began in 1936, when Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, 
Hassan al-Banna’s brother, met with the mufti of Jerusalem. The Brotherhood’s commitment 
to the Palestinian cause was “driven by its doctrinaire perspective and faith in the concept of 
one Islamic nation and the brotherhood of all Muslims and the imperative to engage in jihad 
for the cause of God.”24 In the early 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood founded its first 
Palestinian branches in Palestine, and by 1947 there were around 38 branches and over 10,000 
registered Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood members.25 
The day before the British Mandate over Palestine expired, on 14 May 1948, David 
Ben Gurion (1886 – 1973) proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel. Over the 
following days Arab countries went to war against the newly established state, and Lebanese, 
Iraqi, Egyptian and Syrian forces poured into the area. Hamas scholar Khaled Hroub notes 
that the Palestine question was the “driving force behind the expansion of the Muslim 
Brotherhood across the region.”26 The Brotherhood’s early involvement in Palestine was 
social, political and military, especially in the years prior to, and during the 1948 War. In 
March 1948, al-Banna, noted that he had around 1,500 volunteers in Palestine.27 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 On 17 November 1997, militants from al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) and Jihad Talaat al-Fath 
(Holy War of the Vanguard of the Conquest), killed 60 tourists inside the site of the Hatshepsut’s Temple near 
Luxor, Egypt. Cf. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (New Edition, London: Tauris I.B., 2008), p. 
277. 
24 Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 13. 
25 Sources vary over the number of Muslim Brotherhood branches and members in the early days of the 
Movement in Palestine. Cf. Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 27, Ziad Abu-Amr, “A Historical and Political 
Background”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer 1993), p. 6. 
26 Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 14. 
27 Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism and the West Bank and Gaza, p. 2. 
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The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood following the 1948 War 
The outcome of the war, known as the War of Independence for the Israelis and al-Nakba (the 
Catastrophe) for the Palestinians, was concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. As a 
consequence of the war, the West Bank fell under the auspices of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Gaza Strip became administered by Egypt. With Jordan annexing the West 
Bank in 1950, its inhabitants became Jordanian citizens, and the Brotherhood branches in the 
West Bank united with the branches on the East Bank of the River Jordan. The Brotherhood 
in the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, formed close links with the mother organization in 
Egypt. As a result, the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and in the 
Gaza Strip weakened.28 
Relations between the Brotherhood in the West Bank and the Jordanian government 
were relatively good, with the government allowing the ‘Brothers’ to pursue its activities 
openly. However, active involvement in Jordan’s political affairs was not tolerated. Nor 
would Jordan allow any military activity, either internal or any cross-border operations 
against Israel, and as such, there was no tradition of armed resistance towards Israel.29 The 
Brotherhood, therefore, had little choice but to focus on its social and religious activities; in 
other words, it advocated the gradual ‘Islamization’ of society through education and 
adherence to Islamic principles. 
In the Gaza Strip, the situation was different with the Egyptian government 
persecuting the movement. The fact that the Egyptian government in 1949, and later under 
Nasser in 1954, illegalized the Muslim Brotherhood, gave it the experience in building 
decentralized and clandestine organizations.30 The difficult situation it experienced due to the 
persecution by the Egyptian authorities reduced the movement’s following, and the Gaza 
branch experienced a devastating blow and almost disappeared with the remaining members, 
consisting of students, teachers, and workers, going completely underground. The most 
visible political activities of the Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip started in 1955, when they 
joined other political groups and initiated violent mass demonstrations protesting a proposed 
plan to resettle Palestinian refugees in the Sinai Peninsula.31 In the early 1950s, certain 
                                                 
28 Cf. Hroub, Hamas: Political Though and Practice, pp. 19-20. 
29 Ibid., pp. 22-3. 
30 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement”, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 
ed., Quintan Wictorowicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 120. 
31 This plan, agreed to in June 1953 by Egypt and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 
aimed at relocating 50,000 to 60,000 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip to areas in the north-western Sinai 
desert. See Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, pp. 8-9. 
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elements within the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood also organized military cells to engage in 
armed struggle against Israel.  
The 1950s and early 1960s experienced the births of a number of new political 
organizations, chief among them the Communist movement and two pan-Arab secular 
nationalist parties; the Ba’th party and the Arab Nationalist Movement. In the mid-1950s, 
Fatah also began to emerge. Competition for members increased.  
 
Palestinian Nationalism 
Dissatisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the Palestine question, Khalil al-Wazir 
(1935-88), a Brotherhood member since 1951, wrote in June 1957 a memorandum calling for 
“the Palestinian Brotherhood [to] establish a special organization alongside their own, that 
would not appear outwardly as Islamist, but rather would promote the slogan of liberating 
Palestine through armed struggle.”32 The Brotherhood dismissed the proposal. The idea of 
what later became Fatah, the reversed acronym of Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini or 
the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, emerged in the minds of al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) 
and other young Palestinian refugees, notably Yasser ‘Arafat (1929-2004), and Salah Khalaf 
(1933-91) who met in Cairo in the early 1950s. These men agreed on the principles of what 
later were to become the political thinking of Fatah. Most important among these principles 
was the idea that the Palestinians had to take responsibility for their own future, and that only 
an autonomous organization of their own could reverse their fortune. Further, the way to 
reach the goal of liberation of Palestine was through armed struggle. This goal took 
precedence over the goals of Arab unity and Pan-Arabism.33 
Rather than adopt the Fatah option for the liberation of Palestine, the Muslim 
Brotherhood chose to consolidate the power of its existing organization by continuing 
pedagogical and proselytizing activities, in the expectation that, when it succeeded in its 
mission, it would liberate Palestine with the support of the entire Islamic world. The 
Brotherhood argued that Fatah’s tactics were impractical and doomed to fail, and above all 
“alien to the strategy of the mother [Muslim Brotherhood] organization.”34  This tactic, 
however, seemed to bear little fruits, and the Brotherhood was struggling in gaining 
                                                 
32 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC: Oxford University Press), 1997, p. 84. 
33 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (Second printing, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 213. 
34 Hroub, Hamas: Political Though and Practice, p. 27. 
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supporters, a situation made worse by Nasser’s offensive against the movement, and the 
appeal he had as a Pan-Arab nationalist leader. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood under Israeli Rule 
The intense fighting during six days in June 1967 resulted in an overwhelming and complete 
Israeli victory over the joint Arab armies of Jordan, Egypt and Syria. As a consequence, Israel 
mastered the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in addition to the Golan Heights and 
the Sinai Peninsula.35 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine continued in the years following the Israeli 
occupation to concentrate on “the upbringing of an Islamic generation”36 through the 
establishments of religious schools, charity associations, sports clubs, medical clinics, etc. 
Islamic education was however not enough for a population desperate for liberation from 
occupation. This strengthened the Palestinian nationalist resistance movement, and the 
Islamists, on their side, lost many potential adherents with their Islamization first approach.  
Some factors, however, organizational and objective, as well as internal and external 
developments, were to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist cause. 
 
Islamic Revival in the occupied Palestinian territories  
The Six Day War itself was one of the main factors helping to raise Islamism as a way of 
political thinking in Palestine and in the Arab world in general. This was mostly due to the 
blow that Arab Nationalism and the politics of Nasser took following the defeat in the war. 
The immense rise in oil prices following the 1973 oil boycott was another factor.37 The 
enormous amount of petrol dollar this boycott won Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, 
countries with a strong Islamic orientation, meant more funding to the Islamists in an attempt 
to counter the more secular leadership of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and the Palestine Liberation 
                                                 
35 Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisa, Morocco and Algeria also contributed arms and personnel to the Arab forces. For a 
thorough account of the Six Day War see Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the 
Modern Middle East (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
36 Abu Amr, “A Historical and Political Background”, p. 7. 
37 In October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) proclaimed an oil-
embargo in response to the U.S. administration’s decision to re-supply the Israeli military during the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War between Arab states and Israel. Cf. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 476 
and 480-1. 
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Organization (PLO).38 Other external factors helping to give attention to Islamism were two 
incidents taking place in 1979, the first a victory for Islam, the other a threat to it; namely the 
Iranian revolution and the founding of an Islamic state, and the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan.  
On the other hand, even though Arab nationalism suffered from the defeat in the Six 
Day War, Palestinian nationalism did not. The outcome of the Six Day War thus allowed the 
secular nationalists to take centre-stage in the newly occupied Palestinian territories. 
Advocating that the Palestinians had to take matters into their own hands to fight of 
occupation and oppression, the various nationalist and Marxist-nationalist Palestinian factions 
succeeded in 1969 in taking over the, until then, elite-dominated PLO. This provided the 
nationalists with an important organizational structure and legitimacy, and in the early 1970s, 
they were viewed by most Palestinians as the main opposition to the Israeli occupation. This 
feeling was ‘ratified’ in 1974 when the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole, 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was not able to compete. In the Gaza Strip, it 
lacked organizational structure, and in the West Bank, its leadership was in disarray, having 
been severed from its headquarters in Jordan. However, relations and organizational structures 
were to improve. The outcome of the war, although separating the West Bank from Jordan, 
also meant that the relations between the Brotherhood branches in ‘Palestine total’ became 
closer connected after being united under the same power. In the 1970s they thus joined 
together in the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine, enhancing 
organizational and strategic planning for the movement. Further, in 1973, al-Mujamma’ al-
Islami (the Islamic Centre) was created in Gaza by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (1937-2004), 
followed in 1976 by the al-Jam’iyyah al-Islam’iyya (the Islamic Association). Both focused 
on educational, social and welfare programmes in areas traditionally neglected by others; the 
refugee camps and poor urban areas, both areas with high population density. The years 
following the occupation of 1967 also saw a drastic increase in mosque construction. In the 
two decades following the occupation, the number of mosques in the West Bank nearly 
doubled from 400 to 750 and in the Gaza Strip it tripled, rising from 200 to 600.39 
                                                 
38 Cf. Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 32; Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 12. 
The PLO was established in 1964 in Jerusalem, following an earlier decision taken in the Arab League. Its goal, 
echoing that of Fatah, was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. Cf. Tessler, A History of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 373. 
39 Cf. Abu Amr, “A Historical and Political Background”, p. 8. 
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Islamism in the occupied Palestinian territories also gained more ground due to an 
emerging dissatisfaction with the secular nationalists. The PLO experienced serious setbacks, 
such as the eviction in Jordan of the PLO in the early 1970s and the Israeli invasion of 
southern Lebanon in 1982 which forced the PLO leadership to seek refuge in Tunis. 
Following the October War (Ramadan War/Yom Kippur War) with Israel in 1973, the PLO 
also started to consider the idea of political and diplomatic solutions to the conflict with 
Israel, something that later developed into the idea of a two-state solution to the conflict. The 
failure of the PLO to live up to its promises, its organisational problems, and its changing of 
political positions, all contributed to increased distancing from secular nationalist views to 
Islamist views instead.40 
Yet another factor that helped increase awareness of both nationalist and Islamist ideas 
among the Palestinian population was the influx of universities from the mid-1970s onwards. 
The first was Birzeit University in 1975, and later Bethlehem, Al Najah (Nablus) and Al 
Khalil (Hebron) Universities followed suit. In the Gaza Strip, the first university to be 
founded was the Islamic University, established in 1978. After 1976, when the Israeli military 
administration banned Palestinian municipal elections in the occupied territories, the 
universities, together with different professional unions, became the main arena for political 
contestation. The Muslim Brotherhood saw new opportunities to gain supporters in this 
political environment, especially as many of the students were from the lower classes and had 
grown up in the more conservative refugee camps and urban areas. Not only did the 
Brotherhood’s religious agenda appeal to them, but the insufficiency of the PLO to live up 
their promises, despite a decade of dominance, was beginning to influence negatively on the 
secular nationalists. By the end of the 1970s, and into the early 1980s, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its Islamist agenda, therefore, started to gain more and more ground inside 
the occupied territories. 
However, there were those among the Islamists who disliked the no-willingness of the 
Brotherhood to take on an active military role against Israeli oppression and occupation. 
Instrumental in this regard was Fathi Al-Shiqaqi (1951-95), a former Brotherhood member, 
who, inspired by the Iranian revolution, started to recruit young Palestinians frustrated with 
the Islamists lack of military action against Israel. The outcome of this was to become the 
Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, better known as Islamic Jihad. The almost exclusive 
                                                 
40 By the summer of 1986 a public opinion survey conducted in the occupied Palestinian territories showed that 
only 10.4% of those interviewed preferred a ‘democratic, secular’ Palestinian state. 29.6% preferred it to be a 
state based on ‘Arab nationalism and Islam’ and 26.5% wanted a state based solely on ‘Islamic Law’. Cf. 
Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict, p. 675. 
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hegemony of the Brotherhood over Muslim activity in Palestine was broken and with it the 
question of what its role in resisting occupation should be increased in relevance.41 Should it 
continue with its peaceful, educational approach, thereby risking to loose members to the 
Islamic Jihad and the secular PLO, or should it itself engage in military activism against 
Israel, and as such face Israeli oppression and the risk of loosing its built-up organizational 
structure? New developments arising made the question even more relevant. 
 
The Intifada 
On 8 December 1987, a motor accident involving an Israeli truck and small vehicles 
transporting Palestinian workers, killing four and seriously injuring seven, triggered the riots 
that spread and evolved into what became known as the Intifada (‘uprising’). Many 
Palestinians believed that the incident was a deliberate action of Israeli revenge against the 
Palestinian killing of an Israeli in the Gaza Strip days before and the riots soon spread to the 
West Bank. The images of stone-throwing Palestinian youths facing armed Israeli soldiers 
appeared daily in the world news and brought back the Palestinian issue on the agenda of 
world politics. 
Twenty years of occupation had created anger, feeling of humiliation, despair and 
frustration among the Palestinians. An entire generation of Palestinians had by now grown up 
under Israeli rule and experienced their land and water resources confiscated. Further, Israeli 
established Jewish settlements and military camps and security zones had left the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip fragmented, both demographically and geographically.42 Israel’s ‘Iron Fist 
policy’43 resulted in Palestinian casualties, detention and imprisonment, curfews of towns, 
villages and educational institutions, house demolitions, deportations, economic hardship, and 
so on. In addition to Israel’s policies, and with what the Palestinians perceived as an Israeli 
                                                 
41 Hizb Tahrir (the Liberation Party) was founded already in 1952 as a breakaway faction of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine. The movement had a more radical agenda than the reformist approach of the mother 
organization and gained relatively few supporters. Cf. Are Knudsen, “Crescent and Sword: The Hamas Enigma”, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 8 (2005), p. 1375. 
42 By early 1988, there were approximately 64,000 Israelis living in 125 Jewish settlements in the West Bank 
(East Jerusalem excluded) and 2,400 in 18 Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. Cf. Tessler, A History of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 671-3. 
43 Israeli actions in the occupied territories was routinely described as an “iron fist” policy and included 
deportations, press censorship, and such forms of collective punishment as curfews and the demolition of homes. 
Cf. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 671; Bickerton and Klausner, A History of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, p. 226. 
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unwillingness to compromise44, other catalytically factors are also helpful in understanding 
the outbreak of the first Intifada; the PLO’s failure to deliver on their promises; a feeling 
among the Palestinians that the outside world, especially the Arab, had forgotten about 
Palestine in light of the developments in the Iran-Iraq War and the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. Add to this a dominantly young Palestinian population mixed with an influx of 
universities and colleges from the 1970s onwards that had produced mass numbers of 
educated men and women. However, due to both Israeli restrictions and lesser jobs in the Gulf 
region, there were few job opportunities. Putting these variables together, one should not be 
too surprised of the violence and civil disobedience that erupted inside the occupied territories 
and spread to Israel, and which lasted until 1993. 
 
The Formation of Hamas 
Scholars disagree with regards to the nature of relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the outbreak of the Intifada. Abu Amr states that the Intifada took the Brotherhood by 
surprise,45 whilst Tamimi, although acknowledging that “no one took the decision to ignite 
the Intifada” 46,  still argues that the Muslim Brotherhood anticipated its coming, and that they 
had prepared for it since the early 1980s. Or according to Hroub who saw:  
                                                
 
the joint eruption of the intifada and emergence of Hamas [as] the culmination 
of two parallel, but not separate, curves of changes, one national and one 
partisan. While the first reflected the general Palestinian mood toward the 
deadlock that was facing their national cause, the second represented the 
increasing consciousness of resistance and confrontation among the 
Palestinian Islamists.47 
 
Whatever the case, on 9 December 1987, one day after the Intifada began, the Political 
Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza gathered in the house of Sheikh Yassin. The 
group consisted of Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, Dr. Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Isa al-Nashshar, 
Muhammed Sham’a, Salah Shehada and Abd al-Fattah Dukhan. As they saw it, they had no 
option but to seize the opportunity and they “needed to exploit it [the Intifada] to the limit of 
 
44 Important in this regard is the 1982 Fez Plan who accepts Israel’s right to exist, a plan drafted by the Arab 
states themselves and not by a third party, and the Palestinian-Jordan Accord of February 1985 which made no 
reference to an independent Palestinian state. Cf. Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and 
Gaza, p. 57; Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, pp. 533-677. 
45 Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, pp. 59-63.  
46 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 52. 
47 Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 36. 
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their ability, in order to reinstate themselves as leaders of the jihad to liberate Palestine.”48 
This group of people became the first Hamas leadership and they established several 
leadership wings in the political, security, military and information spheres. 
On 14 December 1987, they issued a statement calling on the Palestinian people to 
stand up to the Israeli occupation. Looking back, Hamas considers this its first serialized 
leaflet, although the organization did not identify itself as such until February 1988, when it 
issued leaflets under the name ‘Hamas’.49 
 
Conclusion 
I stated in the introduction to this chapter that the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, from 
which Hamas grew out of, envisioned Islamization of society as a central element in 
achieving statehood in Palestine. Basing themselves on al-Banna’s ‘bottom-up’ approach, it 
was first necessary to educate the masses into wanting an Islamic state. In light of this, and 
from this discussion of historical events leading up the formation of Hamas in late 1987, what 
seems clear is that the approaches the Muslim Brotherhood identifies to reach the ultimate 
goal of Shari’a statehood in Palestine, is highly influenced by the contextual surroundings in 
which it finds itself. 
Immediate prior to, and during 1948, active resistance was necessary in order not to 
loose Palestine, host of the third holiest site in Islam and the first qibla for Muslims in prayer. 
However, between the wars of 1948 and 1967, the authorities were no longer foreign rule, but 
Arab and Muslim, and the socio-political circumstances in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
respectively triggered a focus on organizational, educational and social approach. The Israeli 
occupation in 1967 brought back ‘foreign’ non-Muslim rule and presented the Arab world a 
devastating loss, not only territorial, but in the mind as well. Palestine was lost, and so was 
Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism. For the Muslim Brotherhood, redemption of Palestine 
would come only through education on Islamic principles of the Palestinian population. 
However, the hardship the Palestinians under occupation encountered, coupled with the rise 
of Islamic Jihad and the continued efforts of the PLO distanced the Brotherhood and its 
Islamization approach from the Palestinian population. A consequence was the creation of 
                                                 
48 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 52. 
49 Cf. Michael Irving Jensen, The Political Ideology of Hamas: A Grassroots Perspective (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2009), p.18. 
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Hamas, an organization combining nationalism and religious sentiments by approaching to 
actively seek to install an Islamic state by first fighting off Israel. 
 
I will in the next chapter discuss Islamism in light of some leading thoughts on the subject.  
By so doing, I again intend to show that the contextual surroundings, also from a theoretical 
point of view, are crucial in any understanding of Hamas and Palestinian statehood. 
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Chapter Two: The Islamic Revival and Leading Thoughts on 
Islamism 
 
The term ‘Islamism’ is a controversial one. It was originally first used by French academics 
around the early 1980s to “signify the belief among radical Muslims that political and social 
action should be based on Islam.”50 Recently, the word ‘Islamism’ has been used in a similar 
way in the United States and European circles. Today, a definition of Islamism usually 
evolves around “Islam as interpreted or reformulated to support political and social action.”51 
It is also know as ‘Political Islam’, ‘Fundamentalist Islam’, ‘Radical Islam’, ‘Militant Islam’, 
etc., and grew to significance in the Middle East following different unfolding events; such as 
the Israeli victory over Arab forces in the Six Day War, the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, and 
the assassination of Sadat in 1981, among other. 
Today, Islamist actors and organizations, slogans and ideologies have become a 
visible feature in Muslim political and social life in the Middle East. It seems that Islam as a 
religion was politicized, in that it “possesses a theory of politics and the State.”52 This theory 
was used by Islamist activists to argue for Islamic principles in their contemporary 
surroundings, surroundings that in many ways were under pressure from ‘modernity’. 
However, the driving force behind this revival of Islam has not only been the challenges of 
modernity. Islamists have often been opposed to, and grown as a consequence of, internal 
challenges, such as popular folk Islam, which they argue include religio-magical practices53, 
and as a result of differences between shi’a and sunni followers. Islamism is therefore both a 
result of internal and external factors in the age of modernity.  
In this chapter I will focus on Islamism as a phenomenon; how it came to significance, 
and which thoughts that are leading in analysing it. 
 
                                                 
50 See Olivier Roy, (ed.), trans. by J. King, The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism (New York: Columbia 
University Press; English edition, 2007), p. 170. Mozaffari notes that ‘Islamism’ was first used by French writers 
at the end of the 17th century, by figures such as Voltaire and Tocqueville among others. These early chapters on 
the subject Islamism, however, sidelined it with ‘Islam’ until the First World War. See Mehdi Mozaffari “What 
is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 
1 (March 2007), pp. 17-18.  See also Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?”, Middle 
East Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 2003) for a good summary on the naming of the Islamic revival. 
51 Cf. “Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1999), Electronic 
article at http://www.meforum.org/article/447. 
52 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Reprinted paperback edition, London: 
Routledge, 1994), p. ix 
53 Cf. Beverly Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (Second edition, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008), p. 135. 
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The Islamic Revival 
Ever since the prophet Muhammad established the first Muslim community in Medina in the 
seventh century, Islam has been understood as ”establishing the rules for a political as well as 
religious community”54 and has “provided an inherent sense of [God’s] unity (tawhid) to the 
Muslim and his or her community (umma).”55 Based on this it has been argued that religion 
and politics in Islam is bounded together, with no separation of the state and the mosque, 
something that has left some scholars to refer Islamism as religio-politics.56 This view has, 
however, been challenged by others who claim that such a linkage is historically not true, and 
that Muslim thinkers have always held a variety of views about the relationship between 
Islam and politics.57 
 
Modern Islamic Thought 
Two of Islamic modernism’s most important thinkers are the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh 
(1849-1905) and the Syrian Rashid Rida (1865-1935). They both based their thinking on 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), original a shi’a Muslim from Iran, and they sought to 
modernize Islam in order for it to fit with the new modern society. Reinterpretation (ijtihad) 
was therefore necessary. They argued that some practices of Islam were no longer relevant 
and they therefore claimed the right and necessity to formulate new regulations.58 The 
modern-Islamic thinkers were therefore both internally and externally motivated as they 
explained the reasons for the decay of Islam as results of both bad leadership and the threat of 
European colonialism. Out of this grew Islamic Modernism in which science and learning 
from the West did not pose a threat, as it did for the pre-modern (revivalist) Islamic thinkers 
such as Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92). Instead, it was argued, it was necessary to 
study and take usage of new modern inventions. Islam and science, revelation and reason 
were compatible, and Muslims should therefore selectively appropriate aspects of Western 
civilization that were not contrary to Islam. 
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In his later years, and following his mentor Abduh’s death in 1905, Rida moderated 
his embracement of the West and argued that Muslim reformers must not look to the West, 
but rather return to the sources of Islam. In this way, Rida is “representing a trend called salafi 
Islam, meaning or pertaining to the good ‘ancestral` example and tradition of Prophet 
Mohammed, his companions and the first four caliphs rather than the centuries of Muslim rule 
which followed.”59 Whereas Abduh was more a social reformer, Rida’s arguments reflected 
matters more in the political realm and “examined the decline of Islam in relation to the 
nature of the state and balance of power therein.”60 In this, he greatly influenced later Islamic 
thinkers. 
 
Neo-Revivalist Islamic Thought 
As opposed to the modern Islamists who called for a modernization of Islam for it to fit with 
the new world, the neo-revivalists, on the other hand, argued for an ‘Islamization’ of the 
society in order for society to adjust with original Islam. Important figures in this respect were 
Hassan al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb as well as the Indian Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-
79). For them, it was necessary to transform the society from within in order to create an 
Islamic oriented state modelled on the example of the Prophet and his first Islamic revolution 
against the unbelievers. They argued that Islam is an all-embracing ideology, that religion and 
society and the relationship of Islam to all aspects of life follow from the Islamic doctrine of 
tawhid, and that sovereignty over all creation is embodied in the nature of the Shari’a: “The 
sharia is a complete scheme of life and an all embracing social order.”61 
Like the revivalists and the modernists, the neo-revivalists upheld the importance of, 
and the right to, reinterpretation of the scriptures. But unlike modernists who looked to the 
West and provided an Islamic rationale for the appropriation of Western learning, the neo-
revivalists emphasized the perfection and comprehensiveness of Islam. All that Muslims 
needed could be found in Islamic tradition. Although accepting the modernist interpretation of 
traditional concepts of consultation (shura) and community consensus they noted that in an 
Islamic state the will of the people remained subordinate to the divine will. Mawdudi called 
this a ‘theo-democracy’ to distinguish it from a theocracy, or clergy state, as he rejected. For 
the neo-revivalists, an Islamic state could never mean that the majority of the people had the 
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power to legislate laws that contradicted to Islamic principles. On the other hand, the ruling 
authorities could also not pass laws without consulting the community. 
Further, by emphasizing the universality of Islam, the neo-revivalists rejected 
nationalism and European-inspired legal codes, and called instead for an Islamic state to be 
governed on the principles of the Shari’a. However, both al-Banna and Mawdudi approached 
this in a more pragmatic way, realizing that pan-Islamic aspirations had to give way to more 
realistic political realities. The focus of al-Banna and Mawdudi became therefore Egypt and 
Pakistan, respectively. 
 
Radical Islamic Thought 
Today, when talking about Islamic activism and Islamism, particularly after 9/11 and the 
subsequent ‘Bush Doctrine’ and ‘War on Terror’, stereotypes of radical and fundamentalist 
suicide bombers are often used. Notwithstanding the section below discussing different 
schools on thought on Islamism, one can not oversee the fact that several of the Islamist 
movements, Hamas included, have used radical and violent means to advocate their agenda. 
As touched upon in the previous chapter, an ideological background and theoretical 
understanding of this can be traced among the cadres of the neo-revivalists in the split 
between those labelled the gradualists and the radicals.  
As we saw, Al-Banna advocated a return to the roots of Islam, and although not 
initially a political movement, it soon grew to challenge secular leadership in Muslim 
societies. Under al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood focused on a gradual-reformist approach 
by emphasizing in the grass root society the need for a return to the original Islam; to the 
Quran, the Prophet and age of the ‘rightly guided caliphs’. In this, the Muslim Brotherhood 
based their thinking on Rida. However, Al-Banna’s death came at a time of deep crisis for the 
Islamic umma; the loss of Palestine to Israel in 1948 as well as the region-wide tendencies 
towards Arab Nationalism. Following this, a split inside the Brotherhood erupted. The 
gradualists argued for al-Banna’s original preaching and education mantra (da’wa wa tabligh) 
to persuade people to get back to Islam, and then first on a later stage act for political change 
by undermining the “existing political order and contest the legitimacy of those who claimed 
to rule in the name of Islam.”62 
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Sayyed Qutb, who after al-Banna’a death became the Muslim Brotherhood’s principal 
ideological thinker, advocated a more radical approach which aim was the overthrow of 
jahiliyya governments and rulers. Whereas al-Banna argued for a gradual change within the 
society, Qutb went further when he advocated for jihad (holy war) against un-Islamic 
governments with the purpose of establishing an Islamic state. For Qutb and his followers, 
change had to come, not from within, but from above. However, the distinction is not 
necessary that clear. As some academics argue, Qutb himself was more prudent, neither ruling 
violence out nor actively advocating it. “What is certain is that, contrary to much academic 
opinion, for Qutb the call to jihad was made in its broadest sense – striving for the liberation 
of the soul, of the individual through education, a return to faith and disengagement, where 
possible, from a state system of contested legitimacy.”63 
Qutb’s influence can, therefore, be seen as a ‘two option – evolution; an agenda that 
both seeks reform from below and revolutionary change by violently overtake the 
government. 
 
Leading Thoughts on Islamism 
As the Islamic revival grew in importance so did the study of Islamism and Islamist 
movements, and during the 1980s and 1990s it emerged as important subjects of scholarly 
debate and investigations. In the following, I will focus on two leading schools of thoughts on 
Islamism; that of the neo-Orientalists and that of the post-Orientalists.   
 
The Neo-Orientalists 
Islamism has also been labelled ‘Fundamentalist Islam’, ‘Radical Islam’ and ‘Militant Islam’. 
Under such labels, Islam is often represented as a contrast to the West, as a ‘clash of 
civilizations’, a concept first introduced by Bernard Lewis64 and later taken to new heights by 
Samuel Huntington65. In his article from 1993, Huntington argues that Islam is the new threat 
facing the Western world after the collapse of communism, with Islamic politics described as 
radical and associated with violence and terror. Advocates among these Orientalists and neo-
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Orientalists include scholars such as the already mentioned Lewis, Elie Kedourié, Martin 
Indyk, Daniel Pipes, Patricia Crone, and others. 
Neo-orientalism is a school of thought that grew to significance following the 1978-79 
Iranian revolution. They agree with Orientalist thinking that Islam is incompatible with 
democracy with reference to what they see as the totalitarian aspect of Islam, namely that 
religion and state is inseparable. However, for the classical Orientalists, the main problem was 
that Islam promotes political submission, and, as a consequence of this, the civil society has 
been very weak. Hence, “a religion which considers it a religious duty to obey the sovereign 
coupled with the absence of strong civil society are [sic] the main reasons for the lack of 
democratization.”66  Following the revolution in Iran in the late 1970s, in which the element 
of civil society clearly was not weak, the claim that Islam promoted submission became 
difficult to advocate, and some scholars therefore “sought to reform and update 
Orientalism.”67 The new argument was now that “throughout the history of Islam, society has 
always been strong and regime always weak”68 and that “by establishing ideals that are 
impossible to fulfill, Islam ensures that Muslims will view any form of government […] as 
illegitimate.”69 
Crone, in particular, has been quite adamant in her arguing that Islamic civilization 
refuses to legitimize political authority.70 She states that after the Shari’a was codified in the 
eight century under the Abbasid caliphate, the ulama (legal scholars) were of tribal origin, and 
that the law they drafted reflected their “profound hostility to settled states.”71 From this she 
concludes that: 
 
[T]he ulama defined God’s law as haqq al-‘arab, the law of the Arabs […] the 
consensus being that where God had not explicitly modified tribal law, he had 
endorsed it. The result was a tribal vision of sacred politics […] Kings were 
rejected as Pharaohs and priests as golden calfs [sic], while God’s community 
was envisaged as an egalitarian one unencumbered by profane or religious 
structures of power below the caliph who was himself assigned the duty of 
minimal government.72 
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For neo-Orientalists, the problem of weak regimes and strong society became even 
more problematic when the ruling elite in Muslim states sought to embrace western and 
modern ideas such as secularization and democracy: “While the elite continues to strive to 
remove all obstacles that stand in the way of modernization, the masses prefer the 
implementation of the laws of Islamic Shari’a.”73 By rejecting modernism, therefore, Islamic 
society obstructs the emergence of modern civil society that “can cooperate with […] the 
regime.”74 This is also echoed in John Hall’s writings when he argues that “the strength of 
society in Islamic civilizations not only made the state unstable; it also obstructed the 
development of true ‘civil society’ and democracy.”75 Islamist fundamentalism, according to 
neo- Orientalists, gives the masses a protection against Western influence that the elites are 
trying to install.  
 
The Post-Orientalists 
On the other end of the academic table, there are those who argue that one has to look at the 
more diverse nature of the phenomenon of Islamic revival, and that one can not 
unconditionally accept labels such as ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘radicalism’ to best describe the 
resurgence of Islam from the 1970s onward. The Islamic revival is different in countries like 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, occupied Palestine and say, Indonesia, Sudan or Somalia.  
Advocates among these post-Orientalists, also known as the reformist school76, 
include scholars such as Edward Said, John Orbert Voll, John Esposito, James Piscatori, 
Shaul Mishal and Laura Guazzone. Some among them describe today’s revival of Islam as 
‘political Islam’. Others again are more at ease with the label Islamism since they argue for 
the all-encompassing element of Islam, which fuses religion and politics together. Islamism 
also more accurately refer to the Arabic reference for an Islamic movement (al-harak al-
islamiyya) and its adherents as Islamists (Islamiyyun). 
The post-Orientalists criticizes the neo-Orientalists who they say “ignore any sort of 
modernity or novelty in Islamic societies in general”77, and because they instead of looking at 
changes and progress in Muslim societies, see only reaction and fundamentalism. Neo-
Orientalists are therefore said to give most prominence to textual interpretation of Islam, 
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“which they consider an enduring and immutable insight into the essence of Islam and the 
Muslim world [and] maintain that Islam is a monolithic threat to the West.”78 Post-
Orientalists oppose such an understanding of Islam, and instead insist “on the diversity of 
Islamic movements and on their being shaped by contingent factors.”79 Their criticism of the 
neo-Orientalists are not so much centred on the labelling as it is more a matter of looking at 
the phenomenon on a micro rather than a macro level, and because of the prejudice and 
Orientalist view they claim the neo-Orientalists carry with them when arguing that Islam and 
democracy are incompatible. 
Post-Orientalists are therefore also known as contingenists as opposed to the 
essentialist approach among the neo-Orientalists. As such, the post-Orientalists with its 
contingenist approach “separates the moderates from the fundamentalists and claims that the 
political conditions in Muslim states are not much different from those that exist in other 
Third World countries.”80 For these scholars, it is the lack of reform among the ruling elites 
that attributed to a rise of Islamic ideas in society, or put differently, attributed to the ‘revival 
of Islam’. For them, political stagnation, corruption, and repression in Muslim countries have 
resulted in the rise of Islamist oriented movements; hence “the repression of freedom of 
speech and political association has left the mosque as the only institution where people can 
gather, criticize the government and organize themselves.”81 
Their view on Islam and Islamism is often criticized by the neo-Orientalists of being 
apologetic82 and failing to seriously debate the more radical and intimidating side of Islamism 
– lack of freedom of expression, women’s role in society, suicide bombings and other violent 
and militant behaviour, etc, which are threatening legitimate power in the Middle East. As 
summarized by Judith Miller: 
 
Any individual or government concerned with pluralism, democracy and 
human rights must not be complacent about the rise of militant Islamic 
groups. Islam is incompatible with these values -as shown by the continued 
oppression of women and minorities in Muslim societies.83 
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Conclusion 
I find the criticism of the post-Orientalists by the neo-Orientalists rather unfair, for several 
reasons. First; several (legitimate) governments in the Middle East are themselves curbing 
freedom of expression and other international human rights, most of them actually supported 
by the West. Second; disagreeing with labelling such as radical or fundamentalist Islam is not 
the same as to say that there exists no such thing as ‘fundamentalist Islam’, or to be apologetic 
for that matter. Rather, when prefixing Islam with such labels when describing political 
activity, the dangers of doing injustice to the whole Islamic umma is imminent. As Edward 
Said informs us: ”Fundamentalism equals Islam equals everything-we-must-now-fight-
against, as we did with communism during the Cold War.”84 Also, “any Muslim who is a 
believer is a fundamentalist because by believing they accept the fundamental tenets of 
principles of their faith.”85 Also, I disagree with sidelining Islam with Islamism, and 
especially with militant Islamist groups as Miller does. 
Coupled with this, I also question the usefulness of an understanding of Islamism 
based on textual interpretation of classical Islam. This de-contextualizing approach advocated 
by the neo-Orientalists will not, in my view, be useful in understanding Hamas’ ideology 
behind the wish for a Shari’s state, nor its actions to reach such a goal. Ijtihad is a vital 
concept within Islamist movements, precisely because modern Islamic thinkers saw the 
necessity “for independent reasoning and reinterpretation of the Quran and Islamic traditions 
and the need to reinterpret the Holy Scriptures and apply them to today’s world.”86 Even 
though Islamists themselves call for a return to original Islam, to understand why these 
Islamists today advocates such a wish, not to discuss the socio-political context each 
individual Islamist movement has grown out from, would in my belief, be a grave error. As 
Jeroen Gunning, a Hamas researcher puts it:  
 
[S]uch an analysis, though appealing in the black-and-white context of the 
War on Terror, is deeply unsatisfactory. Politics is never static. Neither are 
political organisations. Hamas has changed since its inception, and will 
continue to change. The question is merely how fast and in which 
direction.87 
 
 
                                                 
84 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam, (Revised edition, New York: Vintage, 1997), pp. xix 
85 Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics, p. 147. 
86 Knudsen, “Political Islam in the Middle East”, p. 3. (Emphasis added). 
87 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 2. 
  29 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  30 
Chapter Three: Hamas’ Pragmatism and ‘Red Lines’  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the dire situation in the occupied Palestinian territories forced 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to change its strategy and Hamas was born. In August 
1988, the Hamas Charter was issued and Hamas was recognized as a branch of the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ ideology was set forth in the 36-article charter and “spelled out 
the movement’s Islamic orientation and showed its attitude toward Israel to be much more 
uncompromising than that of the PLO and the nationalist mainstream.”88 Three major themes 
in the Charter stood out: First, the land of Palestine was considered waqf - an Islamic trust or 
endowment (Article 11). As such it was argued that no one had the right to give up any part of 
it. In order to liberate the land, the only solution was through jihad which was considered a 
religious duty of every Muslim (Article 15).89 The second major theme in the Charter was the 
importance of Islam as the tool for Palestinian nationalist efforts. Here, Hamas broke away 
from the ideology of Qutb and the Islamic Jihad when it “delimits the concept [jihad] by 
applying it to ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine.”90 In Hamas’ language towards 
Israel, or rather towards the “Zionist state”, we find the third major theme in the Charter – the 
distrust of the Jews, “often expressed in anti-Semitic terms that allege the existence of a 
Jewish-led international conspiracy.”91 However, from the 1990s onwards, this racist 
language, as Khaled Hroub notes:  
 
vanished from the movement’s literature and political discourse, and its 
dealings at the international level ceased to reflect such positions […] 
Hamas’s political view of the “enemy” […] became more sophisticated [and] 
Hamas’s perspective evolved to differentiate clearly between Judaism as a 
religion and Zionism as a political movement.92 
 
This shift in discourse reflects transcendence in Hamas’ thoughts and practices and 
can be contributed to several factors, both internal and external. Many commentators have 
stressed the importance of this. Hroub, for example, portrays “Hamas as demonstrating a 
flexibility in both its ideology and practice that is responsive to the political environment in 
which it finds itself.”93 
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The most important factor in the environment of Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is centred on the question of peace, or rather the lack of it. In a presentation of 
historical events important in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, and in a 
discussion of how Hamas replied to these events, I intend in this chapter to shed some light on 
Hamas’ balance between its ideological ‘red lines’ and its readiness to flexibility and 
pragmatism. This chapter will also provide us with a historical background for later analyses, 
especially relevant for Chapter Six tackling Hamas’ relations with the State of Israel. 
 
Advances and Setbacks towards a Two-State Solution: 1988 – Summer 1990 
On 15 November 1988, in the Palestine National Council’s (PLO’s legislative body) 19th 
session, Yasser Arafat issued the Declaration of Independence for the State in Palestine.94 In 
a political communiqué issued just days later, the PLO committed itself to a two-state solution 
to the conflict with Israel and called for an international peace conference to be held on the 
basis of United Nations resolutions 242 and 338.95 This was not the first time Palestinians 
indicated a willingness to recognize Israel within its pre-1967 borders. The PLO had since the 
1982 Arab summit in Fez for their part been “officially committed to mutual recognition 
between Israel and a Palestinian state located in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem 
as its capital.”96 
 However, the PLO’s gesture towards peace was initially not welcomed by Israel and 
her most important ally, the United States. Both countries did not trust PLO’s willingness to 
renounce terrorism, and Israel in particular did not believe that the organization was sincere in 
its recognition of the Jewish state. However, following a press conference in Geneva on 14 
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December 1988 in which Arafat repeatedly fully renounced terrorism,97 American-PLO talks 
commenced and continued through 1989 and into 1990. Israel, on the other hand, still rejected 
the idea of direct talks with the PLO, and under the Yitzhak Shamir (b. 1915) government 
instead launched a diplomatic initiative on its own. This, as well as both Egyptian and 
American proposals were all failing to bring the two sides together which in the end also 
contributed to the downfall of the national unity government in Israel. Shimon Peres (b. 1923) 
from Labour tried unsuccessfully to form a new coalition in support of the Baker plan,98 but 
in the end Shamir came out with the upper hand. In June 1990 he managed to form a 
government in which his Likud party joined forces with ultra-nationalist and religious parties. 
This new coalition was said to be “the most right wing and hard-line (in its attitudes to the 
Arabs) in Israel’s history”.99  The new Israeli government announced that it would end the 
Intifada, create new settlements and expand existing ones, that there would be no Palestinian 
state, no negotiation with the PLO and no sharing of Jerusalem.100 Chances for peace seemed 
grim. 
Since the beginning of the Intifada, Hamas had taken a leading role in the uprising, as 
a parallel and competing organizer to the PLO-lead Unified National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU). As the UNLU, Hamas also organized strikes and called for demonstrations 
and boycotts of Israeli products. In addition, Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades (Kata’ib al-Shahid Izz al-Din al-Qassam), was responsible for military attacks 
against Israeli targets.101 Further, its intelligence wing, initially a policing unit known as al-
Majd (Glory), was also responsible for identifying and assassinating suspected Palestinian 
collaborators. The PLO’s flirting with peace, successful or not, coupled with the political 
power centre in Israel moving towards the right resulted in more sympathy and increased 
recruitment to the Islamists. As stipulated in the Hamas Charter, no one had the right to give 
up any part of Palestinian land. Thus, it suited Hamas just fine that chances for peace were 
diminishing. 
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For Israel, initially, it was the PLO who was the main target in their struggle to 
succumb the Intifada. However, as Hamas grew in strength, Israel soon took action against the 
organization and in August 1988 the first Israeli mass arrest against its members took place. 
Then, following Hamas kidnappings and assassinations of two IDF soldiers in Israel in 
February and May 1989, Israel rounded up and arrested another 1.500 Hamas members, one 
of them being Sheikh Yassin. These mass detentions presented a serious threat to Hamas, in 
which Israel “almost succeeded in annihilating the movement.”102 
Those still out of harms way saw the urgent necessity for organizational and structural 
change to meet the challenges that the mass arrests presented. One response was to separate 
the political, social and military wings of the movement. In order to ensure that Hamas would 
not totally vanish, Mousa Abu Marzouq (b. 1951) a U.S. educated physician, restructured the 
leadership role to not only constitute people from the ‘inside’, but to also include members 
from the Palestinian Diaspora. Whereas the ‘outside’ had, until now, played the supporting 
role of providing funding and logistics, from now on it was to play an important role in the 
decision making process of Hamas. With leaders working from abroad – in Amman, Kuwait 
and London, the risk of annihilation by the hands of Israel was weakened.103 
 
The Gulf War and Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiatives: August 1990 – Mid 
1993 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union (the U.S.S.R.) had supported PLO’s approach towards 
dialogue and peace. The U.S., on the other hand, especially since the 1980s, opted for a policy 
of greater reliance on Israel as a strategy for securing American interest in the Middle East. 
The end of the Cold War in 1990 and the demise of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991 made the 
U.S. the sole superpower in the world. After Iraqi troops invaded the tiny, oil-rich country of 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the response from the international community was swift and 
overwhelming. Within days, a trade embargo against Iraq was adopted in the U.N. Security 
Council104, and within weeks a large naval force was in place in the Gulf to enforce it. Had 
the Soviet Union still been a superpower it is not certain that it would have vetoed the 
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resolution. However, what was clear was that with the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War 
illustrated a “growing agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on a variety 
of issues, including the danger of potentially explosive regional conflicts.”105 
The Gulf War also represented a huge blow to the notion of pan-Arab unity, as most 
Arab countries sided with the West against Iraq. Arafat and the PLO on their part sided with 
Iraq, that is; they refused to condemn Iraq’s actions. The reasons behind this were several. 
Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) had for a long time been a volatile supporter of the Palestinian 
cause, which was something the PLO had gained from, not least financially. Even more 
important was probably the fact that Hussein tried to portray himself as the Arab combatant 
against the Zionist entity by launching Scud missiles into Israel. As such, Iraq sought to create 
linkages between the liberation of Kuwait and the Palestine question. Many Palestinians also 
believed that the presence of a credible Arab military challenge would force Shamir to the 
negotiating table, and yet another factor was the perceived double standard the UN showed in 
its swift condemnation and action against Iraq as an occupier, whilst the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had lasted for more than 20 years. However, and whether 
understandable or not, the outcome for the PLO and the Palestinian cause more generally, was 
damaging. Gulf countries terminated financial aid to the PLO, as well as expelling PLO 
officials.  
Following the Gulf War, and after a shuttle diplomacy by the American Secretary of 
State James Baker, a Middle East peace conference commenced on 30 October 1991 in 
Madrid. The conference was co -chaired by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (later Russia) with 
Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation attending. Peace 
talks later continued in Washington and elsewhere on an intermittent basis throughout 1992 
and the first half of 1993 but no substantial agreements were made. The Israeli election in 
June 1992, however, increased chances for peace, as the new Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin 
(1922-95) from the Labour party, explicitly stated that his government was committed to a 
“successful resolution of the peace process”106 and vowed to end what he referred to as ‘non-
strategic’ settlement activities. On the other hand, the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip was still fuelled with tension. The construction of Israeli settlements inside the occupied 
territories during 15 years of Likud led governments, long periods of curfews, high casualty 
numbers and continued violence on both sides, still meant that the obstacles for peace were 
immense. 
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Hamas took a more balanced and diplomatic stand than the PLO in regards to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. In its first leaflet on the Gulf War, issued 12 August 1990, Hamas 
condemned the presence of American and Allied troops in the Gulf. On the other hand, just 
weeks later, another leaflet called for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.107 Here, Hamas tried 
to balance its support for the Gulf countries, crucial for the economic survival of its 
organization, and the popular Palestinian sentiment against the West. It worked. In May 1991 
it was reported that the US$ 28 million a month from Saudi Arabia that the PLO received 
before the Gulf War was now going to Hamas instead.108 
Following an incident on 8 October 1990 in which 22 Palestinians were killed and 
more than 200 injured at al-Haram al-Sharif (Al Aqsa Mosque) in the Old City of Jerusalem, 
Hamas initiated what became known as the ‘war of the knives’.109 Hamas issued a leaflet 
calling for attacks on Israel: “Point One: Every soldier and settler in Palestine is considered a 
target.”110 That same day, a Hamas affiliate stabbed and killed three Israeli soldiers in 
Jerusalem and in early December 1990, two Hamas activists stabbed several Israeli workers in 
a factory in Jaffa/Yafo south of Tel Aviv and left on the wall of the factory a declaration of 
responsibility in the name of Hamas. Israel acted by arresting more than 1.700 suspected 
Hamas members. Meanwhile, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s trial for his involvement in the 
kidnapping and killing of the two Israeli soldiers in 1989 went ahead. Yassin acknowledged 
his role in the foundation of Hamas but pleaded his innocence in regards to the death of the 
two soldiers. He was found guilty and received a sentence of a life term plus 15 years 
imprisonment. 
Hamas’ military actions against Israel continued and, in late 1992, the organization 
initiated what they called ‘the war of the seven days’.111 During one week in December 
Hamas militants killed six IDF soldiers and kidnapped another named Nissim Toledano. A list 
of demands was handed over to the Israelis in which Hamas demanded the immediate release 
of Sheikh Yassin in exchange of the safe release of Toledano. Israel refused and Toledano 
was executed, later to be found in a ditch near Ma’ale Adumim settlement outside Jerusalem. 
The Israeli response was swift and harsh. Nearly 2.000 Palestinians were arrested, along with 
415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders. They were all driven north to the border with Lebanon 
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and expelled to an Israeli declared no-mans land, called Marj al-Zahour. This incident gave 
Hamas unprecedented international coverage as “[t]he entire world watched on television as 
the deportees, blindfolded and handcuffed, with their hands tied behind their backs, remained 
confined to their seats in the coaches.”112 Only a few days earlier, Israel had been portrayed as 
the victim. Now, the international community, the U.S. included, condemned it for its breach 
of international law.113 
 The involuntary stay in Lebanon had profound implications for Hamas. In addition to 
receiving world attention, the leaders form Hamas inside and outside were able to meet freely 
for the first time. Ideas and strategies were discussed and refined. Further, they were able to 
train themselves militarily, with the more experienced cadres of the deportees offering 
training in a variety of combat techniques, including how to make explosives. In this regard, 
some have also argued that the stay in Marj al-Zahour was a “milestone in Hamas’s decision 
to [later] use car bombs and suicide attacks as a major modus operandi against Israel”114 
because they came into contact with Lebanese Hizbullah (God’s Party) fighters who trained 
them in such techniques. The expulsions of the Islamists also “provoked an intense debate 
within the Palestinian community about the place of the Islamists in the political fabric of 
society.”115 The PLO could no longer ignore Hamas without loosing its credibility as the 
representatives for the Palestinians. Fatah and Hamas representatives therefore met in January 
1993 in Khartoum to discuss attempts to coordinate protest efforts between the two groups. 
From an Israeli perspective, even the security situation did not improve as a consequence of 
the deportations. Most of the members of Hamas’ military wing had namely not been arrested 
and by end of January 1993 the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades again killed two Israeli 
soldiers in the Gaza Strip. 
Hamas attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers continued throughout the early 
spring of 1993. This violence against Israeli targets must been seen in conjunction with 
Hamas’ rejectionist stand towards the peace talks held in Madrid and Washington: Hamas 
opposed strongly what they perceived was PLO’s abandonment of Palestinians rights, instead 
arguing that no part of Palestine should be ceded in exchange for peace with Israel. This 
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attitude became even more visible as chances for peace prospered after a surprising 
breakthrough in the peace process in 1993. 
 
The Oslo Accords: January 1993 – Late 1995 
As the peace process seemed to go nowhere and Hamas “thought it was preparing itself for its 
moment of glory”116, Arafat and the PLO had through Norwegian liaison commenced in 
secretive negotiations with Israel, culminating on 20 August 1993 in a document known as the 
Declaration of Principles (the DOP/Oslo I Accord). On 9 September, Arafat and Rabin 
exchanged letters of mutual recognition. Here, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and 
further confirmed that those clauses in the Palestinian National Charter (PLO’s ‘constitution’) 
objectionable to Israel would be repelled. Israel on their part recognized the PLO as the 
representative for the Palestinian people and the negotiating partner of Israel.117 This was 
officially concluded on 13 September 1993, when: 
 
[i]n a stunning event on the White House lawn in Washington, the Declaration 
of Principles on Interim Self-Government for the Palestinians […] was signed 
by Foreign Minister [Shimon] Peres and PLO representative Mahmoud Abbas 
[…] while President Clinton, Arafat, and Rabin looked on.118 
 
The declaration was an agenda for future negotiations and stipulated that by 13 April 
1993, Israel had to withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of 
Jericho, with Palestinians taking control of internal affairs in these areas. Election for a 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA/PA) would take place in the occupied territories and 
final status negotiations where scheduled to commence by December 1995. The final status 
negotiations were to be completed within a period of no more than five years, with the 
permanent settlement to take effect by December 1998. The most difficult issues affecting the 
two parties, such as the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, borders and Jewish 
settlements were to be discussed in the final status negotiations.119 On 1 July 1994, Arafat 
arrived in the Gaza Strip and four days later he swore in members of the newly established 
PA. 
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Oslo I was to be followed by Oslo II, also known as the Taba Accords, signed by the 
parties in Washington on 28 September 1995. In this agreement, the West Bank was divided 
up into three areas; area A, with Palestinian control over both security and civilian matters, 
consisted of around 3 per cent; area B, where Palestinians would exercise civil and police 
authority and Israel would retain security responsibility, amounted to around 23 per cent; and 
area C, in which Israel would have exclusive control, consisted of around 74 per cent of the 
West Bank. Then, nearly eighteen months delayed, on 20 January 1996, the elections for the 
presidency of the PA and the 88 member legislative council (PLC), were held. Arafat was 
elected president, and the nationalist Fatah party held the majority (62 of 88 seats) in the 
legislative council.120 However, as touched upon above, many people on both sides were 
opposed to the peace process. Volatile in Israel was the settler community and on 4 November 
1995, Rabin was killed by a right-wing Orthodox Jew. In the occupied territories, the biggest 
opponents to the peace process were the Islamists, with Hamas taking a leading role. 
The main reason for Hamas’ rejection of the Oslo accords was the same:  “no one had 
the right to sign away Palestine and […] Muslims would not be obliged to observe the 
agreement.”121 However, there were also other reasons for Hamas’ objection to Oslo. One 
was the fundamental fear Hamas shared with Islamic Jihad that, with an agreement between 
the PLO and Israel, they would be under attack from two sides: the future of Islamism
Palestine was at stake. That the negotiations had taken place without consulting the Islamists 
or the Leftists, on matters crucial for all Palestinians, created further a feeling of 
marginalization and anger that resulted in additional opposition. Polls, however, did not 
predict good days ahead for the Islamists. At the end of September 1993, more than 70 per 
cent of the Palestinians in the occupied territories said they supported continued negotiations 
with Israel, and around 60 per cent opted for PLO leadership and only 17 per cent for 
Hamas.
 in 
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How should Hamas respond to these challenges? To answer that, several voices have 
spoken of Hamas’ pragmatic approaches, as well as its internal differences. As noted by one 
writer: 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian DOP of September 1993 increased Hamas’s awareness 
of the limits of its power on both intra-Palestinian and regional levels […]. 
 
120 Central Elections Commission – Palestine, “The 1996 Presidential and Legislative Elections” (PDF-file), at 
http://www.elections.ps/pdf/Results_election_1996.pdf. 
121 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, p. 162. 
122 Ibid., p. 163. 
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Calculated policy based on pragmatic interpretation and negotiated profit/loss 
considerations rather than on bondage to a stated doctrine and rigid dogma 
thus characterized its mode of operation.123 
 
Sheikh Yassin, for example, from his prison cell, cautioned his followers not to take a 
rigid stand towards the DOP, and he argued that Hamas participation in local professional and 
municipal elections had already set a precedent for participation in the future PA elections. 
This took many by surprise as participation in the PA elections would imply recognition of 
the Oslo Accords, and indirectly of a two-state solution. However, Yassin’s remarks came 
with certain conditions; most importantly that Hamas’ participation in the elections would 
depend on a long term cease-fire (hudna) with Israel. This did not, on the other hand, mean 
that the call for jihad against Israel was called off, only that it would “allow the soldiers of the 
jihad to address other issues in their own society.”124 In other words; it was a temporary pause 
in the fight against Israel. The debate whether to participate in the PA elections or not 
continued throughout 1995, with the opponents arguing that participation would bestow 
legitimacy to Oslo and to Israel. In the end it became clear that the opponents won ground, 
and, in November 1995, Hamas announced it would boycott any forthcoming elections for the 
presidency of the PA and for the legislative council. However, they also stated they would not 
work to undermine the elections, the PA or the national unity, and in the period from 
September 1993, until the spring of 1994 “it is fair to say that Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
committed themselves wholeheartedly to preserving national unity in Gaza as they watched 
the PLO establish the framework for self-rule there and in Jericho.”125 
Despite Hamas’ vow not to undermine the elections, the organization was still 
committed to continue its jihad against Israel. In the first 16 months following the signing of 
the DOP in September 1993, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were responsible for killing more than 
120 Israelis. Following the ‘Hebron Massacre’ where a Jewish settler from the Kiryat Arba 
settlement outside Hebron shot down and killed 29 Muslim worshipers in the Ibrahimi 
Mosque, Hamas’ armed agenda to end Israeli occupation took a dramatic turn. Following that 
event, Hamas withdrew from its policy of only striking against Israeli military and settler 
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targets.126 On 6 April 1994, seven unarmed Israeli civilians were killed near a bus stop in the 
northern Israeli town of Afula when a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives strapped to 
his body. Hamas later announced that the attack came in retaliation to the Hebron massacre. A 
week later, another Hamas suicide bomber detonated another bomb on an Israeli bus packed 
with people in the coastal town of Hadera. This time five Israelis were killed and another 28 
injured. Israel imposed severe closures on the territories and arrested more than 1.600 
affiliated Islamists. They also demanded that the PA strike against Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 
and after some initial reluctance, the Palestinian Authority ordered its security apparatus to 
crack down against them. Hamas, however, did not back down. On 19 October 1994 a new 
suicide bomber blew up in the middle of Tel Aviv, killing 21 Israelis and injuring around 50 
others.  
With the elections for the PA presidency and for the PLC in January 1996 coming up, 
Hamas eased their operations so that the PA was not embarrassed beforehand. No Hamas 
suicide bombings commenced between August 1995 and January 1996. However, following 
the Israeli assassination in Gaza of the Hamas chief bomb maker, the ‘engineer’ Yahya 
Ayyash, in January 1996, Hamas again responded by launching suicide missions into Israel. 
In late February and early March 1996, 59 Israelis were killed and hundreds injured in four 
different Hamas suicide missions. 
 
New Setbacks in the Peace Process: 1996 – July 2000 
In February 1996, Shimon Peres, who had resumed the post of prime minister following 
Rabin’s assassination, decided to call for early elections in Israel. The date for the elections 
was set to e held on 29 May 1996. Almost immediately following Peres’ announcement, a 
wave of Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel began. Having decided not to participate in the 
parliamentary elections of January 1996, Hamas was lacking an alternative political arena for 
contesting Arafat and his Fatah party. Therefore, “undermining the peace process through 
political violence against Israelis became a particularly attractive option.”127 The Hamas 
suicide bombings in February and March 1996 had a huge impact on both the Israeli election 
and the peace process. In a very close race Peres in the end lost, and Likud’s Benyamin 
Netanyahu (b. 1949) assumed office as prime minister. Netanyahu, although insisting that he 
                                                 
126 Cf. Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 245-6 and note 86 p. 245. Hamas regarded settlers in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as legitimate targets also before the Hebron massacre, both for being armed 
and for their continual attacks against Palestinian civilians.  
127 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 46. 
  41 
wanted peace and that he would honour Israel’s commitments, had never the less asserted in 
statements that Israel would never accept a Palestinian state on its doorsteps.128 
However, although Hamas continued to undermine the peace process, and even though 
both Israelis and Palestinians accused each other of violating the Oslo Accords, talks between 
the two sides did continue. In January 1997, the Hebron Protocol was signed. This signalled 
that the stage was now set for the resumption of the final status talks with the more difficult 
issues of Jerusalem, borders, settlements and refugees remaining. In the Hebron Protocol, the 
PA also committed itself to crack down on terrorism, which in practice meant targeting the 
Islamists.129 The relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians were, however, still 
loaded with tension. This was especially the case following Israel’s decision to allow the 
construction of new settlements, most notably the planned 6,500 housing-unit south of 
Jerusalem to be named Har Homa and the E1 Plan that involved new housing units and 
recreation areas that would connect (East) Jerusalem with the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim 
to the east, effectively splitting the West Bank in two.130 Hamas acted. With opinion polls
recording a high support for the peace process
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131 such acts on the Israeli side presented 
Hamas with legitimacy to continue its violence against Israel. Having refrained from suicide 
operations for a year, a Hamas suicide bomber on 21 March 1997, three days after 
construction commenced on Har Homa, killed three Israelis in a café in Tel Aviv. By ear
September, an additional two suicide operations took place, claiming t
. 
Negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis experienced its most difficult 
stage since the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993. Netanyahu reiterated his claims that the 
Palestinian Authority had failed to disarm and apprehend wanted terrorists, an accusation that 
from now where to stick with Yasser Arafat and the PA ever since. The PA complain
the increased settlement and Israeli by-pass construction. Hamas, on the other hand, 
experienced increased support among the Palestinians, both due to Arafat’s and the pea
’ failure to stop settlement construction and due to corruption within the PLO. 
 
128 Cf. Berry and Philo, Israel and Palestine, p. 100. 
129 Jensen, The Political Ideology of Hamas, p. 23. 
130 Netanyahu is often held responsible for the establishment of Har Homa settlement. It was, in fact, initiated 
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initiative of Labour’s Benjamin Ben-Elizer while he was Housing Minister in the Peres administration. See 
Noam Chomsky, “Introduction” in The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid, ed. Roane Carey (London: 
Verso, 2001), pp. 15-16. 
131 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (CPRS), “Polls 1-48, 1993-2000”, in Gunning, Hamas in 
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It was not until October 1998, after intense U.S. pressure, that the Israelis and the 
Palestinians concluded the next phase of the peace process. This happened with the signing of 
the Wye River Accords in Maryland. Here Israel undertook to redeploy its troops from a 
further 13 per cent of the West Bank, a redeployment to take place in three stages. The PA, 
their part, re-committed itself to combat terrorism and agreed to work with Israeli sec
services and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to improve Israel’s security, 
and to finally amend the parts of the Palestinian National Charter calling for Israel’s 
destruction, as agreed upon in the Oslo Accords. Netanyahu, however, was in trouble w
government coalition, as well as with elements within his own part
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ity in the government, the Knesset voted on 21 December 1998 to dissolve the 
government and called for new elections to be held in May 1999.  
Hamas declared its opposition to the Wye agreement, stating that if implemented it 
would likely stir up internal conflicts among the Palestinians. Yassin, now released from 
prison following a failed Israeli assassination attempt against Hamas political bureau leade
Khaled Mish’al (b. 1956) in Jordan, went on by describing the Wye River Agreement “an act 
of treason.”132 Polls suggested that Hamas was gaining more and more ground within the 
occupied Palestinian territories: “Disillusionment with the Oslo peace process, if not with the
idea of a peace process, rose to the point that only a third of respondents to polls conducted i
1999-2000 believed that a final settlement w
upport for suicide bombers was around 20 per cent in the middle of the 1990s, in th
late 1990s it rose to around 40 per cent.134 
The Israeli election of May 1999 was won by Labour’s Ehud Barak (b. 1942) and 
Israel and the Palestinians resumed final status negotiations at the Camp David summit, 
opened on 11 July 2000. After more than two weeks of talks, no resolutions on the issues
were made and both sides blamed each other for the failure to reach an agreement. The issue
of Jerusalem proved particularly difficult. “There did not seem to be any way that Israel 
would share sovereignty over the city or give up parts of East Jerusalem to the Palestinian
and no way that Arafat could accept less than full soverei
 
132 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 120. For a thorough account on the affair in which Israeli Mossad 
agents unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Khaled Mish’al in Jordan and which resulted in a prisoner 
exchange between Sheikh Yassin and the Mossad agents see Paul McGeough, Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad 
Assasination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas, (New York: The New Press, 2009).   
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While Barak returned to Israel to a no-confidence vote in the Knesset, Arafat on his part 
returned to Gaza praised as a hero who held his ground. 
 
A New Intifada and the Collapse of Oslo: September 2000 – Summer 2002 
With the collapse of the Camp David summit, the Oslo peace process was nearly dead. The 
second Intifada, known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, killed it. When Likud leader Ariel Sharon (b. 
1928), on 28 September 2000, entered the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif accompanied 
around 1,000 security forces, this ignited a new Palestinian uprising.136
by 
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 (from late 1987 to 13 September 1993) claimed around 1,200 Palestinian and 160 
Israeli lives, the second Intifada, also referred to as the ‘armed uprising’ had of December 
2008 resulted in the death of more than 4,800 Palestinians (including 955 children) and more 
than 1,000 Israelis (including 123 children).137 
The al-Aqsa Intifada initially united the Palestinians as never before. On 8 October 
2000, Arafat called for a meeting with all the factions within the PLO, and also included an 
official representative from Hamas, which up to then had boycotted meetings with the PA.
Isma’il Abu Shannab, the Hamas Political Bureau member in Gaza, said in a statement that 
the meeting had been the first to “find [a] formulae to confront the Israeli occupation.”138 L
than a week later, Islamist militants held in PA prisons in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
were released on publi
bligations to combat terror. Meanwhile, Palestinian paramilitary organizations linke
to Fatah, such al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade (AMB), established themselves all over the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and joined forces with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in coordinated 
attacks against Israel. 
In terms of the PA’s reactions to the Intifada, much has been said on Arafat’s role. 
Some claim that he himself planned and orchestrated it in order to win concessions he could 
not secure at Camp David. Others say that he was powerless in stopping the uprising which 
was bound to happen after seven years of Palestinian frustration at the failures of the pea
process.139 What ever the case, what is clear is that Arafat was in a difficult situation. He was 
 
136 Cf. Ibid., pp. 330-4. 
137 B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities in the First Intifada” and “Statistics: Fatalities”, at http://www.btselem.org/-
English/Statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp and http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp, 
respectively. 
138 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 199, note 19. 
139 See Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
pp. 49-63; Berry and Philo, Israel and Palestine, pp. 114-15. 
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under scrutiny from the Israelis and the international society to fight terrorism as stipulated
the agreements with Israel and, at the same time, he needed to maintain his credibility am
his Palestinian const
 in 
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relations with Hamas, and vice versa, were bound to worsen. In October 2001 he ordered the
arrest of two Hamas activists suspected for their role in a suicide attack in July earlier that 
year. Hamas responded angrily and said that such arrests should have stopped when the 
Intifada erupted.140 
 In February 2001 the Israeli public elected Sharon as prime minister on a vow n
negotiate with the Palestinians as long as the Intifada continued. One week later a mem
s Force 17 bodyguards was assassinated by an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter, 
on 19 February a Hamas member was assassinated in Nablus. Further, on 23 November 2001,
a senior Hamas militant and two of his comrades were assassinated by IAF helicopter 
missiles. It seemed that Israel had started on a campaign of targeted assassinations.141 
Hamas retorted by attacking targets inside Israel. In early March 2001, a Hamas 
militant blew himself up in Netanya, killing three Israelis and injuring around 60 others, an
on 1 and 2 December, Hamas carried out a series of suicide missions in Israel, resulting in the
death of 28 and t
im iately ordered a crackdown and arrested around 200 Hamas supporters. Gun battles 
with Hamas militants, resulting in Palestinian casualties, erupted when PA security forces 
tried to implement a house arrest of Sheikh Yassin and a detention of Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi 
(1947-2004).142 
 The violence continued on both sides throughout 2001 and the beginning of 2002 in a 
seemingly never-ending cycle of bloodshed. Hamas’ suicide missions included the bombings 
at the Dolphinarium disco in Tel Aviv and the Sbarro pizza restaurant in West Jerusalem, i
total killing 36 and injuring more than 250 Israelis. On 25 November 2001, the IDF 
assassinated Hamas leader Abu Hanoud, thought to be behind these bombings, again followed 
by Hamas retaliation. With an American delegation in the area trying to achieve a cease-fire, 
Hamas killed 26 and injured nearly 200 Israelis. After this, President George W. Bush (b. 
1946) basically gave Sharon “carte-blanche to retaliate”143 and U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powel said that this was Arafat’s last chance to demonstrate he was a partner for peace. Isra
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on its part, pronounced the Palestinian Authority a terror-supporting entity and declared “that
as far as Israel was concerned, Arafat was irrelevant, and that there would be no more
with him.”
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and C. h the 
ate 
e Egyptian, Jordanian and 
audi diplomats lent their support and agreed to try and persuade Hamas to stop terrorist 
attacks. These efforts, however, proved utterly fruitless after Israel, on 22 July 2002, dropped 
mas leader Salah Shehada (1953 – 2002) resided in 
ter. He 
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144 In early 2002, Israel started on campaigns against PA police headquarters and 
other institutions and laid siege and invaded major Palestinian towns. Then, on 28 March, 
following a Hamas bombing in Netanya claiming 29 Israeli lives, Israel launched Operati
Defensive Shield, a military operation which meant a de-facto re-occupation of areas 
withdrawn fr
Arafat’s compound in Ramallah was laid under siege and largely destroyed wit
Palestinian president confined to only a few rooms, not daring to go outside. On 24 June 
2002, President Bush said that the Palestinians needed to find another leader.145 Arafat’s f
was sealed. 
The EU, meanwhile, in conducting talks with both Fatah militants and Hamas 
officials, tried to work out a unilateral cease-fire agreement. Also th
S
a one-ton bomb on a building in which Ha
the Gaza Strip, killing him and 14 others, including nine children. 
 
New Peace Initiatives: 2003 - 2004 
In March 2003, President Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas (b. 1935) as prime minis
did so after pressure from the Americans who were adamant that too much power was situate
with the Palestinian president. It was also a U.S. condition before they would release a new
peace proposal, initially brought forward by the Jordanians in a visit to Washington in Augus
2002. By the end of April 2003, a document entitled A Performance-Based Map to a 
Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (more commonly know as 
the Road Map)146 was released. The authors behind the document, the so-called Quartet, 
consisting of the U.S., Russia, the UN and the EU, called for a three-phased plan to achieve 
and establish a Palestinian state next to Israel by 2005. In the first phase the following was 
required: All Palestinian violence must stop, Palestinian political structures must be reformed
                                                 
144 Ibid., p. 350. 
145 Ibid., p. 353. 
146 See Israeli MFA, “A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict”, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/-
A+Performance-Based+Roadmap+to+a+Permanent+Two-Sta.htm. 
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ael must dismantle all settlement outposts built since March 2001, and there should be 
a phased Israeli withdrawal from territories re-captured in Operation Defensive Shield. In the
second stage an international peace conference was to be held and a provisional Palestinian 
state would come into being. The final stage would involve a solution to Oslo’s Final status
issues, such as Jerusalem, borders and refugees.  
On 4 June 2003, President Bush met with Prime Ministers Abbas and Sharon in Aqa
in Jordan. Following the Aqaba summit, Abbas issued a strong statement renouncing ter
calling for an end to the armed Intifada and pledging a cessation of terrorist activities agains
Israelis anywhere. Sharon, on his part, in acknowledging that there would be a Palestinian 
state, said Israel would uproot ‘illegal outposts’.147 
Like many Palestinians, Hamas strongly disliked that Palestinians should renounce 
violence at a time when Israel continued its targeted assassinations, house demolitions, 
curfews and other punitive measures against the entire Palestinian population. Maybe m
important in this respect was Israel’s construction of what they called a ‘security fence’ alon
the West Bank.148 This work started on 17 June 2003 and the Palestinians feared that the 
fence was de facto creating borders, including most of the Israeli settlem
es on the ‘Israeli side’ of the fence.149 The humanitarian situation in the occupied 
territories was dire and by mid-2000, around 20 per cent of the Palestinian population lived 
below the poverty line (at US 2.3$/day).150 Abbas’ speech after the Aqaba summit, therefo
angered most Palestinians and not only the Islamists. Hamas announced that they would not
hold any truce or cease-fire talks with Abbas and vowed to continue the Intifada. 
However, following intervention from the arrested high profile Fatah member, and 
Israeli alleged al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade leader (AMB), Marwan Barghouti, a ceasefire for 
three months was agreed to on 29 June by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the AMB. The truce, 
however, was fragile. An Israeli assassination of an Islamic Jihad leader was followed by 
Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 19 August, killing 22 Israelis, six children includ
 
147  The state of Israel operates with two different labels of legitimacy on Jewish settlements in the occupied 
Palestinian territories; those not acknowledge by the state are called ‘illegal’. Cf. Bickerton and Klausener, A 
History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 358-9. 
148 The ‘fence’ structure of this ‘Barrier’ as the UN calls it constitutes construction of up to a width of 30 meter 
consisting of fences, barbed wire, paved patrol roads, and ditches. In major Palestinian urban areas and areas 
near the Green Line, the ‘fence’ constitutes 8m high concrete wall structure and paved patrol roads. As of July 
2008, 86 per cent of the planned 725 kilometre route of the Barrier runs inside the West Bank. See UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier: Four Years 
After the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Barrier” (PDF-file), July 2008, at 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Barrier_Report_July_2008.pdf. 
149 For a good account on Israel’s construction of the ‘West Bank Barrier’ as the UN refer to it see Ray Dolphin, 
The West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine, (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 
150 Cf. Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 49. 
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Israel immediately froze security talks and its planned withdrawal from West Bank locati
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, on their part, officially announced that the truce was over two days 
later when the Israelis killed Hamas Abu Shannab. As the violence continued on both sides, 
Abbas resigned as PM on
ons. 
 6 September 2003, to be followed by his immediate supervisor 
during 
el and 
of 
 tunnels from Egypt. In 
such an
,800 people homeless. Between September 2000 and May 2004 around 1,500 
uildings were destroyed by the IDF and 15,000 Palestinians were made homeless in 
Rafah.152 Palestinian militants responded by launching rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip 
 
 Strip as well as four small Jewish settlements in the 
norther
s 
                                                
the negotiations over the Oslo Accords, Ahmed Ali Muhammed Qurei (b. 1937), 
known as a staunch ally of Arafat. Bush said that Arafat had “failed as a leader” and the 
Israelis declared that “Arafat was a complete obstacle to any reconciliation between Isra
the Palestinians”, that the government would work to “remove” this obstacle “in a manner and 
time of its choosing.”151 
The violence continued. Israel also commenced on military operations in the south 
the Gaza Strip, intended to uncover and destroy suspected smuggling
 operation in Rafah in May 2004 alone, around 300 buildings were demolished, 
making almost 3
b
against Israel, most notably targeting the southern down of Sderot.  
Then, in December 2003, Ariel Sharon started to talk of a unilateral withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip. 
 
The Unilateral Israeli ‘Disengagement Plan’: 2004 – September 2005 
By spring of 2004 it was clear that Ariel Sharon wanted to evacuate all 21 settlements and 
military installations from the Gaza
n part of the West Bank. Although completely physically withdrawing from the Gaza 
Strip, Israel would, however, remain in total control of the coastline and airspace, as well as 
continue to have control of the border crossings surrounding the Strip. Sharon, considered one 
of the main architects behind Israel’s settlement policy and a staunch advocate for ‘Greater 
Israel’, took everyone by surprise. 
The plan also met with fierce opposition, both from settlers and members of his Likud 
party, as well as from Palestinians. The PA opposed the unilateral nature of the plan as they 
feared that a non-negotiated Israeli withdrawal would distract attention from what they saw a
 
151 All quotations are from Bickerton and Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 360-61. 
152 See UNOCHA, “United Nations Rafah Humanitarian Needs Assessment, Executive Summary, 6 June 2004”, 
at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Executive_Summary_English.pdf. 
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Sharon’s plan for consolidating control of the West Bank by ‘sacrificing’ the Gaza Strip. The 
continued construction of the West Bank Barrier, the E1 plan, and other facts on the ground
all pointed in this direction, they argued. This fear increased even further following President 
Bush’s speech on 14 April 2004 in which he said: “In the light of new realities on the ground
including the already existing major Israeli population centres, it is unrealistic to expect that 
the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice line 
of 1949.”
 
, 
nd 
 
ithdrawal came following their armed 
opposit
by the 
lly 
 
they w
d 
 
 the Gaza Strip and by 
2 September, 38 years of Israeli presence in the Strip ended. The Palestinians of Gaza, led by 
Hamas, celebrated the liberation of the Strip, attributing it primarily to armed opposition 
 talks, the Oslo 
f 
The Municipal Elections: December 2004 – December 2005 
                                                
153 The PA further feared that Sharon’s disengagement plan would create greater 
instability and a power-vacuum, leaving the Gaza Strip without an effective government, a
that Sharon’s plan would effectively create more supporters for the Islamists, as Hamas and
the Islamic Jihad would be claiming that the Israeli w
ion against occupation. In short, the PA was afraid that a unilateral Israel withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip would strengthen Hamas versus Fatah. Then, on 22 March 2004, Sharon 
ordered the assassination of Sheikh Yassin to be followed by another assassination 
Sheikh’s successor al-Rantisi on 17 April. Sharon clearly did not want Hamas to take over 
after he was to leave the Gaza Strip in a year’s time. 
In reality, however, many of the measures Israel took after Sharon was elected actua
had the effect of undermining the PA and as a consequence strengthening Hamas. Arafat was
himself facing an uprising against his leadership in the Gaza Strip. Fatah affiliated 
Palestinians kidnapped four French aid workers as well as two Palestinian policemen, saying 
ould not release them unless Arafat tackled corruption in the PA. It seemed clear to 
everyone that lawlessness was increasing in the Gaza Strip in the months leading up to the 
Israeli withdrawal, as different parties, groups, families, clans and factions began to try an
strengthen their positions. There were daily demonstrations against the PA and increased
criminal and violent behaviour, including the kidnapping of several internationals. 
On 15 August 2005, Israel began to unilaterally withdraw from
1
against occupation. The failure of the peace process, whether the Madrid
Accords, the Road Map or Sharon’s unilateral disengagement policy, proved in the eyes o
many Palestinians that Hamas’ approach was the only one working. 
 
 
153 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 205. 
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On 11 November 2004, Yasser Arafat died in a Paris hospital. Never truly trusted by the 
Israelis as a man who genuinely wanted peace, Arafat had spent his last years in house-arre
in the West Bank town of Ramallah. With his death, oppor
st 
tunities for negotiations to resume 
betwee
e 
, 
. On 8 February 2005, Abbas met 
s 
s from 
ing 
e 
n 
lim Brotherhood, Hamas had by 1992 become a significant political 
threat t
atah 
Hamas won most its electoral victories in highly 
popula  
n Israel and the PA appeared to re-open, and on 9 January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas 
(Abu Mazen) won the presidential election. Abbas inherited Arafat’s two-sided problem in 
both pleasing Israel by stopping Palestinian militant attacks against Israel and, at the sam
time, not be seen as someone only doing Israel’s bidding. 
Abu Mazen was not ready to act against Hamas, fearing a civil war on his hands. 
Instead he went to Gaza in order to meet with Hamas to discuss a cease fire. At the same time
he ordered his security apparatus to deploy to the northern areas of the Gaza Strip in an 
attempt to prevent Palestinian rocket attacks against Israel
with Sharon in Sharm Al-Sheikh in Egypt where a mutual cease-fire was announced. Hama
said that Abbas’ statement was a unilateral declaration by the PA and that it was not binding 
to them, but after some talks with Abbas in Gaza, and after pressure from Egypt, Hamas 
leaders agreed to a temporary period of calm (tahdi’ya).  
 Although Hamas boycotted the presidential election in January 2005, stating that a 
presidential election under occupation could not be considered free and fair, they welcomed 
positively the announcement of municipal elections to be held in four different round
December 2004 to December 2005. Hamas had, in fact, on several occasions since the com
of the PA in 1994 asked for municipal elections, not held in the occupied territories sinc
1976. And although Hamas also boycotted the legislative elections of 1996, this did not mea
that they did not have election experience. Drawing on the experience of its mother 
organization, the Mus
o Fatah’s dominance in the occupied territories, winning a number of important 
victories in student and professional union elections. For instance, between 1995 and 2006, 
Hamas won all student elections at al-Najah and Hebron universities, as well at the Islamic 
University in Gaza.  
Overall, Hamas won around a third of the seats in the Municipal elections, with F
taking control over 121 municipalities and Hamas 81. However, these numbers only tell one 
part of the story. They do not inform us that 
ted areas. Despite Fatah having won control over most municipalities the locations of
the Hamas victories meant that “over 1,000,000 Palestinians now live in municipalities 
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governed by Hamas, compared with about 700,000 in municipalities controlled by the hitherto
dominant Palestinian movement, Fatah.”
 
o 
ating in the PLC elections. They felt confident they would 
o well. Hamas members in the West Bank were more cautious but in the end it was decided 
that Ha  Oslo 
era was  of the 
Hamas
at 
rove 
d 
ron’s disengagement plan was “a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle.”156 On 4 
une 2005, Abbas issued a decree postponing until further notice the legislative elections, 
giving as reason for the delay a dispute over reform of the election law. However, on 20 
id 
154 
Abbas had promised legislative elections to be held no later than 17 July 2005. The 
results from the municipal elections truly encouraged Hamas members in the Gaza Strip wh
became enthusiastic about particip
d
mas should participate. The explanation to do so was first and foremost that the
 dead and that therefore the legislative elections. As Izzat al-Rishiq, the head
 election committee put it: 
 
Our boycott at that time [1996] was not ideological […] It was based only on 
our own assessment of what was in the interest of our cause and our people 
and what was not. We knew the Oslo Accords were doomed and that it was 
only a matter of time before the peace process between the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel reached a dead end and collapsed.155 
 
Several Fatah leaders, however, advocated for a postponement of the planned PLC 
elections. They were nervous and feared that Fatah would not do well. Some also argued th
holding the elections prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was likely to imp
the position of Hamas. In fact, in a March 2005 poll, 75 per cent of the respondents believe
that Sha
J
August 2005, the President announced that the date for the elections would be 25 January 
2006.  
 
Increased Unrest, Hamas’ Surprise Victory, and International Boycott: M
2005 – Summer 2007 
The security and humanitarian situation in the occupied territories and Israel deteriorated 
during the second half of 2005. Following Israel’s disengagement, the Gaza Strip descended 
into internal lawlessness and anarchy. Abbas and the PA seemed unable to control the 
                                                 
154 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 147. 
155 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 212. See also Mouin Rabbani, “A Hamas Perspective on the 
Movement’s Evolving Role: An Interview with Khalid Mishal: Part II” (Mishal Interview, Part II), Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2008), p. 68. 
156 CPRS, “Poll 15, March 2005”, in Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 177. 
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different families, clans and factions who had been trying to position themselves ever since 
the months prior to the Israeli withdrawal. The situation was not much better in terms o
external fighting. Although Hamas honoured the 8 February 2005 Agreement, Isla
f 
mic Jihad 
and oth l. 
e 
 
ts had been counted up, it was clear that all polls had been 
wrong.  
 March 
 
mas’ unwillingness to recognize Israel has had a huge impact with 
ousands of Palestinian refugees dreaming of returning to their land. Second, Hamas, as a 
success ulation. 
Compa ted for 
Hamas king added 
to Ham
 
                                                
er Palestinian militants fired rockets from the northern Gaza Strip into southern Israe
Israel re-entered northern parts of the Gaza Strip, launched major helicopter rocket attacks, 
and resumed targeted assassinations. In the West Bank, Israel continued its construction of th
Barrier, expropriated land and restricted travel for the Palestinians through a dual road 
network as well as through physical barriers put in place on Palestinian roads.157 
Meanwhile, polls conducted before the 25 January 2006 parliamentary elections all 
predicted that Hamas would do well, but still indicated that Fatah would win. In one of these 
polls, for instance, Fatah was said to gain 50 per cent of the votes and Hamas 32 per cent.158
Another poll in early January 2006, narrowed the difference down, indicating that Fatah 
would obtain 39.3 per cent and Hamas’ Change and Reform list would get 31.3 per cent.159 
After Election Day, when the resul
 Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in the parliamentary elections and Fatah only 45. The
following day, Ahmed Qurei resigned together with his cabinet, saying that “it now falls to 
Hamas to form a government.”160 He did, however, at the request of President Abbas remain 
in office until Isma’il Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas Change and Reform list, on 29
2006 formed a new government.  
Several factors have been contributed to Hamas’ surprise victory, chief among them 
was the notion that the voters wanted to punish Fatah for its corruption, and as such instead 
voted Hamas, known as “a movement with clean hands.”161 Others have also pointed at other
reasons: First, Ha
th
or to the Muslim Brotherhood, is a major social provider to the Palestinian pop
red to the corruption within the Fatah dominated PA, many therefore instead vo
. Third, the failure of the peace process and Israel’s unilateral decision ma
as’ gain: 
 
157 The UN states that 475 physical barriers were in place in the West Bank in January 2006, all restricting access 
for Palestinians. See UNOCHA, “West Bank Closure Count and Analysis”, September 2006, (PDF-file), at 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Closure_count_analysis_sept06.pdf. 
158 Cf. Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 217. 
159 Ibid., p. 218. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Mahjoob Zweiri, “The Hamas victory: shifting sands or major earthquake?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, 
No. 4 (2006), p. 678. 
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Rather than deliver the Palestinians from their misery, the apparently endl
process seemed only
ess 
 to have aggravated their suffering. Hamas had predicted 
all along that Israel would not fulfil its bargain, and that it was using peace-
 
 be 
less 
id 
s 
sed 
. This economic boycott meant that the PA lost around $1 
billion 
 
 
n a 
 
n two conditions: That Hamas recognize Israel’s right to exist and 
                                                
making in order to expropriate more land. [It seemed that] Israel proved 
Hamas right when it turned against its own partners in the peace process, 
destroying the Palestinian Authority’s institutions and literally besieging 
Yassir Arafat… 162 
 
The U.S. and Israel reacted as expected. Israel, in breach of the 1994 Paris Protocol,  
immediately withheld the around $60 million a year it collects in taxes and revenues on behalf
of the PA and tightened its grip on the borders around the Gaza Strip, allowing very little 
goods to enter and nearly none to be exported.163 The Bush administration said there would
no recognition of Hamas, no dialogue and no aid to a Hamas led Palestinian Authority un
Hamas agreed to three conditions: First, Hamas had to recognize Israel. Second, it had to 
renounce violence and disarm, and thirdly, it had to accept all previous Palestinian-Israeli 
agreements. Hamas, on their part, did not intend to meet these demands. For Hamas, the 
problem was with the occupier, not with the occupied. If the U.S. truly wished to achieve 
peace, Hamas argued, they should pressure Israel to end its occupation. However, Hamas d
announce an extension of its long-term unilateral truce. This hudna was offered by Hama
prior to the elections, suggesting that Hamas would not attack Israel as long as Israel cea
its offensive against Palestinian cities. Also the Quartet joined the U.S. and Israel in their 
boycott of the new PA regime
in aid annually, money needed to pay salaries to around 150,000 PA employees 
(including 58,000 PA security forces) who were the breadwinners to approximately one third
of the Palestinian population.164 
Khaled Mish’al, the political bureau leader in Damascus, and de facto leader of 
Hamas, said in a speech soon after the elections that Hamas was committed to a partnership
with Fatah in forming a new government. Mish’al also said that Hamas would approach the 
current political situation in Palestine, including what had resulted from the Oslo process, i
spirit he called “extreme realism”165 and that Hamas would respect the commitments of its
predecessor as long as this did not conflict with the best interests of the Palestinian people. 
Fatah, initially opposed to an idea of a national unity government with Hamas, eventually 
agreed to it, however, o
 
162 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 221. 
163 See UNOCHA, “Gaza Access Reports”, (Regularly updated), at http://www.ochaopt.org/?module=-
displaysection&section_id=10&static=0&edition_id=&format=html. 
164 Cf. Zweiri, “The Hamas victory: shifting sands or major earthquake?”, p. 682. 
165 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 224. 
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 international boycott of the new government led to increased 
unrest n 
 
LP), the 
ter 
e document’s contents. Then, in June 2006, Fatah’s leadership said 
that the  
 
                                                
, that Hamas should recognize the PLO’s claim to be the sole legitimate representativ
of the Palestinian people. Hamas refused and formed a government of its own, which took 
office 29 March 2006. 
President Abbas, in a bid to undermine the Hamas government, issued a number of 
decrees stripping the new cabinet of powers. As a consequence, the Hamas-led government 
had no police force at its disposal, no government-control over the media, almost no control 
over land sales and registration, and no authority whatsoever over the frontier crossings wit
Israel. All these powers resided instead with President Abbas who, through support and 
financial backing from the international community, tried to establish a parallel government
Hamas, on their part, had to take action against the lawlessness that took place in the Gaza 
Strip. As Abbas’s police force stood by and did nearly nothing,166 Hamas announced the
formation of a special Interior Ministry Force of 3,000 men to keep the peace and maintai
law and order. Meanwhile, the
in the Palestinian society. All the PA employees, not having received a salary i
months, soon staged violent protests against government buildings and the protests soon 
escalated into armed clashes. 
In an attempt to reconcile with President Abbas and to meet the International 
community’s demands of Israeli recognition, imprisoned Hamas official ‘Abd al-Khaliq
Natsheh, together with imprisoned leading members from the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PF
Islamic Jihad, and Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, signed the National Reconciliation 
Document (also known as the ‘Prisoners Document’)  in May 2006.167 However, Hamas la
retracted its signature from the document when Abbas insisted to hold a Palestinian 
referendum based on th
y formed a new military unit, consisting of 2,500 members in the West Bank as a
response to Hamas’s 3,000-strong militia in the Gaza Strip. Fatah also trained another 3,000 
men in the Gaza Strip. 
Israel, meanwhile, had continued its firing into the Gaza Strip, allegedly to deter 
Palestinian rocket attacks fired into Israel. Then, on 9 June, Israel fired several artillery shells
at the beach of the northern Gaza Strip, killing nearly an entire Palestinian family, seven 
 
166 Cf. “Hamas’s Coup in Gaza” (PDF-file), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 05 
(June 2007), at http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=2571&type=full&servicetype-
=Attachment. 
167 See Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC), “The Full Text of the National Conciliation 
Document of the Prisoners, June 28 2006”, at http://www.jmcc.org/documents/prisoners2.htm. 
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people in total, and injuring dozens. Hamas called off its 16-months truce and vowed to
resume attacks against Israeli targets. On 24 June, Israel entered the Gaza Strip and captured 
two known Hamas members. Less than 24 hours later, Palestinian militants, among them 
members from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, killed four Israeli soldiers at Kerem 
Shalom border crossing. They also captured an IDF corporal, Gilad Shalit. It did not take long
before Israel responded. On 29 June, Israeli troops detained 87 Hamas officials, including 
both ministers and PLC members, most of them were apprehended from a hotel in th
 
 
e West 
as in 
the offices of the Prime 
inister, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 This, coupled with the increased internal infighting, lawlessness and turmoil all 
 Strip. 
p. 
d 
ry 
ere 
ore than 550 injured in the fighting in this week in June alone.170 The June 
takeover was triggered by Hamas’ belief that the Fatah partisans of the presidential Guard, 
Bank town of Ramallah. At the same time, Israel also continued targeting the border are
the Gaza Strip, as well as infrastructure and PA institutions, including 
M
pointed towards insecure days ahead for the people in the Gaza
 
The Battle of Conflict: December 2006 – June 2007 
During the second half of 2006, 103 Palestinians were killed in infighting in the Gaza Stri
The increased tension and escalating violence between Fatah and Hamas loyalists continue
in 2007, with 396 Palestinians killed in the first six months of the year compared to 124 
Palestinians killed by Israeli actions during the same period.168 As an attempt to stop the 
fighting, a Palestinian national unity government was established on 17 March 2007. This 
government, reached as a consequence of the Mecca Agreement of 8 February was, however, 
just as fragile as an early June truce between the two sides.169 In the end, a regular milita
battle for power of the Gaza Strip took place in the second week of June. On 15 June, the 
fighting ended, resulting in an overwhelming victory for Hamas. More than 115 people w
killed and m
                                                 
168 See UNOCHA, “Protection of Civilians Summary Data Tables”, at http://www.ochaopt.org-
/documents/PoC_tables_July_07.xls.  
 According to the accords in Mecca, Hamas would hold nine cabinet posts in addition to the prim169 e minister 
d, 
t 
20224/025f24b73a37ef712ad576eb84b22e84.htm
and the responsibility to name an independent interior minister. Fatah would have six seats and other parties 
would hold four. See “PA President Mahmud Abbas and Hamas Political Leader Khalid Mishal Mecca Accor
Mecca, 7 February 2007”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Spring 2007), p. 189. 
170 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Gaza-West Bank - ICRC Bulletin No. 22/2007”, a
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/2 . 
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which 
amas 
h 
nomic isolation.172 As Hamas gained control over the Gaza Strip, Israel 
tighten
li 
 
elf to 
008. Hamas 
announ
srael, 
                                                
the U.S. had helped built up and train, was in fact preparing to seize control from 
Hamas.171  
President Abbas had already on 14 June dissolved the national unity government, 
dismissing Isma’il Haniyeh from the office as prime minister, and declared a state of 
emergency, ruling both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by a presidential decree. On 15 
June, Abbas swore in a Hamas free PA government in the West Bank, led by the independent 
Salam Fayyad, and promised to hold new parliamentary elections as soon as possible. H
dismissed the presidential decree, and two rival governments in the Gaza Strip and Ramalla
emerged, both claiming constitutional legitimacy. Abbas' government won widespread 
international support and the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip still faces international, 
diplomatic, and eco
ed its grip of the border crossings and Egypt closed the pedestrian border in the south 
of the Gaza Strip.  
Hamas and others continued to fire rockets into southern Israel. According to Israe
sources, 697 rockets and 822 mortar shells were fired at Israeli towns in the period between 
Hamas’ taking control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and end of January 2008.173 On 19 
September 2007, Israel declared the Gaza Strip a hostile entity, and cut of fuel and electricity 
supplies. In February 2008, Israeli-Palestinian fighting increased, again with rockets fired into
Israeli towns and Israel firing into the Gaza Strip. Then, on 17 June 2008, a ceasefire brokered 
by Egypt was agreed between Hamas and Israel. In this tahdi’ya, Hamas committed its
stop firing rockets into Israel and Israel promised to ease the closure on the Gaza Strip. It was 
a six-month cease-fire to start 19 June 2008 and to expire 19 December 2
ced that they would “adhere to the timetable which was set by Egypt but it is Hamas's 
right to respond to any Israeli aggression before its implementation.”174 
Then, on 4 November 2008, Israeli forces killed six Hamas militants in a raid inside 
the Gaza Strip and Hamas replied with firing several rockets into Israel. According to I
 
171 Cf. Beverly Milton-Edwards, “The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and Consolidation in the Gaza 
Strip”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 8 (2008), p. 1589. For U.S. involvement in the conflict between 
Hamas and Fatah in 2006 and 2007 see also Rabbani, “Mishal Interview Part II”, pp. 70 and 73-4; David Rose 
/-“The Gaza Bombshell”, in Vanity Fair (April 2008), at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04
gaza200804?printable=true&currentPage=all. 
172 For a discussion on the legal issues regarding President Abbas’ dismissal of the Hamas government see 
o?, at Nathaniel Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, What can Abu Mazin d
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/AbuMazinUpdateJune1507.pdf. 
173 Israeli MFA, ” Statistics of Kassam rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip”, at 
om+http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Missile+fire+fr
Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm#statistics.  
news/israel-and-174 See AFP: “Israel and Hamas reach Gaza truce deal”, at http://www.indianexpress.com/
hamas-reach-gaza-truce-deal/324154/. 
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during November alone, more than 190 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel.175 
On 18 December, Hamas issued a statement declaring that it would end the six-month 
ceasefire scheduled to officially expire the next day.176 Hamas blamed Israel, saying it had not
resp
 
ected its terms, including the lifting of the blockade under which very little humanitarian 
aid was allowed into Gaza.177 Israel blamed Hamas for the rockets fired at its southern towns. 
st 
ment from F16 fighter jets and IAF fighter helicopters, 
and con t the 
d an 
 
iring 
Strip. 
61) was 
178 
Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 27 December 2008 – 21 January 2009 
Over the weekend of 27-28 December, Israel implemented Operation Cast Lead again
Hamas. The Israeli announced purpose of this military operation was to stop Hamas from 
firing rockets towards Israel and to target members and infrastructure of Hamas. The 
operation started with aerial bombard
tinued with a ground offensive on 3 January 2009. Hamas continued throughou
operation to fire rockets into Israel. 
The UN Security Council, on 28 December, issued a statement calling “for an 
immediate halt to all violence”179 and passed, on 9 January, resolution 1860, calling for “an 
immediate, durable and fully respected cease-fire leading to a full Israel withdrawal” an
end to Gaza arms smuggling.180 The resolution was passed by 14 votes to one abstention from
the United States. On 17 January, Israel declared a unilateral cease fire, stating that the 
military objectives had been achieved. The following day, Hamas said they would stop f
rockets into Israel for one week, on condition that Israel would withdraw from the Gaza 
Then, on 21 January, the same day that U.S. President Barack Obama (b. 19
                                                 
175 Cf. Robert Lustig, “Gaza: the numbers”, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/worldtonight/-
2009/01/gaza_the_numbers.html 
176 Toni O’Loughlin, The Guardian, “Hamas answers Israeli air raid with rockets as truce ends early”, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/19/israel-hamas-gaza-violence. 
177 BBC News, “Hamas declares Israel truce over”, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/-
7791100.stm. 
178 See also Head of UNRWA, Karen Abu Zaid’s, statement saying that “Hamas had observed the truce quite 
 turn - because 
would be opened, she said. The 
g truce with Gaza”, in 
strictly for almost six months, certainly for four of the six months, and that they got nothing in
there was to be kind of a deal […] If there were no rockets, the crossings 
crossings were not opened at all”, AP, “UN official says Israel responsible for breakin
Haaretz.com, at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051211.html. 
179 Reuters, “U.N. Security Council calls for an end to Gaza violence, 28 December 2008”, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE4BR0H920081228. 
180 See UN Security Council – Resolutions, “Resolution 1860 (2009)”, (PDF-file), at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/204/32/PDF/N0920432.pdf?OpenElement. 
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inaugurated, Israeli forces withdrew completely from the Gaza Strip. The cease-fire(s), 
however, remain fragile and have been breached on both sides already.181  
 According to Palestinian sources, following 22 days of Israeli bombardment from a
sea and land, 1,417 Palestinians (including 313 children and 116 women) were killed and o
5,303 injured (including 1,606 children and 828 women).
ir, 
ver 
2 and 25 January indicated that, in 45 surveyed localities 
 Gaza, 10,991 displaced households, or 71,657 people, were staying with host families due 
to the destruction of their homes.183 
 
 
 
 that 
ed to take a balanced stance to the Iraq-Kuwait issue. Meanwhile, failed 
peace p
hority 
182 According to Israeli sources, 
three Israelis civilians were killed and 183 injured since 27 December 2008 by Palestinian 
rocket and mortar fire and 11 IDF soldiers were killed and 340 wounded in the operation. An 
UN assessment conducted between 2
in
 
Retrospect: Hamas and the Peace Process from 1988 to 2009 
The history of Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a history of broken peace 
proposals and violence between Palestinians and Israelis and internally among both 
Palestinians and Israelis, and Hamas has from the very beginning been one of the major 
obstacles to a peaceful solution. As stated in Chapter One, Hamas was born as a consequence
of the first Intifada in late 1987. During the first years of the organization’s existence, Hamas 
concentrated its efforts in participating in the Intifada and as such acted as accordingly to its
founding principles by fighting against Israeli occupation. However, as shown in the first Gulf
War, Hamas also reflected signs of pragmatism already in its early years. Had Hamas only 
been an organization basing itself on fundamentalist ideology and doctrine, it is unlikely
it would have bother
roposals between the Israelis and the Palestinians seemed to vindicate increased 
support for Hamas. 
However, with the signing of the DOP and the installation of a Palestinian Aut
in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in mid-1994, Hamas found itself in a more difficult situation. 
                                                 
181 See UNOCHA, ‘‘Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 10 – 16 March 2009”, (PDF-
file), at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_03_16-
_english.pdf and Shaar Hanegev, “More than 120 rockets hit southern Israel since end of Gaza war”, American 
Friends of Magen David Adom, at http://www.afmda.org/content/newsroom/mda%20news.aspx#. 
182 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), “Press release 12 March 2009 (Ref: 36/2009)”, at 
http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR/English/2008/36-2009.html. PCHR further breaks down the Palestinians 
killed into the categories of: 65 per cent civilians, 18 per cent police officers, and 17 per cent combatants. 
183 Cf. UNOCHA, “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 30 January – 2 February 2009, 
1700 hours” (PDF-file), at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report-
_2009_02_02_english.pdf. 
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First, the mood among the Palestinian population was clearly in favour of a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict with the Israelis. As such, Hamas risked loosing its popular support. 
Second, with the creation of a Palestinian Authority, Hamas found themselves also attacked 
internally. Nevertheless, Hamas did not immediately take a rigid stance against the DOP, an
seriously debated participation in institutio
d 
ns born out of it. That Hamas in the end came out 
in favo  and 
gh 
, house demolitions, restricted access and a policy of targeted assassinations 
as well
ew’ 
r on 
er 
tions 
s reflected for Hamas a 
wish to  
Strip, during which very little goods, medical supplies, and fuel were allowed in. Despite a 
ate, 
ur of non-participation is nevertheless a testimony to flexible thinking. Flexibility
pragmatism is also detectable in Hamas’ stance towards the Wye River Agreement. Althou
opposing it as something born out of Oslo and as such justifying its stand on more ideological 
grounds, Hamas also opposed Wye River due to the dangers it represented towards its own 
existence as its threat to Palestinian unity. 
In the end Hamas did not need to worry too much with regards to its Palestinian 
constituency. The Islamist organization was saved not only by its own strategy of actively 
undermining the peace process, but also by the failure of the peace partners to live up to their 
obligations. With the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 2000, the peace process 
was clearly dead. Israeli measures, such as increased settlement and Barrier construction, 
continued curfews
 as unilateral steps to solve the conflict, all helped in bringing down any hopes of a just 
settlement. As for the Palestinian Authority, increased disagreements between ‘old’ and ‘n
Fatah cadres, and accusations of corruption and nepotism, as well as an inability to delive
its promises in the peace process surfaced, particularly following Yasser ‘Arafat’s dead in 
November 2004. 
However, these developments also opened for Hamas’ contestation for political pow
in the occupied territories from December 2004 to January 2006 and bears witnesses of a 
pragmatic organization which, nevertheless, has some red lines it does not wish to cross. 
Participation in the 2005 presidential elections was not welcomed, but the municipal elec
were, as was the PLC elections. Participation in the municipal election
 serve the Palestinian people, as well as the perceived political influence this would
gain for its organization. Non-participation in the presidential elections, on the other hand, 
was not only justified on ideological grounds – that it would mean recognition of a two-state 
solution, but was also justified by a more secular argument, which holds that to serve as 
president under occupation does not make any sense. 
The Israeli operation ‘Cast Lead’ followed 18 months of tight closure of the Gaza 
truce signed on 17 June 2008, and despite an agreement brokered by U.S. Secretary of St
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Condoleezza Rice in November 2005,184 Israel allowed very limited imports into the Gaza 
Strip and almost no exports. ‘Cast Lead’ also followed a period of increased rocket firing 
from the Gaza Strip into southern Israeli locations, which accordingly was what prompted
Israel to launch the operation. However, Israeli 
 
statistics show that the rocket firing from the 
Gaza S
eration 
killing six Hamas militants on 4 November.185 
been on
 of 
mine 
n segment of the Palestinian community against the 
other; and of the international community, many regional actors included, which 
demanded Hamas turn from militant to political organisation without giving it 
sufficient incentives to do so and only recognised the utility of Palestinian unity after 
spending years obstructing it.186 
 
, 
al and 
 process reflect a 
pragma
trip into Israel was quite low in the period of calm in second half of 2008. It was only 
in November that the numbers again increased significantly, following an IDF op
Since Hamas’ surprising victory in the elections in January 2006 the outcome has thus 
e of collective failure. As commented by the International Crisis Group: 
 
[…] by Hamas, which missed the opportunity to act as a responsible political actor;
Israel, which stuck to a shortsighted policy of isolating Gaza and seeking to under
Hamas that neither helped it nor hurt them; of the PA leadership, which refused to 
accept the consequences of the Islamists’ electoral victory, sought to undo it and ended 
up looking like the leader of o e 
 
Conclusion 
In light of the above discussion on historical events in the peace process and Hamas’ role in it
what seems clear is that Hamas is not an Islamist movement grounded only in ideologic
dogmatic beliefs. On the contrary, Hamas’ actions related to the peace
tic and flexible organization more than that of a fundamentalist one. This seems clear 
both in terms of Hamas’ notions of the peace process and through its relations with its 
counterparts, especially towards Israel and the Fatah dominated PA.  
First, in regards to its relations with Israel, this can be exemplified, for instance, when 
it comes to Yassin’s announcement in 1994 that Hamas could accept a long-term solution to 
                                                 
184 The World Bank, “The Agreement on Movement and Access of November 15, 2005” (PDF-file), at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AgreementMovementAccess.pdf. 
185 In 2008, the average monthly rockets and mortar shells fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip was following: 
January to May: 406, from 1 – 18 June: 237, 18 – 30 June: 8, July – October: 7, November: 193, December: 602. 
See Israeli MFA, “Statistics of Kassam rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip”. 
186 International Crisis Group (ICG), “New Policy Briefing, Ending the War in Gaza”, at http://www.peacengo-
.org/article.asp?ID=269. 
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the conflict by accepting a hudna. It is also true when it comes to Hamas’ use of violence 
against Israeli targets. Violence has not only been initiated due to fundamentalist beliefs tha
is the ‘right’ thing to do, but more often so because of enfolding events in a changing socio-
political environment. A retribution policy – use of violence following Israeli aggression – 
has been important in such regard. This was the cas
t it 
e following the movement’s decision to 
strike a
 
atic 
es of 
e the peace process – this does not discredit 
the arg
ly 
 
e 
t the Peace Process’. Rather, Hamas uses secular arguments for 
exampl he 
ill of 
The fighting between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip is also justified in secular terms, and 
gainst Israeli civilians after the 1994 ‘Hebron Massacre’, as well as after the Israeli 
construction of the Har Homa settlement and Israeli assassinations of Hamas leaders. Also the
use of violence before the Israeli election in 1996 can be interpreted as a proof of pragm
thinking and not just of fundamentalist reasoning. 
Even if such an argument is ‘apologetic’ in the sense that Hamas takes advantag
enfolding events to its benefit – e.g. to undermin
ument itself.  One might call such an approach cynical and misleading, but not 
fundamentalist in terms of basing one’s thinking and actions only on doctrines. Rather it 
reflects both an understanding of the socio-political environment one exists in, and an 
understanding and a willingness to adjust to it. 
Second, and equally true in terms of reflecting pragmatism over fundamentalism, is 
visible in Hamas’ relations to its Palestinian secular counterparts. Although opposing the 
PLO’s role in the peace process, Hamas also acted not to undermine and embarrass the new
installed PA in the eyes of the Israelis and the international world. That was why Hamas, for 
instance, initiated a period of relative calm during the 1996 presidential and PLC elections, 
with no suicide attacks in Israel between August 1995 and January 1996. It was also due to a
wish of national unity that Hamas initially wanted a unity government following the 2006 
elections. On the other hand, Hamas’ ‘red lines’ regarding Fatah and President Abbas’ PA ar
also quite noticeable, not least as demonstrated in the violent internal battles between Hamas 
and Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip in 2006 and 2007. It is also evident when it comes to 
Hamas’ refusal to participate in the Oslo process. However, these ‘red lines’ are not only 
justified, on Hamas’ behalf, by fundamentalist argumentation as in ‘we do not accept Israel 
and therefore we do not accep
e that it opposes Oslo due to the fact that Hamas does not acknowledge the PLO as t
sole representative of the Palestinian people. As Hamas and other organizations were not 
consulted in the process to begin with, the peace process, therefore, does not reflect the w
the entire Palestinian people. 
Further, when Oslo was deemed dead, Hamas did participate in the political realm. 
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not just religious terms, by arguing that Fatah did not respect the democratically elected 
representatives. And again, as with Hamas’ relations with Israel and the peace process, even if 
amas is ‘cynically’ relating towards the secularists – e.g. in order to enhance public support 
trine. 
 the following chapters, by analysing Hamas’ thoughts and actions regarding a future 
alestinian state, I intend to underpin my argument that Hamas reflects flexibility and 
ragmatism over fundamentalism and radicalism. 
H
– the approach itself can not be called purely fundamentalist guided by ideology and doc
If such was the case, then why argue at all, in secular terms even? 
 
In
P
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  62 
  
 
Chapter Four: Hamas’ Philosophical Thoughts on Palestinian 
Statehood 
 
The ideological origin of Hamas is clearly spelled out in Article One in the August 1988 
Charter: “[…] Islam is its system. From Islam, it reaches for its ideology, fundamental 
percepts [sic], and view of life, the world and humanity” and in Article Two of the Charter, 
Hamas is recognized as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Further, based on an 
understanding of Palestine as an Islamic trust, the only solution to liberate the land is through 
Jihad against Israel (Article Thirteen and Fifteen) in order to “raise the banner of Allah ove
every inch of Palestine” (Article Six) and establish an Islamic state in which the “Qura
187
r 
n is its 
constitution” (Article E
mas 
itic and racist language on the Jewish state of Israel, so visible in the 1988 Hamas 
Charter. Instead Ham
1948. 
The underlying purpose of this chapter is to argue that what signifies the issue of 
ight).  The major goals are, in other words, two-folded: the 
establishment of a Shari’a state on the ruins of the state of Israel. When talking about Ha
today in the Western world, it is usually these two goals, as well as Hamas’ violent tool of 
suicide operations to achieve them, which are mostly brought to mind. 
In this chapter, I intend to discuss these two major goals in Hamas’ political thinking 
and practice; the first relating to Hamas’ notions on religion and statehood, the second 
regarding its relations with Israel. First, on a more structural level: What constitutes a Shari’a 
state for Hamas? In other words, what kind of state is it and how will it look like? What 
constitutes legitimacy and authority? Further, who are the citizens in a ‘Hamas state’? What 
rights do they have, etc.? Second, by examining Hamas’ second major goal – the annihilation 
of the state of Israel, I will discuss Hamas’ relations with the Jewish state and consequently 
Hamas’ notions on the two-state solution. I will argue that in the 1990s, Hamas downplayed 
its anti-Sem
as’ rhetoric evolved into focussing on the Israeli occupation following 
the Six Day War. In this regard, the most important socio-economic contextual factor was the 
result of six days during the summer of 1967 and not the bloody events in May and June 
Palestinian statehood in the eyes of Hamas today is not what is most often perceived in the 
                                                 
187 All quotations are from the Hamas Charter, Appendix 2 in Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Prac
pp. 267 - 91. 
tice, 
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Western world – that of a strict ‘talibanian’ state established on the graveyard of Israel.18
Instead, Hamas’ notions on statehood, my argument goes, is signifying many aspects of 
Western understanding of democracy, and also of a willingness to compromise its stated goal
of the destruction of Israel. As such, Hamas accepts, albeit not un
8 
 
-conditionally, a two-state 
olution to the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
w 
ve 
pter three of his book 
amas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, from 2007.189 
 
pendent of 
 
rnment, headed by a prime minister, may also 
 
s
 
Not much has been written on the more specific structures underlining Hamas’ political 
thoughts on Palestinian statehood. Indeed, many has outlined the general political thinking of 
Hamas in terms of its wish for the establishment of an Islamic state based on Shari’a, but fe
has attempted to reveal what such a Shari’a state actually implies. I.e., what constitutes an 
Islamic state for Hamas? This is clearly a field of study that needs to be examined further. 
One who has looked at these aspects of Hamas’ political philosophy is Jeroen Gunning who, 
basing himself on extensive interviewing with Hamas members, answers some of the abo
questions. This chapter relies chiefly on his work, discussed in cha
H
A Trias Politica 
Hamas is picturing an Islamic state in Palestine with powers divided between an executive 
branch, a legislative branch and a judicial branch. The judicial branch is to be inde
the executive and legislative branches. The legislative branch consists of a shura 
(consultative) council with elected legislators. It is the responsible of this council to form the
executive branch - the government. This gove
include unelected experts and technocrats.190 
 The principal source of legislation would be Islamic Law. However, Hamas 
acknowledges that the Shari’a is mostly a general set of principles. Therefore, other legal 
systems, such as elements of Western legal traditions, as well as scientific knowledge would
need to complement the Shari’a. Then again where Islamic law is quite specific, such as in 
penal codes, the Shari’a would be the central guide. It would, however, not become law until 
                                                 
188 See for instance Daniel Pipes, “Fundamentalist Muslims Between America and Russia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
64 (1986); Denis MacEoin, “Marching for Hamas”, in  Middle East Forum, at http://www.meforum.org/-
2056/marching-for-hamas; Yair Ettinger, “Bush: Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaida are all the same”, in Haaretz.com, 
at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/983468.html; Ilan Marciano, “Bibi: Hamastan established before our 
eyes”, in YnetNews.com, at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3207079,00.html. 
189 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, pp. 55 – 94. 
190 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 57. 
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the shu hich 
te. 
gislators. 
t, and should install a pride in the 
 The 
 by 
for this by stating that in an Islamic state, freedom, equality, and justice are 
vital fa
 for 
as 
 
ne 
as head of state, which, according to Hamas, is a position women are not physically fit to 
                           
ra council have legislated the ruling. It is therefore the elected legislative branch w
has the ultimate authority on legislative issues. 
In acknowledging the nature of man and the “corrupting influence of power”,191 
Hamas proposes certain measures to keep the system in check. One measure would be to hold 
regular elections to make sure that the legislators are being held accountable to the electora
Another measure would be a moral code that Hamas wishes to establish among the le
Such a moral code would derive from religious sentimen
legislators in which they would wish to lead by example. Yet another measure is the 
expansion of political parties into a multi-party system. 
 There are two main components of decision making in Hamas’ political theory.
first is the already mentioned shura and the other is ijma’ (consensus). Shura is so important 
for Hamas that the state it advocates is sometimes referred to as a ‘shura democracy’. 
Legitimate authority has to consult the people. For Hamas, an Islamic state has to be willed
the people in order for it to be truly Islamic. If forced into being, it ceases to be Islamic. 
Hamas argues 
ctors and that if an Islamic state was to be enforced, that would contradict all three 
principles.192  
How then, does Hamas foresee that an Islamic state can be achieved? The answer to 
that is two-folded and consists of shura and through the process of education and 
socialisation, the Islamization process mentioned in earlier chapters. What is important
Hamas is that a decision is more likely to be correct if it is a product of consensus. However, 
what constitutes consensus in a community? The general interpretation within Islamic 
tradition has been that it reflects a community of religious scholars (ulema), but in that Ham
begs to differ. Instead, Hamas follows the interpretation of al-Shafi’I (767 – 820) who
advocated that by community what is meant is the community at large.193 However, as o
can not expect that the whole of the community would deal with everyday aspects of 
government; this would instead befall an elected group of legislators, the shura council. 
 Everyone would have the right to vote; Muslims, Christians, Jews and Communists, 
men and women alike. Women, and non-Muslims, would also have the right to run for 
positions in the legislative and executive offices, but a woman would not be able to function 
                      
ocratization, Vol. 16, 
for a discussion on Islam, Hamas, and the compatibility with democracy.  
191 Ibid., p. 58. 
192 Ibid., p. 60. See also Are Hovednak, “Hamas in transition: the failure of sanctions”, Dem
No. 1, pp. 63-5 
193 Ibid., p. 61. 
  65 
undertake.194 And since a head of state would have to represent everyone in the state in whic
the majority is Muslim, a head of state wo
h 
uld have to defend the Islamic nature of the state 
nd hence would need to be a Muslim.195 
 
r 
 
een 
f humanity’s purpose, which is to be God’s representatives 
n earth. As Sheikh Yassin stated: 
 
 – ust as a merchant appoints a trustee to do his business 
a different country.198 
y 
e 
 
s in 
harmony with his own nature. […] Only [through obedience to the Shari’ah] does man’s 
                                                
a
Hamas’ Double Contract 
How can one argue for free will as represented by the right of the people to select their leaders 
and at the same time advocate for an Islamization process by “creating the right conditions fo
people to voluntarily will this state”196? The latter would surely contradict the first, would it
not? For Hamas, there is no contradiction. They justify this “in the form of a dual contract: 
one between the people and their representatives (safeguarding free will), and one betw
the people and God (safeguarding divine design).”197 To better grasp this, one need to 
understand Hamas’ interpretation o
o
God has created the human being and provided him with a brain, thus 
increasing his value above that of other creatures,…so that he can be 
vicegerent [khalifah] of God on earth. God has made him a waqil [authorized 
gent] to do his work  ja
I 
 
However, being an agent would imply free will as “people who are part of this state 
can say and believe in whatever they wish; they can practice their personal beliefs in any wa
they want, socially or politically.”199 Yet, in parallel with this, and as an agent of God, man 
also has obligations to his creator. Therefore, being free means both being able to do as on
pleases and, at the same time, submit one self to God. Although possibly contradicting to 
most readers, for Hamas there is no contradiction: As God has created man, submitting one 
self to his will means “acting in accordance with one’s higher nature.”200 In this, Hamas relies
heavily on Sayyed Qutb who explained that: “He Who has created the universe […] has also 
prescribed a Shari’ah for [man’s] voluntary actions. If man follows this law, then his life i
 
194 Ibid., p. 62. 
195 Ibid., p. 62. 
196 Ibid., p. 60. 
197 Ibid., p. 63. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Yahya Musa, in Ibid., p. 64. 
200 Ibid. 
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personality, internal and external, become integrated.”201 Put differently; by being God’s 
agent man is fulfilling his destiny. As such, man is free. How then, can one juxtapose free will 
in society at large? Hamas answers this by arguing that only a state based on divine law will 
preserve freedom for the society: 
 
The human being is born free. But when human-made systems come into 
existence, in many cases these systems exploit and subjugate the human 
being. Revelation and religion [a cultural framework, not a personal and 
private belief] have come to preserve this freedom and to protect [him] against 
enslavement by human-made systems.202 
 
The tensions between free will and submission to God, and between freedom from 
enslavement and submission to the Shari’a merge together in Hamas’ dual contract; one part 
divine and one part social. The divine part of the contract is to make sure that people act in 
accordance with God’s laws. Only in a system based on God’s laws will the right balance 
between individual and communal needs, between individual and social harmony, and 
between freedom and equality be met. However, Hamas’ political theory does not end here. If 
it did, it would echo a system of theocracy, or rather of nomocracy– the rule of (divine) 
law.203 Instead, Hamas argues that a leader’s obligations are just as much directed towards the 
people as they are towards God. As everyone is an agent of God, no one has the right to 
govern over anyone else. Therefore, one can not impose a system on anyone against their own 
will. That would constitute tyranny. Instead the ruler needs consent by the ruled and it is here 
where the social contract plays it part. Basing their thinking on Hassan al- Banna, Hamas says 
that the social contract is a “temporary transferral of sovereignty from those of God’s agents 
who agree to be ruled, to those of God’s agents they consent to be ruled by.”204 In such a 
contract, the ruled remain free because they have, through their free will, agreed to be 
governed. Further, those who govern do so as representatives for the nation and have, as such, 
representative authority, and not religious authority. 
The social and divine parts of the dual contract are reliant on each other. Without a 
social contract those who govern would be nothing but despots and dictators. However, 
without a divine contract, the agreement would negate God’s sovereignty:  
 
                                                 
201 Sayyed Qutb, cited in Ibid. 
202 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in Ibid., p. 65. 
203 Ibid., p. 66. 
204 Ibid. 
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It may guarantee that the governed remain free from tyranny in the sense that 
they have elected those who govern them. But by itself, it does not guarantee 
that the government governs according to God’s laws, thus negating one 
fundamental aspect of freedom, as Hamas sees it: only in a system governed 
by God’s laws will humanity have the freedom to live in harmony with 
intended purpose, and strike the right balance between individual and 
communal needs, freedom and equality.205 
 
Sovereignty is, as such, neither entirely God’s nor solely belonging to the people. In Hamas’ 
political system, citizens have the power to elect their representatives and God has the 
sovereignty regarding moral and the principles on which legislation is based. As such, one 
could argue that Hamas’ political system is neither a democracy, nor a theocracy, but a 
combination of both. 
 
Sources for Hamas' Political Thoughts 
Hamas rely on both Islamic traditions and interpretations and on aspects of western political 
theories in their thinking of the dual contract. Originally, the Indian Islamist Mawdudi, in 
examining Sura 24:55206 developed an Islamist contractual theory. That Hamas relies on 
Mawdudi’s interpretation is a point which deserves mentioning. The classical Islamic view is 
that the legislative power should rest with religio-legal experts (mujtahidun) and not with the 
people, and for Qutb, one of the most influential figures in Hamas’ mother organization, there 
was not even need for legislature as, for him, the Shari’a was complete. These views are today 
shared by groups such as al-Qa’ida and it is noteworthy that Hamas differs from them in 
respect of authority and representation. 
 Despite the reliance on Mawdudi, Hamas also differs from him in some important 
ways. First, for Mawdudi, the notion of a vicegerent should be understood as a gift from God. 
For Hamas, to govern is not only a gift but also a right, and with rights follows obligations. 
Second, in Mawdudi’s work, the gift to rule has only been employed to Muslims. Hamas, on 
the other hand, extends the right to rule to include Christians, Jews and even atheists.207 
Third, Hamas places more trust in the common people. While agreeing with Mawdudi that 
                                                 
205 Ibid., pp. 67-8. 
206 Sura 24, Verse 55, “Allah has promised to those of you who believe and do good that He will most certainly 
make them rulers in the earth […] ”, Holy Qur’an, English trans., M.H. Shakir, (Qum: Ansariyan Publications), 
p. 341. 
207 Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 69. 
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people are easily misled, Hamas nevertheless disagrees with Mawdudi’s notion of an 
enlightened ruler “to save the common people from their own mistakes.”208 
se 
s that 
ecause:  
 
nforce 
 
 it must always operate within the 
ork of natural law.211 
 
 
ted that 
aped 
te, 
                                                
 Drawing on the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has also studied 
Western political thinking, something that becomes clear when analysing Hamas’ notion of a 
dual contract. In particular John Locke (1632-1704) is important. Locke insisted that in a 
‘natural state’ humans are “by nature, all free, equal and independent”209 and that this 
freedom can only maintain if the individual is “under no other legislative power, but that 
established, by consent.”210 However, Locke, as Hamas, argues that authority is legitimate 
only within the context of God’s law since God has given the world to man. From this follows 
that freedom is not the right for every man to do what he wants, but instead to learn to choo
the “greater good” by way of his/her reason. For Locke, as for Hamas, there are thus two 
sources for political authority, one divine and one contractual, and he tackles the inherent 
tension between these two sources in much the same manner as Hamas. Locke argue
b
[n]atural law cannot command political obligation, for lack of both political 
and specificity, it needs human agents to turn it into codified law and e
it. For this, consent is needed. Yet, because consent does not have the
y to contradict natural law,authorit
framew
 
Western political influence can also be seen in the way Hamas is interpreting Islamic
tradition and sources. The sources, the Qur’an and the hadith (the Prophet’s oral traditions) 
are for instance lacking in clarity with regards to who should be consulted, and whether the 
consultation should be binding or not. And neither is it anywhere in the sources stipula
consultation should mean national wide elections. Yet, these are issues that Hamas is 
discussing. The traditional aspect of ijtihad or scholarly interpretation has also been resh
from the understanding of responsibility and authority trusted with religious scholars to 
describe the practice of elected legislators, whose authority stems from their popular manda
and not from their religio-legal knowledge. Hamas has further re-interpreted the notion of 
ijma’ or consensus. While the traditional view on ijma’ was a process where religious scholars 
 
208 Abul A’la Mawdudi, in Ibid., p. 69. 
209 John Locke and P. Laslett, in Ibid., p. 70.  
210 Ibid. 
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turned a legal interpretation into law, Hamas holds that this is the responsibility of the elected 
would 
 
risk 
rful groups are trying to manipulate the democratic process, thereby making it a 
democr
h 
s the social contract serves to protect freedom, equality and 
ccountability, the divine contract makes sure that the law is just and that the weak is 
protect  a point of 
moral a
 
me 
corrupted. But there are various ‘security valves’. The first of these is the fear 
of God. A leader must be pious and must understand that he will be held 
 God – that, if he deviates from the just path, his destiny 
at fate should be rejected by any sane person.212 
w. 
 
nd 
                                                
shura council. 
Hamas’ Criticism of Western Democracies 
In the political thinking of Hamas, the popular will can not be left unrestrained. If so, it 
undermine freedom. To better understand what Hamas means by this let us look at its 
criticism of Western democracies as well as of its main rival on the Palestinian stage, the 
secular Fatah party. For Hamas, there are two particular threats stemming from secular 
democracies that are damaging to their concept of freedom. The first comes from powerful 
interest groups, the second from the misguided masses. Even though everyone is an agent of
God, powerful groups can easily persuade ignorant people. Further, the masses’ ability to 
rightly choose is also questioned; what if the people elect bad leaders? This is especially a 
when powe
acy only for the strong, rich and powerful. Hamas claims this is precisely what is 
happening in Western democracies and what has happened with the Fatah-led Palestinian 
Authority. 
Hamas, on the other hand, states it has diminished the threats against freedom throug
its double contract system. A
a
ed against manipulation from the strong. It does so by installing in society
nd legal reference:  
It is to be expected that the Head of Sate or the government can beco
accountable before
will be hell-fire. Th
 
Law and Legislature 
An important consequence of Hamas’ thoughts on the dual contract is visible in the process of 
legislation. Here, Hamas makes a sharp distinction between the Shari’a and codified la
Shari’a law is, for Hamas, a set of general principles and codified law is the law that has been
passed in legislature. With Hamas’ insistence on consent, God’s law is not legislated law, a
 
212 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in Ibid., p. 76. 
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therefore not legally binding. For a law to be legally binding, it has to pass through a 
legislature process among elected legislators. However, there are some exceptions to this. In 
terms of the hudud, the revealed penal laws, and to some extent family law, the Shari’a is 
quite specific. Consent, therefore, becomes of less importance. But even here, where God’s 
 to 
mic 
s look at 
n 
ociety 
n 
d of God. As Jeroen Gunning notes: “Once utility is used to justify a religious 
impera
 
ns in legal matters becomes particular plentiful. But 
cknowledging that man could be to ignorant and/or easily misled to differentiate between 
right and wrong, Hamas understands the necessity in establishing the right balance between 
                                                
law is quite clear, does consent play a part as it is still needed to legitimate the process and
ensure that the hudud is not implemented prematurely. In theory, therefore, in Hamas’ Isla
state, man has veto over God’s law.213 
 Hamas interpretation of revealed law vs. legislated law may seem to have created 
another contradiction. If consent is needed to legitimize the word of God, would that not 
compromise a secular argument? Well, not according to Hamas. As an example, let u
the religious injunction to wear hijab (headscarf) that Hamas argues for. For Hamas, wome
should wear hijab, not only because of God’s law, but also with reference to the headscarf’s 
usefulness in society. As the hijab helps the woman to more freely operate in a male-
dominated society, it is therefore beneficial to society at large, Hamas argues. For Hamas 
therefore, there is no contradiction. Although usefulness is a fundamental goal in Islam, it is 
not the primary reason for obeying hudud. And although Islamic teaching is based on 
usefulness, a Muslim’s duty is first and foremost to obey, regardless of the command being 
useful or not. Man still need to practice commands out of obedience to God, otherwise s
will forget God. Nevertheless, it still seems that this interpretation on authority is placing ma
above the wor
tive in the context of gaining a popular mandate, whether or not the argument is 
persuasive to the electorate becomes more important than whether the argument is divinely 
ordained.”214 
Where God’s revealed words are not so specific, consent and consultation becomes 
even more important. And since the Qur’an’s dealings with legal matters are rather scarce,215
man’s dealings and interpretatio
a
expertise and popular mandate. 
 
 
213 See Ibid., pp. 77-80. 
214 Ibid., p. 80.  
215 Of the around 6,000 verses in the Qur’an only around 600 concern legal matters and only 350 are considered  
to be ‘legal verses’. Ibid 
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Authority: Representative or Religio-Legal? 
The dual contract appeals to two types of authority; one represented by the people, the other 
represented by God through revelation. Representative authority derives from the notion that 
every human being is an agent of God, and as such a source of wisdom. The religio-legal 
authority derives from expertise and knowledge.216 Notwithstanding that Hamas is saying that 
authority stems from popular mandate, it also states that legislators should be familiar with the
Shari’a and work within God’s law. On the other hand, Ham
 
as differs from the traditional 
ic view which states that legislators have to be religious scholars. Hamas disagrees, 
placing f the 
people 
 
Elections bring up individuals who the people themselves want. Thus the 
 separate religion and 
 in an Islamic state one also needs a group of 
nocrats would be elected by the legislators 
and would only be able to guide the shura council who in the end would have the final say.  
                           
Islam
 representative authority above religio-legal authority by saying that the trust o
is the most important characteristic for a legislator: 
people decide who should be in the majlis al-shura [Shura Council]. It is not 
necessary that his person should be a mujtahid…Those who are elected by the 
people […] should be in this position and they should be representing the 
majority of the people.217 
 
Further, in mirroring Islamism in general, Hamas agrees that one can not
politics as the Shari’a fuses these two elements together. However, in reality, Hamas 
recognizes, “de facto, that the ‘religious’ and the political realms are different.”218 As such, 
religious authority does not imply political authority and vice versa. 
 Again, there seem to be a contradiction. One the one hand, Hamas is saying that 
representative authority is above religio-legal authority. On the other hand, one also needs to 
be trained in religious law to become a legislator, or how else could one expect the legislators 
to rule in accordance with God’s principles? Hamas does not give a clear answer on this but 
tries to tackle this discrepancy by proposing that
different experts to consult. However, these tech
 
Liberty: ‘Positive’ versus ‘Negative’ 
                      
ed Yassin, in Ibid., p. 82. 
216 Ibid., p. 81. 
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A contradiction that needs further probing is between the notions of individual freedom and 
pious behaviour by following God’s principles. On the one hand, Hamas is saying that 
freedom means that man can “say and believe in whatever they wish”219. This is what 
philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1909 – 97) called a ‘negative’ notion of liberty. On the other hand, 
Hamas s 
form 
 
 laws. 
h in 
 
ch 
r G.W.F. Hegel (1770 – 1831), who claimed that only in a state composed 
accordi wn inner 
out 
e 
                                                
 is also saying that freedom is only obtainable through obedience to God, as freedom i
to realize one’s higher destiny.220 This corresponds with what Berlin called a ‘positive’ 
of liberty, in which he argued that positive freedom has often been used to cover up abuse,
leading to the curtailment of people's negative liberties in the people’s best self-interest.221 
The inherent contradiction in Hamas’ discussion on freedom reveals itself in several 
forms. First, it is revealing in Hamas’ defence of individual rights and at the same time 
subjecting these to one version of community, that of Islam. Second, it appears in Hamas 
insisting that laws have a popular mandate, and, at the same time, that they are God’s
Third, and possibly most importantly, the contradiction is revealing in Hamas’ approac
establishing an Islamic state. On the one hand, Hamas says it would accept the decision of the
people. On the other, Hamas is continuing the Muslim Brotherhood’s socialisation approa
by educating the people into wanting an Islamic state. Here, Hamas reflects German 
philosophe
ng to a universal or divine will, will man come into “possession of their …o
universality”222 and as such become free. True freedom, therefore, to both Hamas and to 
Hegel, is “[to] know and will the universal … [and] recognize it as [one’s] own substantiate 
mind.”223 
Hamas’ belief that man can only be truly free in an Islamic state affects the 
relationship between the individual and the state. Where, in a Western notion, the state’s 
primary function is to protect its citizens, for Hamas the state’s number one priority is ab
human fulfilment of their divine destiny. As such, “the Islamic state is trying to create th
right legal and communal framework for both the individual and the community to discover 
and fulfil their divine destiny.”224 Hamas’ state is about membership and participation with 
the ‘right’ attitude installed in the people, and consultations are part of this socialisation 
process. This ‘positive’ notion of freedom colours Hamas’ thoughts on statehood when 
arguing that freedom is nevertheless guaranteed by the fact that the law is God’s law. Those 
 
219 Yahya Musa, in Ibid., p. 85.  
220 Ibid. 
221 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 122-34. 
222 G.W.F. Hegel, in Gunning, Hamas in Politics, pp. 85-6. 
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who disagree need only to be taught the truth in order for them to understand what is best for 
them. However, by insisting on consent in the establishment of an Islamic state, this notion o
‘positive’ freedom is kept in check by the ‘negative’ conception of freedom. The latter also 
informs Hamas that there should be a separate private sphere outside the Islamic state’s reac
f 
h. 
 this sphere, what you do and think are of no concern of the state, but a matter between the 
individual and God. Thus, “a Muslim drinking alcohol in his home is sinning but should be 
iety.”225 However, any public behaviour to 
ly 
state 
me the 
26 
ights of life, liberty and 
propert
d 
ut 
                                                
In
allowed to do so if he does not corrupt or harm soc
undermine the Islamic character of the state, once legislated by the electorate, is forbidden. 
 
To Establish an Islamic State in Palestine 
Getting rid of Israel will not in it self result in an Islamic state in its place. In order to actual
create an Islamic state in Palestine, the Palestinian people will have to want the creation to 
occur. However, as the people do not know what is always best for them, religious education 
is needed for the people to embrace the benefits of an Islamic society. In such a theory of 
building Hamas closely mirrors Hegel and his approach to statehood “and with it co
same types of accusations of harbouring totalitarian designs which Hegel is accused of.”2
Unlike Locke who argued for an ideal state stressing the individual r
y at its centre, and which the Western notions on liberal democracy are based on, 
Hegel and Hamas, insists that “the ideal state can not be realised without a lengthy 
preparatory process during which structures and institutions are altered so as to socialise 
people into the type of citizens the ideal state needs to function.”227 
Hamas relies here also on Mawdudi who, by looking at the first Islamic umma argue
that the prophet established an Islamic state in steps, by gradually creating practices and 
institutions which “would produce genuine Muslims capable of running an Islamic state 
according to the divine principles they had internalised.”228 Take the example of alcohol 
during Islam’s early period for instance. It was not until the people themselves realised the 
negative effect alcohol had on man and society that prohibition against it became law.229 
Preparing society into realising that an Islamic state is the right option is not only abo
educating the people through Islamization. It is also necessary to establish the right socio-
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economic conditions. Islamic ruling on theft, for instance, argues Hamas, only become
when poverty does no longer exist. Only in a society where there is no need to steal
s valid 
, will the 
prohibi
 the 
ognising the Shari’a as the right choice for governance, in it self 
eans becoming free. As God is the creator of man, his laws are also part of man, and by 
acknowledging them man fulfils himself and becomes free. However, as Hamas plays so 
ce on consultation, this process can not be forced upon the individual, or 
 elements which are 
compat f the 
te 
on-Muslims can not serve as head of state are in 
fact no le 
 
e 
                                                
tion against theft become law. Thus, only in a society “where leaders subject 
themselves to the law, children are taught the values of religion, poverty is eradicated, and
moral environment offers no causes for deviation, like wines and drugs and places for 
corruption and inciting sexual desires […] – can shari’ah law be implemented.”230 
However, as seen before, creating an Islamic state is also a process in which 
consultation plays a vital part. A group decision is better than an individual decision. For 
Hamas therefore, the Islamization process is not contradicting to notions of liberty as 
becoming socialised into rec
m
much importan
consequently upon society. 
 
Conclusion 
By examining in more detail Hamas’ political thoughts we find
ible to Western political theories. These elements are particularly the notions o
divisions of power, popular will, the social contract and representative authority. In fact, for 
Hamas, the issues of political pluralism and division pf power are not based on Western 
political philosophy, but instead reflect Islamic traditions.231   
A Shari’a state for Hamas means a state with separate judicial, executive and 
legislative powers. It also means a state in which the people decide whom to rule, and a sta
in which all citizens have the right to vote. Notwithstanding its archaic notion on women and 
capabilities, Hamas’ view that women and n
t that conservative or radical. We have yet to se, for instance, a non-Christian or fema
head of state in the United States. Also, Hamas’ argument to why non-Muslims could not 
serve as head of state is not grounded in religious discourse, but rather in a somewhat ‘logical’
fashion, whether one agrees with it or not. 
A state for Hamas further means a state which places legislative power over religio-
political power. This differs from the traditional Islamic view, somehow inherent today in th
 
230 Ibid. 
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examples of Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. This difference is also high
visible in Hamas’ insistence on representative authority over religio-legal knowle
ly 
dge, which 
also ho  
, and that individuals need to be socialised in order for them to realise 
e ‘true meaning’ and as such become truly free. On the other hand, that Hamas insists that 
 perceived 
 the Western world. 
his becomes even clearer when examining some recent documents representing Hamas’ 
olitical thinking following its political participation in the January 2006 elections. 
 
 
lds true in cases where the Shari’a is quite specific. With its emphasises on the social
contract, Hamas is also mirroring Western conceptions of democracy, including in terms of 
the people’s right to revolt against an unjust ruler – in Hamas’ thinking represented by the 
electorate’s right to regularly elect representatives through a multi-party system. 
However, there are several key differences between Hamas’ political theory and the 
notions of Western liberal and constitutional democracies. The most important difference is 
arguably the emphasis Hamas is placing on the community and the ideal state. Here Hamas’ 
draws more on Hegelian elements, for instance the ideas that freedom can only be found in a 
divinely ordained state
th
popular mandate is more important to the legislative process than religio-legal knowledge 
may be a hint that Hamas places not so much importance on religion in politics than
in
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Chapter Five: Hamas’ Political Programs on Palestinian Governan
 
Hamas’ participation in the 2004-2005 municipal and the 2006 parliamentary elections 
introduced it to the practical affairs of governance and challenged its political philosophy 
base. While the 1988 Hamas Charter is general and lacking in regards to the specifics of 
Palestinian statehood, Hamas’ participation and surprise victory in the 2006 elections brought 
forward a set of new documents that guides us on this issue. These documents are: the 
electoral political platform of Hamas of autumn 2005; Hamas’ draft proposal for a coalition 
government; and the cabinet platform presented by Hamas Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh on
27 March 2006. These documents have received little notice from Western media, pundits, 
and politicians, whom still refer to the 1988 Hamas Charter when describing the goals and 
ideological thoughts of the Islamist movement. This is unfortunate. The Hamas Charter w
issued less than a year after the foundation of the movement, a foundation that came as we 
have seen as a consequence 
ce 
 
as 
of the Intifada, “and when its [Hamas’] raison d’être was armed 
resistance to the occupation. Yet, when the 
ly, they 
y is the religious discourse downplayed. Few 
referen
a ‘Hamastan’ stipulate a more ‘democratic’ version of a Shari’a state than usually perceived, 
ut also that the documents in themselves reveals an understanding of a different socio-
political situation, and, in such respect, a commitment to change. 
                                                
election and postelection [sic] documents are 
compared with the Charter, it becomes clear that what is being promoted is a profoundly 
different organization.”232 
First, in conjunction with the above discussion on Hamas’ political philosophy, these 
documents stipulate more specifically what constitutes a state for Hamas, and second
inform us that Hamas of today has become much more pragmatic and moderate than the 
Hamas of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not onl
ces are also made in regard to the armed conflict with Israel, and where such 
references are made, the emphasis is on the occupation of Palestinian land in 1967 and not the 
creation of Israel in 1948. 
In discussing these documents, I thus intend to argue that not only does the specifics of 
b
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The Change and Reform List’s Electoral Platform 
The electoral platform of the Change and Reform list from autumn 2005 consists of 17 
articles and a section entitled ‘our essential principles’ in addition to introductory and 
concluding remarks. Hamas uses the introduction section to justify their participation in t
2006 parliament elections. The justification is basically made in reference to the difficult 
situation for the Palestinian people and, although without actually mentioning Oslo explicitly
in the introduction, the demise of the Oslo peace process justified the participation. This 
becomes cl
he 
 
earer at the end of the document where it reads that “[t]he blessed Al-Aqsa Intifada 
has cre he past 
urying 
sisted, 
truggle (3); the right of the Palestinian refugees to return (4); the 
e 
using all means, including armed struggle”234, and not on militant objectives in 
emselves. Instead the electoral platform focuses on the domestic arena and not so much on 
the Isra
govern
 
 the freedom to form political parties, resorting 
for arbitration to the ballot boxes and the peaceful alternation of power are 
ated new facts on the ground that have rendered the Oslo program a thing of t
and different parties, including the Zionist occupation, have already spoken about “b
Oslo.””233 
In ‘our essential principles’, Hamas explains the core principles forming the 
organization’s political program. As in the 1988 Charter, Islam is again listed as the 
movement’s frame of reference (1). The other main principles are; Palestine is part of the 
Arab and Islamic land and owned by the Palestinian people (2); occupation should be re
including through armed s
right to a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital (5). The last two principles guiding 
Hamas are the priority of reinforcing the Palestinian national unity (6); and the issue of 
Palestinian prisoners (7). 
 The absence of militant language in the electoral platform is striking compared to the 
‘jihadist’ rhetoric in the 1988 Charter, with only few references made in this regard. Further, 
in the only reference made to ‘armed struggle’, the emphasis is on the right to end th
occupation, “
th
eli-Palestinian conflict. The emphasis is instead on corruption and reform of 
ance: 
Political liberties, pluralism,
                                                 
233 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 293. 
234 Hroub, “A “New Hamas” Through Its New Documents”, p. 10. 
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considered the best framework for regulating Palestinian political activity and 
the guarantee for reform, combating corruption and building an advanced 
Palestinian civil society.235 
 
In terms of legislative policies, the electoral platform stresses the three-divided 
separation of powers and calls for reform of the Judicial Supreme Council in which membe
should be elected by popular support and not by partisan considerations. Hamas also pro
to work for a society with equality before the law and to provide security for all its citizens. 
 Apart from the broader pledges in regards to governance, the rest of the docume
focuses on Hamas’ programming policies, for instance on its policies regarding shelter, 
environment, women, children and youth, etc. In light of the Islamization and socialization
process, wh
rs 
mises 
nt 
 
at is interesting with the electoral document is not only its lack of militant 
nguage but also of what could be called a non-emphasis on religious rhetoric. In addition to 
the refe  of the 
docum
 
n usted with your vote in choosing 
your representative to the legislative council.[…] So, make sure you make the 
 
g 
al 
t of 
                                                
la
rences made to Islam in the introduction, the most conspicuous is at the end
ent: 
When you stand before the ballot box, remember your responsibility when 
you meet the Almighty Allah. You are e tr
right choice through which you aim to please your Lord and your Prophet 
peace be upon him […] yes, make the right choice for your happiness and the 
happiness of your people, God willing.236 
 
The only article which fully refers to Islam is article seven, ‘In the Subject of 
Admonition and Guidance’, where all five points, dealing with the efficiency of imams, 
security interference in the religious apparatus, the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and care for
mosques, refer to Islam. In article four, entitled ‘Legislative Policy and Judicial Reform’, the 
first of 13 points refers to Islamic Shari’a as the main source of legislation in a Palestinian 
state. However, the rest of the points do not mention Islam or the Shari’a, instead placin
emphasises on separation of powers and judicial reform such as revitalizing the constitution
court. In article six, ‘In Educational Policy’ only one of 19 points mentions Islam, when it is 
stated that “Islam is a comprehensive system that attends to all aspects of life” and it is 
therefore on Islam that the “philosophy of education in Palestine”237 should be based. The 
other points regarding education centres around rules of mandatory education, developmen
 
235 Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, p. 276-7. 
236 Ibid., p. 294. 
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the curricula with a focus on humanities and languages, teaching and training of teacher
pupil numbers, private schools and construction of more schools. ‘In Social Policy’ (article 
eight), two of the 16 points refers to Islamic values as a source that helps preserve “social 
norms.”
s, 
ith 
s 
 
lam e e text, 
 
ts’, ‘In 
’ 
d it is 
ion 
g 
ne of which mentions the negative 
aspects
                                                
238 This article also deals with issues, such as creating social support networks, 
women and child welfare, pensions and poverty. In article ten, entitled ‘In the Questions of 
Women, Children and the Family’, one out of eight points refer to Islam: “Shield women w
Islamic education and through making them aware of their legitimate rights and affirm the 
women’s independent personality that is based on chastity, decency and observance.”239 The 
rest of the points tackle women and children’s rights, also through the introduction of new 
regulations and programmes enhancing women’s role in society. The last article referring to 
Islam is article nine, ‘In Cultural and Media Policy’, covering issues as freedom of the pres
and the role of cultural institutions in the Palestinian society. None of its eight points refer to
Is xplicitly. However, secular critics points to an underlying Islamic meaning in th
most notably in point two: “Protect the citizens, especially growing young people, against 
corruption, Westernisation and intellectual invasion and combat cultural normalisation.”240
 The remaining 11 articles – ‘On Domestic Policy’, ‘In External Relations’, ‘In 
Administration Reform and Fighting Corruption’, ‘In Public Liberties and Citizen Righ
the Issues of Youth’, ‘In Housing Policy’, ‘In Health Policy’, ‘In Agricultural Policy’, ‘In 
Economic, Fiscal and Monetary Policy’, ‘In Questions Pertaining to Labour and Labourers
and ‘Transport and Passages’ – make hardly no mention of Islam or religion at all. As 
socializing and Islamizing the public is an important tool in the wish for Shari’a statehoo
especially revealing that none of the 19 points in article one dealing with domestic policies 
mentions Islam. Only in points two and 18 are references made to Islam, but then in relat
to the protection of “Islamic and Christian Palestinian holy cities” and in “[P]reservin
Palestinian Islamic and Christian endowments.”241 The other points tackle questions mostly 
centred on political and public liberties and national unity. Interesting is also the lack of 
Islamic references in the policies related to economy and monetary issues. Although 
introducing the article with verses from the Qur’an, o
 of usury,242 none of the 14 points explicitly mentions Islam or ‘Islamic economy’. 
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Instead, the focus is on encouraging investment by creating an investment climate and on
need to establish an economy independent of Israel. 
The Change and Reform electoral platform document informs us of a comprehensive
structured and detailed political thinking on governance. It also informs us of a dramatic 
change since Hamas’ early days in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The two most vis
characteristics from the 1988 Charter, the militant and the religious tone, as well as its anti-
Semitic and racist language against the Zionist entity of Israel, has here been replaced by a 
language which could be found in most secular electoral programs
 the 
, 
ible 
 according to 
amas scholar Khaled Hroub “closer to Fatah’s outlook than to Hamas’s founding 
principles.”244 The focus in the electoral document is not directed at the establishment of a 
, but rests instead on domestic policies, 
 for 
r 
the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people, and 
Hamas  
rms 
 
 the question of the Palestinian people’s rights for determination, free of 
occupa o 
                                                
243, and is
H
Shari’ state and the destruction of the state of Israel
reform and national unity in order to improve Palestinian living conditions. 
 
The National Unity Government Proposal 
As already discussed, Hamas participated in the elections on a ballot promising to work
Palestinian national unity. Thus, after its surprise victory Hamas set forward to share powe
within the framework of a coalition government. In this, Hamas failed.245 Fatah was never 
interested and instead hoped that Hamas would “dirty itself.”246 It refused to join in coalition 
with its Islamist rivals, claiming two main reasons for not doing so: Hamas’ refusal to 
acknowledge the PLO as 
’ refusal to acknowledge past Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Although failing to form
a unity government, an examination of the draft proposal is nevertheless interesting in te
of Hamas political thinking, also because it does not differ much from the final Hamas cabinet
platform later presented. 
The document consists of an introduction and 39 articles. The introductory remarks 
centres around
tion, and the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. In addition t
mirroring many of the issues in the electoral platform, the unity proposal document 
 
243 Cf. Flournoy, Ideological & Behavioral Metamorphoses, p. 39. 
244 Cf. “Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration”, International Crisis Group, No. 49 (January 
2006), p. i. 
245 The coalition governments formed in March 2007 was not based on Hamas’ draft proposal, but on the March 
2007 Mecca Agreement.   
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emphasises three other issues, issues who again differs greatly with Hamas as specified in its 
1988 Charter. 
Keeping in mind the international pressure on Hamas to recognize past agreem
and resolutions on 
ents 
Palestine, the first issue relates to Hamas’ relations with the international 
commu unity 
at 
e ten 
at 
compared to the 1988 Charter which reflect 
a rathe
c 
ted 
to join 
ld 
s is also repeated in the draft 
unity p s 
e 
ah’s demands to join the PLO on ideological and religious 
grounds Hamas uses democratic arguments against joining. 
                                                
nity. Article five, for instance, talks of “cooperating with the international comm
[to achieve] withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967”. In article nine, Hamas reassert th
“the government will deal with the signed agreements with high responsibility” and articl
states that “the government will deal with the international resolutions with national 
responsibility.”247 
Although these pledges were not good enough guarantees for the international 
community, they nevertheless signify a change on Hamas’ part, a change in which Hamas 
tries to balance support from international agencies and its own constituency. This again 
informs us of a pragmatic behaviour and of responsible governance on behalf of Hamas. Th
this presents a change is especially notable when 
r naïve view on international affairs. Here “international initiatives and conferences 
[…] are a waste of time, a kind of child’s play.”248 In Article 14 in the Charter, only three 
spheres central in the liberation of Palestine are identified; the Palestinian, Arab and Islami
circles.249 The International realm is thus not important in the liberation of Palestine in the 
early days of the Islamic Resistance Movement. 
The second issue relates to Hamas’ relations to Fatah, or rather to the Fatah domina
PLO. As already mentioned, one of the reasons the draft unity proposal was unsuccessful was 
Hamas’ refusal to recognize the PLO as the sole representative for the Palestinian people. 
This issue had been seriously debated since early 2005. However, Hamas was reluctant 
the PLO on the ground that it demanded that members to the PLO’s National Council shou
be proportional represented as reflected by popular vote. Thi
roposal document where article eight states that “[t]he government reiterates what ha
been agreed upon in the Cairo dialogue of March 2005 between the Palestinian factions on th
subject of the PLO, and emphasizes the need to speed up the measures required to that 
end.”250 Instead of refusing Fat
 
247 All quotations, Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
248 Hamas Charter, Article 13, ‘Initiatives, Peace Solutions, and International Conferences’, in Hroub, Hamas: 
Political Thought and Practice, p. 275. 
249 Article 14, ‘The Three Circles’, in Ibid, pp. 275-6. 
250 Hroub, “A “New Hamas” Through Its New Documents”, p. 18. 
  82 
Notwithstanding the early evolution of Hamas in which joining an outright secular 
organization as the PLO was something totally unheard of, Hamas’ willingness to here join 
the PLO informs us again of its commitment to change, pragmatism and responsible political 
articipation and governance. 
he national unity proposal, that of Hamas relations to Israel 
and the notion of a two-state solution, will be examined in Chapter Seven. 
red 
l unity 
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ong 
p
The third major issue in t
 
Hamas’ Cabinet Platform 
Arguably the most important of the new Hamas documents is the cabinet platform delive
by Prime Minister Haniyeh on 27 March 2006. Written after the collapse of the nationa
government proposal, this document is unique in that it represents Hamas alone. The m
goals in the cabinet platform, part from presenting the government agenda, was to addres
assure different audiences: to the Palestinian people Hamas reassured its willingness to 
govern, to Fatah and other rivals its commitment and wish for cooperation, 
tional community and Hamas’ Arab neighbours its commitment of responsible, 
trustworthy and moderate governance. Hamas relations with Israel and the international 
community will be dealt with in Chapter Seven. Here, I will concentrate on one of the issue
at the core of Haniyeh’s speech; that of the government political program. 
The newly elected prime minister listed seven main challenges that formed the 
government agenda. They were: resisting the occupation, installing security against the 
lawfulness and anarchy prevailing in the territories, relieve the economic hardship, refor
government
atic basis, raise the status of the Palestine question at the Arab level, and enha
relations on both a regional and international level. Much has already been said regarding 
these issues, but others were emphasised by Haniyeh and therefore deserves additional 
discussion. 
First, regarding the issue of citizenship, Hamas again r
icting a neo-Orientalist theoretical understanding of Islamist thinking when d
that “[W]e stress the need to reinforce the spirit of tolerance, cooperation, coexistence am
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the Muslims, the Christians, and the Samaritans in the framework of citizenship that does no
discriminate against any on the basis of religion or creed.”
t 
ish the Palestinian people because of its democratic 
e [Israeli] occupation, prolonged closure and siege of cities 
ave severely destroyed much of our infrastructure […] aid and support from the international 
commu
  the 
U.S. an
elp in the establishment of an 
its capital.253  
However, Haniyeh’s choice of words reflects not the rhetoric of a fundamentalist Islamist 
n criticizing, as well as appealing to, the international community, but instead 
r 
religious and the militant, are 
particu e either 
251 
Another issue that was emphasized in Haniyeh’s speech was to plead to the 
international community not to pun
choice, and to lift the boycott against the PA already in place. As long as “the surrounding 
political conditions created by th
h
nity [is badly needed].”252 
At the end of his speech, Haniyeh uses a less diplomatic tone when addressing
d its role in the conflict: 
 
The American administration, which has been preaching democracy and the 
respect of people’s choices, is called before all others to support the will and 
choice of the Palestinian people. Instead of threatening them with boycotts 
and cutting aid, it should fulfill its promises to h
independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as 
 
movement whe
certifies Hamas’ democratic and pragmatic reasoning. 
 
Conclusion 
In an analysis of these new Hamas documents, the dominant characteristic is not radicalism. 
Instead, these documents reveal pragmatism and change in the political thinking of Hamas, a 
statement all the more evident when comparing these documents with the 1988 Charte
calling for a Shari’s state and the annihilation of Israel. In this regard, the diminishing use of 
the two most influential rhetoric tools in the 1988 Charter – the 
larly striking. In terms of religious overtones, most of the Islamic references ar
structurally informed; Quranic verses and hadith sayings are common also in secular 
                                                 
251 Ibid., p. 23. Samaritans is defined as a sister group of Judaism and claim to worship the true religion of the 
Israelites, predating the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. That its group is mentioned by Hamas, and not Judaism, is 
not surprising as Samaritans reside mainly near the West Bank town of Nablus, and has done so since long 
before the Israeli occupation in 1967. 
252 Ibid, p. 24. 
253 Ibid, p. 25. 
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discour ety and 
in refer
 
ocum  i particularly the case in 
nd 
ll 
also, God willing, be displayed in building and construction and in reinforcing 
 
When resistance against Israel is pointed out, the underlining theme is always resistance 
against the occupation following the Six Day War and not resistance against the state of Israel 
itself. In other words, importance is placed on 1967 and not on 1948. Neither is the militant 
approach the only mean to resist occupation, but only one of several approaches. 
 
This becomes even clearer when examining in more detail Hamas’ relations with Israel. 
                                                
ses in the Muslim world –  or generic; describing the nature of Palestinian soci
ence to the nationalist Palestinian cause. 
In terms of militant rhetoric, the language of Hamas as revealed in these new
ents also reflect very few tendencies to radical positions. This s d
Haniyeh’s presentation of the cabinet platform, which seeks to address the future while 
referring to the resistance behaviour as something from the past: 
 
Our people have shown all creativity in their resistance to the occupation a
set an example of patience, sacrifice, and steadfastness. Their creativity wi
the democratic choice, something that, if it succeeds, will be a model to be 
followed by freedom fighters and noble people in the world.254 
 
254 Ibid. 
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Chapter Six: Hamas and a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict 
 
Israel received international condemnation for disproportional use of force during operation 
Cast Lead. Israeli commentators usually replied to such criticism by asking their critics ‘what 
else can we do’, the underlining presumption being that “the fundamental goal of Hamas is 
the elimination of the state of Israel, and the institution of an Islamic state between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean.”255 Their proof of Hamas’ goal was not only found in the 1988 
Charter of the Islamist movement, but also in Hamas’ actions against Israeli targets, 
exemplified to its most extreme by its history of suicide bombings and rocket attacks. As 
summarized by Israeli President Shimon Peres: “We left Gaza completely. All the passages 
were open […] we evacuated the settlements out of our free will, at a very high cost […] so 
why are they [Hamas] firing?”256 
This is not the place for a legal discussion over the status of the Gaza Strip after 
Israel’s disengagement, nor to speculate over the reasons behind the Israeli military operation 
– to “teach them [the Palestinian people] a lesson.”257 Instead, I intend to argue that Hamas’ 
wish for Israeli annihilation is not as adamant and one-sided as usually perceived in Israel and 
the Western world, particularly when wearing the glasses of the neo-Orientalists. I intend to 
approach this argument by examining and discussing key elements of Hamas’ behaviour on 
the Israeli-Palestinian scene; the violent, the peaceful and the political. 
 
Pragmatic Violence 
Stemming from Hamas’ notions of Palestine as an Islamic waqf (endowment), arguably the 
most notable aspect in the 1988 Charter is the emphasis on armed resistance. As Palestine is 
sacred land, it can never be bargained, divided or given away by man. Jihad against Israel, 
based on ideological grounds, thus became the feature mostly identified with the Islamist 
movement, an approach increasingly supported by the Palestinian people. This was especially 
the case in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, in the 1990s, and especially following 
                                                 
255 “Histadrut Statement on the Situation in Southern Israel and Gaza”, (PDF-file) at 
www.labourstart.org/israel/Histadrut_on_Gaza.pdf. 
256 See “Intervju med Shimon Peres – Nyheter – NRK Nett-TV” (Peres Interview), NRK broadcasting, at 
http://www1.nrk.no/nett-tv/nyheter/spill/verdi/89520, and translated (Norwegian) version “NRKs intervju med 
Shimon Peres”, miff.no, at http://www.miff.no/nyheter/2009/02/17NRKsIntervjuMedShimonPeres.htm. 
257 See Peres Interview and Per Anders Madsen, “Fredsprisvinnerens falitt”, (‘The failure of the Nobel Peace 
Price Laureate’), Aftenposten.no, 16 January 2009 at http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentatorer/-
madsen/article2870252.ece. 
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the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, things changed. For one thing, 
Hamas lost supporters to Fatah due to what seemed to be a step away from resistance and 
Intifada and towards Palestinian self-reliance. Further, the physical threat that the newly 
established Palestinian Authority security forces constituted, in addition to the Israeli 
adversary, meant that Hamas faced a tremendous challenge. As a consequence of this new 
socio-economic environment, Hamas’ goals, as well as its means to achieve them, changed 
and evolved. 
In terms of its relations with Israel this could be argued in light of Hamas’ 
confinement of its military actions against Israeli targets. First, Hamas committed itself to 
launch attacks only against Israeli targets within ‘occupied territory’, referring to British 
Mandatory Palestine. In so doing, Hamas differed with PLO’s strategies in the 1970s and 
1980s, renowned for its international airplane hijackings and not least for the terrorist attack at 
Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics. Second, Hamas refrained initially 
from targeting Israeli civilians, a principle that Hamas stuck to for seven years. According to 
Khalid Mish’al, “it was the enemy that transformed our conflict into an open battle […] when 
Israel broadened the conflict, we did as well.”258 Not until Baruch Goldstein opened fire at 
Muslim worshippers in Hebron in 1994 did Hamas target Israeli civilians. Again according to 
Mish’al, on several occasions, Hamas also suggested to Israel to “remove civilians on both 
sides as targets”259, a proposal Israel declined.260 
Hamas’ relations to its secular nationalist adversary, notably the Fatah dominated 
PLO, is another factor not ideologically grounded which is important in the understanding of 
Hamas’ use of violence against Israel. As mentioned in Chapters Four and Five, Hamas is 
concerned with Palestinian national unity, and being the lesser player on the Palestinian arena 
when the PA established itself, this issue became even more important. The much stronger 
and larger security forces of the Palestinian Authority were a physical threat to Hamas, 
especially in light of Israel’s demands that the PA strike against ‘Islamist terrorism’.  
However, the PA also faced a challenge in this regard, particularly if the peace process 
did not deliver on its promises and if the living conditions in the occupied Palestinian 
territories did not improve. Hamas, therefore, attempted to play a double role vis-à-vis the PA. 
On the one hand, as not to embarrass the PA, Hamas agreed in December 1995 not to attack 
Israeli targets inside, or from, PA controlled areas. This issue of not undermining the 
                                                 
258 Rabbani, “Mishal Interview, Part II”, pp. 63, 65 
259 Ibid., p. 63. 
260 Cf. Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 246 and note 88 at same page referring to a Martyr 
‘Izzedin al-Qassam Brigades communiqué from 17 May 1994.  
  88 
Palestinian Authority was also the underlining factor behind Hamas not claiming 
responsibility for some of its bombings in Israel, as was the case with two suicide operations 
in August and September 1997.261 On the other hand, in terms of a political power-struggle 
with Fatah, by sabotaging the peace process Hamas was also trying to undermine the PA and 
the PLO. 
Another important and parallel factor shaping its actions against Israel and the peace 
process is Hamas’ relations with the Palestinian people. At times when Palestinian public 
support in favour of the peace process was large, aversion against suicide missions was 
equally ample.262 Hamas could not ignore such sentiments among the Palestinian 
constituency. However, when the peace process stalled due to inefficiency or unwillingness 
on behalf of either Israel or the PA, or both, this “alleviated Hamas’s concerns, rendering the 
use of violence less necessary.”263 For instance, following the election of the Netanyahu 
government in June 1996 Hamas did not retort to suicide bombings until the 21 March 1997 
bombing in response to the Har Homa settlement construction. 
Also personal motivations rather than movement strategy have been behind violent 
actions against Israeli targets. The earlier mentioned suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 19 
August 2003 that resulted in the death of 22 Israelis was for example carried out in revenge of 
the Israeli assassination of an Islamic Jihad leader. Although this act of retribution was carried 
out by a Hamas member, it was not authorized by the Hamas leadership.264 Other acts of 
violence against Israel have, on the other hand, been authorized and justified by Hamas 
precisely because of Israeli actions. This was the case following Israel’s decision to allow 
construction of Har Homa. This retribution policy has by some also been contributed to the 
wave of suicide bombings in Israel in February and March 1996, conveniently corresponding 
with the Israeli election for prime minister and thought to sabotage the candidacy of Shimon 
Peres.265 Others, however, claim that these attacks were initiated and accomplished by a 
Hamas splinter cell, operating primary out of personal revenge of ‘Ayyash’s killing.266 
                                                 
261 Cf. Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp. 77-8. 
262 According to CPRS and JMCC, polls conducted in May to July 1997 indicated that a majority of the 
Palestinians supported the peace process in its early years while a majority likewise opposed Hamas’ suicide 
bombings. See Gunning, Hamas in Politics, pp. 204-5. 
263 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 77. 
264 Cf. Jeroen Gunning, “Peace with Hamas? The transforming potential of political participation”, International 
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2004), p. 242 
265 Cf. Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 75; Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the 
Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence”, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 263 – 
4; Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 249; Jensen, The Political Ideology of Hamas, pp. 22-3. 
266 Cf. Gunning, “Peace with Hamas?”, p. 242. 
  89 
A final reason behind Hamas’ attempts to sabotage the peace process that is not 
ideologically grounded is explained in the peace process itself. First, Hamas opposes that the 
PLO should be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Keeping in mind Hamas’ 
notions on shura and consensus this is not surprising. Neither should it be surprising 
considering that almost the entire PA leadership upon its establishment consisted of ‘outside’ 
members. These men had not experienced life under Israeli occupation but instead followed 
the ranks of the PLO in Amman, Beirut and Tunisia. Second, Hamas truly believes that the 
peace process, as stipulated by both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map, is not a solution for 
a just and genuine peace. For Hamas, the peace process represents an Israeli attempt of 
consolidating control of the occupied territories.267 This attempt, Hamas argues, is verified by 
Israel creating ‘facts on the ground’, most notably the continued construction of Jewish 
settlements and roads in the West Bank, the Barrier and other closure obstacles hindering 
Palestinian movement. For Hamas, by agreeing to Oslo, Yasser Arafat and the PLO sold out 
the Palestinian cause. Violence should still be an option as it is needed as a bargaining tool 
with the Israelis: 
 
If we stop military operations today, how will the [Palestinian] Authority 
exercise pressure on Israel so that it would abide by what it is required to do? 
In Cairo [in the lead-up to the 1996 elections], when the Authority asked us to 
stop military activity, we told them: okay, now you are negotiating with the 
enemy, what [leverage] will you have to force Israel to give you statehood and 
abide by its commitments…? … When you negotiate for the final settlement, 
what cards will you have? If you stop resistance, there will be no pressure on 
Israel, and Israel without pressure does not give.268 
 
Thus, Hamas use of violence against Israel is not only based on ideology and religious 
doctrine. It is more so based on an interpretation of the contextual surroundings and on 
Hamas’ relations to its own constituency, to its Palestinian secular opponents, to Israel, and to 
the outside world. This was arguably most evident immediately prior to and following 
Hamas’ participation in the 2006 parliamentary elections. The victorious outcome for Hamas 
moved the Islamist movement from a movement in opposition to a political movement in 
power. At such it would also be held accountable for the well-being of the Palestinians. 
Hamas, therefore, needed to tread more lightly in terms of its militant stance against Israel, a 
fact witnessed by the period of calm initiated in the autumn of 2004, re-endorsed in the Cairo 
                                                 
267 Rabbani, “Mishal Interview, Part II”,  pp. 69-70.  Cf. also Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 
305; Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 203. 
268 Khalid Mishal in Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 203. 
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Agreement of March 2005 and lasting until 9 June 2006 when Israeli artillery shells killed 
seven Palestinians at the beach in the northern Gaza Strip. 
 
Pragmatic Peace 
“There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by jihad.”269 Such reads the 1988 
Hamas Charter. It would therefore seem that Hamas would reject any peaceful resolution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Charter’s anti-Semitic and racist language, as well as the 
distrust of the international (Western) community it portrays, likewise indicated that Hamas 
paid tribute first and foremost to religious ideology and doctrine. And yet, during the first 
years of its existence Hamas tried to move away from placing the conflict in a religious 
discourse. Instead Hamas’ views of Israel evolved to differentiate between Judaism as a 
religion and Zionism as a political movement: 
 
The non-Zionist Jew is one who belongs to the Jewish faith […] and takes no 
part in aggressive actions against our land and our umma. The Zionist, on the 
other hand, is one who embraces the aggressive Jewish ideology and becomes 
an instrument for the realization of those ideas on our land and against our 
umma […]270 
 
Notwithstanding Hamas’ use of violence against Israeli targets discussed above, the 
Islamist organization has also, ever since its first days of existence, advocated for an ‘interim 
solution’ to the conflict. This temporary solution would be a first step towards Hamas’ goal of 
a ‘historic solution’ in which the whole land of Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Jordan River, is liberated. As early as in 1988, just months after the formation of the 
movement, Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar (b. 1945) met with Israeli Labour leader 
Shimon Peres. In this secret meeting al-Zahar proposed to Peres an outline of “Hamas’s ideas 
on an interim solution that included addressing the issue of a ceasefire.”271 The conditions 
placed by al-Zahar upon such a solution were: A withdrawal and dismantlement of Israeli 
forces and settlements from areas occupied in the Six Day War of 1967, including from East 
Jerusalem; the occupied territories would be placed under United Nations custody; the 
Palestinian people would name their own representatives for peace talks; and at a time of 
                                                 
269 Hamas Charter, Article 13, in Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, pp. 274-5.  
270 Hamas leadership interview cited in Ibid., p. 51. 
271 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Alastair Crooke, “Waving, Not Drowning: Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires 
and Islamic Movements”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004), p. 299.  
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mutual agreement, negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian representatives would 
commence. 
Over time, Hamas has repeatedly offered solutions in similar wordings. For instance, 
in January 1993, Hamas stated that it would accept a peaceful solution to the conflict with 
Israel if Israel returned to the Green Line.272 This was also echoed in Sheikh Yassin’s 
statements on the issue in the 1990s when he offered a truce to last from 10 to 50 years if 
Israel ceased its attacks on Palestinians and withdrew from the territories occupied in 1967 
and allowed free elections for Palestinians to take place.273 The elected Palestinians would 
then commence in negotiations with Israel to find a solution to the conflict. This truce, or 
hudna, could therefore allow Hamas to put aside the ‘historical solution’, and ultimately 
“allow the ‘interim solution’ to become the solution.”274 
Hamas has over the years also committed itself to another type of truce with Israel. 
Compared to the hudna which is a long-term truce, the tahdi’ya or ‘period of calm’ is more a 
temporary suspension of attacks for a short period of time. It can either be implemented 
unilaterally or in agreement with other parties. Historically these periods of calm have been 
implemented at times when Hamas was weak or under heavy scrutiny from Israel or the 
PA.275 However, they have also been employed as a consequence of reacting to Palestinian 
public opinion and in preparation for its participation in Palestinian political life. The 
unilateral ceasefire of June 2003 by the militant Palestinian factions, for instance, was seen as 
a breakthrough in the peace process and “offered a glimmer of hope for all parties involved in 
conflict resolution and security efforts in the Middle East.”276 By announcing this tahdi’ya, 
Hamas agreed to the first demand of the Road Map for peace – to cease its acts of violence 
against Israeli targets. The outcome, as already mentioned, resulted in nothing. After six 
weeks, the truce collapsed with Israel assassinating the Islamic Jihad leader followed by a 
Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem. Hamas has always maintained that a truce could only 
be short-lived unless it was followed up by Israeli measures signifying a progress towards a 
credible Palestinian state. Israel, on the other hand, seemed more satisfied with creating its 
                                                 
272 Cf. Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, p. 75. 
273 Milton-Edwards and Crooke, “Waving, Not Drowning”, p. 299. 
274 Ibid., p. 300. 
275 Cf. Haim Malka, “Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
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own way forward, a unilateralism that “paved the way for the assassinations of Shaykh Yassin 
and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi in spring 2004.”277 
Despite such setbacks, Hamas offers and commitments to both a hudna and tahdi’ya 
with Israel continued. The tahdi’ya agreement reached in Cairo in 2005 is one example. In it, 
Hamas vowed for the first time that it would participate in institutions that resulted from the 
Oslo Process. The hudna offer proclaimed by Prime Minister Haniyeh in January 2007 is 
another example.278 The Israeli and American view, however, was still that Hamas was a 
terrorist entity and therefore they did not trust the movement’s commitment to the truce: 
“Hamas had said in the past it wanted to wipe Israel from the map and there was no indication 
it had changed its position.”279 Such a viewpoint was also evident, at least implicitly, in the 
Israeli withholding of PA tax revenues and the Western boycott of Hamas following the 
January 2006 parliamentary elections. 
However, and in light of the discussion of the new Hamas documents, the 
downplaying of militant and religious discourse and the nearly absence of references to 1948, 
demonstrates that Hamas of today is first and foremost occupied with the Israeli withdrawal 
from areas occupied in 1967. Only in regards to the right of return for the refugees does the 
new Hamas documents refer to 1948 and historic Palestine. The emphasis is instead on the 
right to end the occupation. As a member of Hamas’ shura council put it: 
 
We should negotiate with Israel since that is the power that usurped our rights. 
If negotiations fail, we will call on the world to intervene. If this fails, we will 
go back to resistance. But if Israel were to agree with our internationally 
recognized rights – including the refugees’ right of return – the Shura Council 
would seriously consider recognizing Israel in the interest of world peace.280 
 
 
Pragmatic Politics 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Hamas participated and won several important locations in the 
different rounds of municipal elections held from late 2004 to late 2005. As a consequence 
                                                 
277 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Alastair Crooke, “Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process”, Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Summer 2004), p. 46. 
278 See Archives Breaking News, “Hamas offers truce deal over Palestine” at http://archives.tcm.ie/-
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279 Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev in Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas denies Meshal said group would 
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280 Sheikh Ahmad Hajj, in Graham Usher, “The New Hamas: Between Resistance and Participation”, Middle 
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Hamas also had to deal with Israeli authorities. Although not officially acknowledging such 
‘cooperation’ Hamas nevertheless dealt with the occupying force in mundane affairs. Then, 
with Haniyeh’s presentation of the cabinet platform in March 2006, Hamas took an important 
step forward in terms of its relations with Israel: “The government and relevant ministries will 
take into consideration the interests and needs of our people and the mechanisms of daily life, 
thus dictating necessary contacts with the occupation in all mundane affairs: business, trade, 
health, and labour.”281 Although stopping short of actual official recognition, what this 
signifies is a de facto recognition of the existence of the state of Israel: “Israel is there, it is 
part of the United Nations and we do not deny its existence. But we still have rights and land 
there which have been usurped and until these matters are dealt with we will withhold our 
recognition.”282 
Another practical concession in Hamas’ dealing with Israel was its agreement to allow 
President Abbas conduct negotiations with Israel. Abbas is one of the chief architects and 
supporter of the Oslo Accords and thus fully endorses the two-state solution. He also 
renounces violence and accepts past agreements. That Hamas allows Abbas to represent the 
Hamas-led government in direct peace talks with Israel, bringing such sentiments on the 
negotiating table, means in practical terms that Hamas’ views reflect the same opinions. Such 
a concession becomes even clearer when looking at Haniyeh’s presentation of the cabinet 
platform in which he explicitly promises to deal with the signed agreements on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.283 Other practical indications of concessions in Hamas’ relations with 
Israel are; the Hamas cabinet platform’s endorsement of the 2002 Arab League summit, 
which called for Arab normalization with Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 
Green Line; Hamas’ agreement to the ‘Prisoners Document’ in May and June 2006; and 
Hamas’ participation in the national unity government of March 2007, which was formed on 
the basis of respecting past agreements between the PLO and Israel. 
These concessions all point towards an understanding of a changing and evolving 
Hamas, an organization distancing itself from the content of the original 1988 Charter. 
However, the fact remains that also a plentiful of contradicting statements are being uttered. 
Following a Reuter interview with Khaled Mish’al, for instance, in which Hamas’ top leader 
was quoted saying that Hamas would consider recognizing Israel once a Palestinian state was 
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established284, other Hamas leaders were quick to reply that Hamas would never recognize 
Israel. As stated by Premier Haniyeh:  “we [the Hamas-led government] accept a Palestinian 
state on the lands occupied in 1967, but in return for a long-term truce and not 
recognition.”285 This is therefore often interpreted by Israeli and Western commentators
proof of a “cynical attempt by Islamist leaders to deflect military and political pressure or, 
worse, as a deliberate deception to pursue conflict against Israel by other means.”
 as a 
ate of Israel. 
                                                
286 Israelis, 
in particular, feel that Hamas will never give up its objective as presented in the 1988 Hamas 
Charter – the destruction of the st
According to Israel and the West, the fact that Hamas has never officially recognized 
the Jewish state, therefore, remains the major obstacle towards a resolution of the current 
stalemate. Some commentators have pointed at the Palestinian constituency in explaining this 
stance. As long as the occupation continues, with its restriction of movement, its policy of 
detentions and arrests, assassinations and house demolitions, “few Palestinian leaders are able 
to speak the language of reconciliation with Israel.”287 But as a political player with increased 
power in the occupied Palestinian territories, and in tandem with an understanding of its 
commitment to the Palestinian people, “Hamas needs to keep its rhetoric high and loud, 
refraining from any blunt offer of recognition of Israel, in order to compensate for the slow, 
daily ‘undoing’ of its military struggle. If Hamas gives in on both rhetorical and practical 
fronts, it will lose out in the eyes of its supporters.”288 
 
Conclusion 
By examining Hamas’ relations with Israel through its different approaches of practical 
behaviour - the violent, the peaceful and the political – I have argued that Hamas is a 
pragmatic movement willing to and capable of change, and not only a movement basing its 
thoughts and actions on religious fundamentalist ideology and doctrine. Its use of violence, 
 
284 Reuters, “Reuters Q & A interview with Khaled Meshal”, in Haaretz.com, at http://www.haaretz.com/-
hasen/spages/812079.html. 
285 Reuters, “Palestinian PM says U.S. aims to topple his govt,” at http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/-
L21669738.htm. 
286 Alastair Crooke, “From Rebel Movement to Political Party: The Case of the Islamic Resistance Movement”, 
Conflicts Forum, Briefing paper #3, p. 7. 
287 Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas”, p. 579.  
288 Khaled Hroub, “Hamas path to reinvention”, Open Democracy, 2006, at http://www.opendemocracy.net/-
conflict-middle_east_politics/hamas_3982.jsp. See also Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, 
“The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists”, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2003), pp. 171 — 184, especially p. 178 summing up Palestinian ‘hatred 
towards Israelis’. 
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for instance, exemplified to its most extreme by the suicide bombings, is thus more a tactical 
mean and not a strategy in it self, which was also stated by Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar: 
 
We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we 
can fulfil our goals without violence, we will do so….We will never recognize 
Israel but it might be possible that a truce (muhadana) [hudna] would prevail 
between us for days, months or years.289 
 
This is an important observation as tactics more easily implies pragmatism and change, and 
not rigid interpretation guided only by religious doctrine.290 
Also in terms of Hamas’ more peaceful and political ‘tactics’ this holds true. In fact, 
what the hudna offer actually signifies, part from its duration factor, is a two-state solution, 
not far from the solutions proposed in the Oslo Accords and the U.S. led Road Map. Even the 
time frame is arguably indefinite “as the possibility for continual renewal and/or decisive 
action by future generations are explicitly provided as available options.”291 By announcing a 
willingness to accept a temporary solution based on the 1967 borders, even if only as a first 
step in the liberation of British Mandatory Palestine, Hamas demonstrates a pragmatism and 
flexibility not common among fundamentalists. By employing the concept of hudna, a 
concept stemming from early Islamic history, Hamas has therefore moved from a rigid 
position based on ideology. Also Hamas’ preparedness to participate in tactical ceasefires, 
such as the latest tahdi’ya between Israel and Hamas agreed upon on 18 June 2008 and the 
unilateral ceasefire of 18 January 2009, as well as its willingness to let the PA president 
negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinian people and its government, also bears 
witness of a movement highly influenced by its contextual surroundings and of a willingness 
to change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas”, p. 577. 
290 Cf. A. Strindberg, “Challenging the “Received View”: De-demonizing Hamas”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, Vol. 25 (2002), p. 268. 
291 Flournoy Swiney, Ideological & Behavioral Metamorphoses, p. 62. 
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Conclusion: Pragmatism over Fundamentalism 
 
I have argued here that Hamas’ two most commonly known characteristics – that of an 
Islamist organization wanting to establish a Shari’a state on the graveyard of the Jewish state 
of Israel – are not so clear cut as often perceived. Instead, and notwithstanding recognition of 
Hamas’ violent and terrorist activities, my main argument insists that Hamas today is a 
pragmatic movement. As such, Hamas is both willing and capable of reform of its original 
goals as stated in the 1988 Hamas Charter, and its thoughts and actions are more guided by an 
understanding of the socio-political contextual society in which it lives than by religious 
discourse guided by ideological doctrine. 
 
Hamas’ foundation was a breakaway from the ideological reasoning of its mother 
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, who preached Islamization and socialization of the 
Palestinian people and of the Arab world in general. This ‘bottom-up’ approach would in the 
end lead to Palestinian salvation. However, socio-political realities – such as the formation of 
Fatah and the PLO, the Six Day War and the subsequent Israeli occupation, the formation of 
Islamic Jihad, and not least the outbreak of the Intifada – resulted in an alteration of the 
ideological approach of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, and although 
overlapping each other, with ‘alteration’ I mean change more in terms of transformation than 
in terms of a new strategy. Notwithstanding the formation of Hamas and its armed resistance 
approach against Israel, Hamas nevertheless continued in tandem with its socialization 
approach. Had it not continued this work of religious education, social networks and charity, 
it is highly unlikely that Hamas would have managed to establish such a formidable political 
power base in the occupied Palestinian territories, and that it would have succeeded in 
winning the 2006 parliamentary elections. That Hamas is a pragmatic movement should 
therefore not come as a surprise. It was after all born out of pragmatism, merging thoughts 
from both the gradualist and the radical factions in the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 
Hamas’ pragmatism and willingness to change from its original goals as stated in the 
1998 Hamas Charter becomes clear when examining what constitutes statehood for this 
Islamist organization. First, by discussing its political philosophy on future Palestinian 
statehood, I have argued that Hamas’ thoughts does not reveal such fundamentalist and 
radical views as often perceived in the Western discourse, but rather a political thinking which 
in several ways reflect Western notions of democracy. It is a state with divisions of power, 
and with the judicial branch independent from the executive and legislative branches. And 
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although the principal source of legislation is Islamic Law, Hamas nevertheless acknowledges 
that the Shari’a is mostly a set of general principles and that other legal systems need to 
supplement it. And even where the Shari’a is quite specific, as with the penal laws, the 
legislative council would still have the final say in a ruling. 
In Hamas’ notions of decision making, however, we encounter what seems to be a 
contradiction with democracy. How can one justify free will in society and at the same time 
advocate the need for an Islamic educational approach to ‘teach’ the public into voluntarily 
wanting a specific type of state? As we have seen, for Hamas there was no contradiction, 
justified in the Islamist movement’s thoughts on a dual contract – one divine, the other social. 
As man is God’s creation, abiding by his will means acting in accordance with one’s true self. 
From a Western democratic perspective, this does not abide well, even though the ruler needs 
consent by the ruled. On the other hand, the social contract hold the divine contract in check, 
and as such, Hamas’ notions on political system differs from that of, say, the Taliban or Saudi 
Arabia. 
This becomes even clearer when considering Hamas’ emphasis on consensus and the 
people. Whereas the classic Islamic view is that legislative power should rest with religio-
political experts, a thought held among others by al-Qa’ida, Hamas insists rather that this is 
the responsibility of an elected council. The emphasis on consensus is also vital in Hamas’ 
views on law, legislature and authority. In terms of authority, Hamas again differs with the 
traditional Islamic view which holds that legislators should be religious scholars. One could 
therefore say that, in practice in Hamas’ political system, man has veto over God’s law. 
Second, by examining new important Hamas documents and the movement’s relations 
with Israel and the peace process, I find that Hamas is first and foremost engaged with the 
Israeli occupation following the Six Day War in 1967. The absence, downplaying and 
development of both militant and religious discourse in recent Hamas documents and 
statements inform us more of Hamas’ right to resist the 1967 occupation and not of an 
immediate wish to destroy the Jewish state of 1948. Acknowledging a both legal and moral 
discussion on Hamas’ use of violence against Israeli civilians, that Palestinians should resist 
the Israeli occupation, an occupation that has now lasted for more than four decades, is in my 
opinion not behaviour of radicalism. Instead it reflects international humanitarian law and UN 
resolutions. And again, even if Hamas’ wish for an ‘interim’ solution is just that – i.e. a 
temporary solution accepted now due to an understanding of present-day realities and as such 
just a pause before the ‘historical’ solution should be achieved – such reasoning is 
nevertheless informed by pragmatism, and not fundamentalism. 
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 In this regard, one should also not forget that Israel’s accepted Palestinian partners for 
peace, President Abbas and the Fatah dominated PLO, originally also called for the 
destruction of the Jewish state. As Hamas’ Charter of 1988, also the 1968 edition of the PLO 
Charter read: “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.”292 And, as with Hamas’ 
electoral programme before the 2006 PLC elections, PLO’s position developed in the 1970s 
into a “struggle by every means”293 although not abandoned entirely until the late 1980s and 
not officially repelled from the Palestinian National Charter until 1998, way into the Oslo 
peace process and five years after Israel recognized the PLO. To state that Hamas would not 
be able to do the same, argued simply based on a neo-Orientalist understanding of the Islamist 
organization as a fundamentalist and radical entity basing itself on religious doctrine 
incapable of change is, in my opinion, a simplistic, unfortunate and wrong argument. 
For the neo-Orientalists, pragmatism and Islamism, or rather ‘radical’ or ‘militant’ 
Islam, does not fit well together. They would probably also describe my argumentation as 
‘Islamist apologetic’. If so, I both apologize and disagree. It has not been my intention here, in 
any way, to ‘apologize’ Hamas’ actions. Instead, I have tried to explain these acts, and to 
explain is, of course, not the same as to apologize. And if I, in this explanatory quest, have 
come to the conclusion that these acts of violent and deliberate terror tactics, are also 
informed by pragmatism, that is not the same as to ‘apologize’ for them. This holds true even 
if Hamas’ statements that it only targeted Israeli civilians after an Israeli settler butchered 29 
Muslims in Hebron in 1994, or that many of its suicide operations came as a result of 
retribution of Israeli acts, is in fact cynical ploys used to achieve its goals. That might be, and, 
at lest in terms of undermining the peace process, probably also was. However, such ‘cynical 
ploys’ depict pragmatism, and not fundamentalism grounded on religious ideology and 
doctrine as a neo-Orientalist is more likely to argue. 
Hamas’ jihad tool is thus used not only based on religious ideology and doctrine, but 
rather as a consequence of Hamas’ understanding of different socio-political realities. Here, 
Hamas’ relations to both the Palestinian secularist nationalists and the Palestinian 
constituency are important factors. So is an understanding of Hamas’ use of violence as 
retaliation against Israeli aggression and as a consequence of the peace process in itself, a 
process deemed unjust and unfair. Also Hamas’ proposals of a hudna and its commitment to 
tahdi’ya signify that Hamas is not only led by ideological beliefs. 
                                                 
292 Jensen, The Political Ideology of Hamas, p. 148. 
293 Ibid. 
  99 
Hamas has, since its early days of existence, proposed a truce with Israel on the 
condition that Israel withdraws to the Green Line. Over the years Hamas has also, both 
unilaterally or in agreement with Israel and others, announced and stuck to ceasefires. The 
Hamas hudna offers and the agreement and implementation of several tahdi’ya thus inform us 
of pragmatism and an understanding of its contextual surroundings. This is exemplified 
maybe even more so when examining Hamas after its participation in the political process 
and, especially so following its victory in the 2006 elections. By officially working with Israel 
in mundane affairs, by allowing President Abbas to negotiate with Israel and by repeated 
promises to respect former Israeli-Palestinian agreements, Hamas is clearly indicating a 
change to its rhetoric of the 1988 Charter. 
 
Lastly, the outcome of the above portrays an Islamist organization not bound by religious 
doctrine and ideology but instead reveals an Islamist organization and political player 
advocating Shari’a statehood with a democratic twist and a willingness to compromise its 
beliefs into a possible recognition of the state of Israel: “[T]he provisions in its charter 
[calling] for the destruction of Israel are not indelible.”294 Israel has so far refused to accept 
such reasoning on the grounds that Hamas is not sincere and that the Islamist organization’s 
statements on truce and possible recognition are cynical and tactical ploys that will be 
abandoned at Hamas’ own time of choosing. This is unfortunate. A truce between enemies 
will always be a risk. That one of the sides in the conflict is a religious (Islamist) organization 
is not a sufficient argument against reconciliation. Especially not, and which is the case here, 
when the movement in question signifies pragmatic realpolitik dressed in secular rather than 
religious discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
294 Abu Marzouq, in Flournoy Swiney, Ideological & Behavioral Metamorphoses, p. 88. 
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